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Introduction: Foresight in 
International Development
Gioel Gioacchino and James Sumberg
Abstract This article introduces this special issue of the IDS Bulletin on 
Foresight in International Development. It argues that foresight should be 
at the centre of development studies, and suggests two reasons why this 
is not the case. The four-year Institute of Development Studies research 
stream on foresight in policy-oriented research is introduced, as are the 
articles that make up this issue of the IDS Bulletin.
Keywords: futures, participation, methods.
1 Introduction
Foresight encompasses a wide range of  methods and approaches that 
help individuals and groups to think about and prepare for different 
possible futures. Systematic approaches to foresight originated in 
the private sector, where the interest was in developing strategy, 
understanding implications of  present and future trends and events, 
facilitating better decision-making and improving risk management 
(Conway 2008). Governments and public sector bodies subsequently 
embraced foresight with similar objectives.
Looking to the future is – or certainly should be – at the core of  
development studies. While the benefit of  ‘looking back to look forward’ 
is well recognised, foresight is more akin to ‘looking forward to look 
forward’. It is striking that foresight approaches and methods do not 
figure prominently in policy-oriented development research (Bingley 
2014). Why might this be so? We suggest two possible explanations. 
First, most social science disciplines are more comfortable with the 
analysis of  the past and the present than the future. Second, the model 
of  the large, well-funded public sector foresight programme simply does 
not reflect the realities of  much policy-oriented development research.
A principle concern of  this IDS Bulletin is whether foresight approaches 
and methods can be usefully integrated into small-scale, exploratory 
research of  relevance to the international development community.
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Chaturvedi, A.; Vijayalakshmi, K. and Nijhawan, S. (2015) Scenarios of Waste and Resource Management: For Cities 
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http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/5789/ER114_ScenariosofWasteandResource 
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Wilson, E. (2015) ‘Managing the Emerging Waste Crisis in Developing Countries’ Large Cities’, IDS Policy Briefing 86, 
Publisher: IDS, Output ID: 543 – see more at: http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/5786/
PB86_AGID543_WasteCrisis_Online2.pdf;jsessionid=F99366F98188F231E4ED224FEA735820?sequence=1
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Table 1 Outputs of IDS foresight work, 2012–16 (cont.)
Glover, D. and Sexton, A. (2015) Edible Insects and the Future of Food: A Foresight Scenario Exercise on Entomophagy and 
Global Food Security, IDS Evidence Report 149, Publisher: IDS, Output ID: 261 – see more at:  
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/7063/ER149_EdibleInsectsandtheFutureofFood.
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Publisher: IDS, Output ID: 260 – see more at: http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/7168/
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Gupte, J. with Commins, S. (2016) Cities, Violence and Order: The Challenges and Complex Taxonomy of Security Provision in 
Cities of Tomorrow, IDS Evidence Report 175, Publisher: IDS, Output ID: 575 – see more at:  
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ForesightMethodsAGuidetoEasilyAccessibleToolkits.pdf;jsessionid=AE11DA3D615A868D31704073FDB04508?sequence=1 
Source Authors’ own.
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2 Low-budget foresight
Between 2012 and 2016, with support from the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), researchers at the Institute of  
Development Studies (IDS) and their partners undertook a number 
of  small-scale, policy-oriented projects using foresight approaches and 
methods. Most of  these projects were completed for around £50,000 
each – a far cry from the multi-million pound budgets associated with 
many public sector foresight activities. Topics were identified through 
a competitive process, and were meant to address new and emergent 
trends and policy issues that have the potential to impact significantly on 
development processes and outcomes. The project teams benefited from 
some limited input by a foresight specialist (Alun Rhydderch), and the 
expectation was that the projects would be completed within 12 months. 
Each project resulted in a published report and policy brief.
The topics addressed by these studies included: the rise of  non-
communicable disease; the meaning of  resilience in rapidly urbanising 
contexts; drivers of  investment in alternative energy; urban waste; 
the potential of  insects as food; big data as a development resource; 
implications of  knowledge sharing for development; the future of  social 
protection; and security provision in the cities of  tomorrow. Table 1 
provides a listing of  the published outputs from this stream of  work.
In October 2015 a one-day conference on ‘Foresight and International 
Development’ was held at IDS (Gioacchino 2016). The conference 
brought together 30 academics, development practitioners and foresight 
experts to explore a number of  questions including: What is foresight 
in the context of  international development? What kind of  foresight 
is useful? Should the use of  foresight be more widely promoted in 
international development? The presentation and discussion highlighted 
some challenges associated with small-scale foresight studies.
3 This IDS Bulletin
This issue of  the IDS Bulletin focuses on the role of  foresight in policy-
oriented international development research. It draws directly on the 
work and the conference described above and seeks to draw attention 
to the opportunities and challenges associated with a range of  foresight 
approaches and methods.
Kate Bingley (this IDS Bulletin) and Alun Rhydderch (this IDS Bulletin) 
set the stage by introducing the field of  foresight, reviewing its use in 
international development, highlighting some potential limitations 
of  the dominant foresight model in developing country contexts, and 
identifying key aspects of  alternative models. Both authors argue that 
widening participation and engagement in foresight beyond experts and 
policymakers is of  critical importance.
Marie de Lattre-Gasquet and Sébastien Treyer (this IDS Bulletin) compare 
and contrast the Agrimonde and Agrimonde-Terra foresight studies 
undertaken by the French Agricultural Research Centre for International 
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Development (CIRAD) and the National Institute for Agricultural 
Research (INRA). Focused on food security and land use respectively, 
these studies were relatively long term and well resourced, and in these 
respects they reflected some well-established approaches to public sector 
foresight. Three key lessons emerge from the comparison. First, the 
design of  foresight processes and the selection of  methods depend on 
the objectives and desired changes. Second, foresight exercises take place 
on a sea of  expectations, which can lead to both creativity but also to 
vulnerability, and which must certainly be managed. Finally, much more 
attention must be devoted to understanding the strategies of  different 
actors, and the power relations amongst actors.
Robin Bourgeois (this IDS Bulletin) also takes a futures perspective on 
food security, but in this case through an analysis of  briefs produced by 
the authors of  38 recent foresight studies. From this analysis Bourgeois 
argues that policy, cultural values and individual and collective 
behaviours have the potential to disrupt patterns of  food insecurity 
observed today. Shifts in framing – food security to food insecurity, 
and from technology to people, institutions and society – and more 
attention to local specificities will allow foresight studies to be more 
relevant to the transformative agenda that is integral to the Sustainable 
Development Goals.
Three articles draw on the IDS experience with low-budget foresight 
studies. Ashish Chaturvedi and Jai Kumar Gaurav (this IDS Bulletin) 
describe the use of  an analytical framework that combines foresight 
and political economy methods to explore the future of  urban waste 
management in India. They argue that this process has opened up 
deliberations beyond the usual expert committees, and has the potential 
to help open up and democratise the policymaking process of  waste 
management in India, particularly through the inclusion of  the informal 
sector. Stephen Devereux, Keetie Roelen and Martina Ulrichs (this 
IDS Bulletin) use a foresight approach to explore the possible futures for 
social protection following its rapid ascendency up the development 
agenda. A ‘wind-tunnelling’ exercise highlights the importance of  a 
country’s political regime as a fundamental determinant of  its approach 
to social protection policy. They conclude that a better understanding 
of  political processes is needed to protect the gains made in social 
protection systems against possible reversals when the political climate 
shifts against pro-poor redistributive policies. Jaideep Gupte and 
Stephen Commins (this IDS Bulletin) ask ‘How will security in cities be 
understood in the future’? Working with a number of  foresight tools 
including the social, technological, economic, environmental and 
political (STEEP) framework their process developed two contrasting 
scenarios: ‘coastal collapse’ and ‘post-capital commons’. A particularly 
important conclusion is that misconceived urban planning, policy and 
design are likely to create insecurity, not reduce it. In this sense there is a 
critical gap in the understanding of  the lessons that the safest cities can 
provide in terms of  systems thinking.
6 | Gioacchino and Sumberg Introduction: Foresight in International Development
Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’
Finally, on a methodological note, Dominic Glover, Kevin Hernandez 
and Alun Rhydderch (this IDS Bulletin) describe how they adapted 
existing foresight scenario methods to investigate possible trade-offs, 
tensions and synergies amongst the international development goals 
of  reducing inequalities, accelerating sustainability, and building 
secure and inclusive societies. They find that the trilemma triangle is 
particularly successful in forcing participants to confront the possibility 
of  trade-offs and tensions, and as such helps expose some of  the 
difficulties and challenges which might be faced in international 
development in the coming decades.
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Foresight and International 
Development*
Kate Bingley
Abstract This article provides an overview of the use of foresight‑type 
approaches and techniques in policy‑related work in international 
development. It draws primarily on published and grey literatures, as well 
as select interviews with foresight practitioners. It begins with a brief 
introduction to the approaches and tools used in the field of strategic 
foresight, and then a broad mapping of the foresight landscape as relevant 
to international development. It provides reflections on the evidence of use 
and impact of foresight initiatives, and makes suggestions around future 
directions for foresight in international development.
Keywords: Development, evaluation, foresight, futures, international, 
scenarios.
1 Introduction
In general terms, foresight is about understanding the future systematically, 
usually considering a horizon of  at least ten years into the future (Kuosa 
2011: 9). Slaughter (1995: 48, in Kuosa 2011) defines foresight as a process 
that attempts to broaden the boundaries of  perception in four ways: by 
assessing the implications of  present actions and decisions; by detecting and 
avoiding problems before they occur; by considering the present implications 
of  possible future events; and by envisioning aspects of  desired futures.
Numerous foresight techniques are available for different, specific 
purposes (EEA 2011b: 16). One principal distinction is made between 
quantitative studies that rely heavily on modelling methods, and are 
commonly used in fields of  study such as macroeconomics, energy 
and climate change; and qualitative approaches, which provide a 
narrative description of  futures issues, paths and uncertainties, and that 
have been applied in many sectors ranging from technology foresight 
to environment and politics (EEA 2011a: 9). Each approach has its 
advantages and limitations, and in practice, quantitative modelling and 
qualitative methods are increasingly used in combination.
Another principal distinction is made between horizon-scanning (or 
environment-scanning) approaches, which may involve scanning various 
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sources (including non-traditional literature such as newspapers and 
blogs) for information on emerging trends; model-based projections 
that can provide an understanding of  causal relationships; and broader 
scenario-planning approaches. In their course on foresight, Loveridge, 
Keenan and Saritas (2010) foreground methods such as Delphi (a large-
scale survey tool) and technology roadmapping, in addition to scenarios 
and horizon-scanning approaches.
Valuable sources of  information on specific foresight techniques and 
tools include the UK Horizon Scanning Programme Team’s Futures 
Toolkit (Cabinet Office and Government Office for Science 2014), 
and the Futures Research Methodology compendium produced by 
the Millennium Project,1 the latest edition comprising 39 chapters with 
detailed information on a wide range of  foresight methods (Glenn and 
Gordon n.d.). Both sources detail techniques and tools most commonly 
associated with the general field of  foresight. Loveridge and Cox (2013) 
produced a guide entitled Innovation for Development: Knowledge and 
Research Application to Address International Development Goals: A Toolkit, 
intended for use by planners, policymakers, decision-makers and other 
relevant bodies in government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and the private sector. The notion of  ‘toolkit’ is slightly misleading, 
as the publication does not focus on methods or tools; however, it 
recognises technology and innovation as a major force on human 
development and vice versa, and does provide readers with a good 
introduction to technology foresight more broadly.
Foresight methods are evolving, and being adapted to different contexts. 
The Millennium Project has developed various tools, including the 
Real-Time Delphi and the State of  the Future Index (SOFI). The 
SOFI is a quantitative time series that indicates the changing state of  
the future and shows whether conditions promise to get better or worse. 
The Millennium Project regularly publishes global and regional studies 
such as the 2013–14 State of  the Future, a global report based on the 
SOFI (Glenn, Gordon and Florescu 2014). National-level State of  the 
Future reports have also been produced, but the SOFI is currently only 
applied in a selection of  developed countries.
One aspect of  foresight which has particular relevance to international 
development is the nature of  stakeholder participation in the foresight 
process. In their catalogue of  environmental scenarios, the European 
Environment Agency (EEA 2011a) makes a useful distinction between 
initiatives that are analytic (defined as desk-based research and analysis 
by an individual or a group) and those that are participative. In the 
broader literature, the rationale for participatory processes varies widely, 
and is often implicit rather than explicit. Many government foresight 
units recognise the importance of  involving key policy stakeholders in 
the foresight initiative from the start, in order to inform the process and 
findings, and to secure buy-in and enhance the likelihood of  the findings 
ultimately informing decision-making; this mirrors practice in research 
uptake more broadly. Havas, Schartinger and Weber (2010) describe 
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some of  the process benefits associated with developing context-specific 
scenarios. However, in describing processes as ‘participative’, 
documentation of  foresight initiatives often fails to distinguish between 
expert participation and ordinary citizen participation; which likely 
reflects implicit assumptions regarding how policy change is achieved, 
and also regarding whose voices count in the policymaking process. 
A separate strand of  the foresight literature does, however, focus on 
the opportunities for anticipatory democracy (see, for example, Bezold 
2010), and how ways that futures thinking can ‘reflect the needs of  the 
vast majority of  people, rather than the interests of  the few’ (Ramos, 
Mansfield and Priday 2012: 86).
Having outlined some of  the main approaches to strategic foresight, 
the remainder of  this article deals with foresight in the context of  
international development. Section 2 presents a broad mapping of  
the foresight landscape, as relevant to international development. In 
Section 3, the author shares examples of  scenario processes used in a 
variety of  international development contexts. The author then reflects 
on the evidence of  use and impact of  foresight initiatives in Section 4, 
before concluding and suggesting future directions for foresight in 
international development in Section 5.
2 Mapping the foresight landscape
2.1 Global overview
Foresight initiatives have been undertaken around the world by a wide 
range of  international development actors including international 
intergovernmental organisations (multilateral agencies), governments 
in the global North (or bilateral agencies), philanthropic foundations, 
as well as academia (universities, research institutes, policy thinktanks) 
and NGOs/civil society organisations (CSOs) in the North and South. 
Examples can be found at the national, regional or global level in sectors 
such as health, agriculture and food, governance, conflict and security, 
climate change and the environment, technology and innovation. 
However, documentation of  foresight initiatives undertaken in least 
developed countries is relatively sparse. The level of  resources invested 
in foresight initiatives varies enormously, from a modest local exercise 
conducted involving a few staff members at minimal cost, to a large-
scale international project costing US$24 million (the total cost of  the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005) at the upper end of  the scale.
There are varying degrees of  foresight activity in different regions. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) has played a pivotal role in the 
development of  a foresight culture (Popper and Medina 2008: 259). 
UNIDO’s Technology Foresight Programme for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (TFLAC) was launched in 1999; this led Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela to initiate preparatory 
activities for setting up national programmes, but only some of  these 
countries managed to institutionalise a technology foresight programme 
(ibid.). According to the most recent mapping exercise undertaken by the 
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European Foresight Monitoring Network (EFMN), foresight initiatives 
in Latin America tend to be national in scope and feed into national 
policymaking processes, but they are more often sponsored by non-state 
actors such as international organisations or NGOs than by their own 
government (EFMN 2009: 36).
Africa is excluded from the data altogether; the authors acknowledge 
that Africa remains under-represented in the report, and attribute this 
in part to the fact that foresight is commonly understood as technology 
foresight, and ‘Africa’s roles in technological innovation remain 
rather limited (and perhaps in some respects invisible)’, and that work 
undertaken by forecasters, modellers or scenario-builders in other topics 
unrelated to technology are not properly represented (ibid.: Foreword). 
In the same vein, the Global Foresight Outlook 2007 data indicates that 
only 11 of  846 initiatives mapped globally are African. In comparing 
foresight ‘style’ in six world regions, Keenan and Popper (2008: 34) note 
that ‘the data for Oceania and Africa have been deemed inadequate for 
inclusion in our analyses’.
2.2 International institutional programmes
The OECD2 Secretariat and the EU European Commission created 
dedicated futures research units in the late 1980s, and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) followed 
suit in the early 1990s (Sagasti 2004). The OECD’s International 
Futures Programme promotes forums, projects and networks (OECD 
2010). The primary policy focus of  recent studies has been on OECD 
member countries, although one study of  the ‘bioeconomy to 2030’ 
explicitly states the relevance of  its findings to developing countries 
(OECD 2009). The Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC), a member of  
the OECD Development Cluster, is a group of  West African regional 
organisations, countries and international organisations that exchange 
experiences and perspectives to help build more effective regional 
policies. The SWAC Secretariat plays a role in foresight by providing 
independent and forward-looking analysis which aims to enrich the 
debate and better inform decision-makers about future challenges.
In 1992, UNDP set up the African Futures project to support African 
countries to undertake forward-looking studies and develop a long-term 
vision of  their development. Between 1992 and 1995, African Futures 
provided technical support to the planning and implementation of  
25 national studies that reflected on visions and alternative strategies 
for the future; one example of  such a process is Burundi Vision 2025. 
Publications of  the African Futures project include a set of  four scenarios 
for Africa in the year 2025 (Sall and Mbeki 2003). In early 2004, UNDP 
established the African Futures Institute (AFI) in order to harness the gains 
made under the African Futures project, and to sustain futures analysis 
in the region. Registered in South Africa, the AFI positions itself  as a 
pan-African organisation, with a vision to facilitate Africa’s formulation of  
its own path to development, developing its own methods and approaches.
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UNESCO’s Foresight Programme is located in its Bureau of  Strategic 
Planning, and it convenes a futures forum, as well as organising lectures 
and seminars. The stated purpose of  the programme is to sensitise 
members of  the global UNESCO Secretariat as well as member 
states to future trends in education, the natural sciences, the social 
and human sciences, culture and information and communication, 
and to support member states in developing their own capacities and 
approaches in the field of  foresight. In May 2014, a three-day forum 
was organised by UNESCO’s Imagining Africa’s Futures project, in 
collaboration with the University of  the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 
and the Southern African Node of  the Millennium Project. This 
symposium, ‘All Africa Futures Forum: Transforming Africa’s Future’, 
brought together African futures thinkers and practitioners with the 
aim of  exploring ‘how the “discipline of  anticipation” has been shaped 
and applied in Africa and how it can be deliberately leveraged towards 
transforming Africa’s future onto more positive trajectories.’3 One of  
the stated objectives was to enable the establishment of  an African 
Network of  Foresight Practitioners.
Hilbert, Miles and Othmer (2009) describe an initiative supported by 
the UN that they believe to be the ‘most extensive online participatory 
policy-making foresight exercise in the history of  intergovernmental 
processes in the developing world to date’. The process comprised a 
five-round Delphi exercise and secured 1,454 contributions, which 
were then fed into intergovernmental decision-making as part of  the 
Regional Action Plan for the Information Society in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (eLAC2010). The authors highlight the governments’ 
acknowledgement of  the value of  collective intelligence from civil society, 
academic and private sector participants of  the Delphi and the ensuing 
appreciation of  participative policymaking. On the basis of  the 
eLAC experience, Hilbert et al. (ibid.) advocate the potential of  online 
foresight tools to facilitate participation in resource-scarce developing 
countries. UN agencies have sponsored many high-profile foresight 
exercises to explore concerns and problems that transcend national 
boundaries. These include the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(2005), Global Environment Outlook (UNEP 2012), the Global Energy 
Assessment 2012 (GEA 2012), and the Fifth Assessment Report of  the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
2.3 The UK Foresight Programme
The UK Foresight Programme was established in 1994 to embed 
a futures approach in strategic policymaking in government. It is 
considered a relatively mature programme in the European context, 
together with Sweden and the Netherlands (EEA 2011b). Studies 
are essentially expert-led, reflecting the ‘less egalitarian/participative 
tradition to policy making’ observed in the institutional arrangements 
of  the UK compared to Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands (EEA 
2011b: 49). There is, however, broader engagement with stakeholders, 
and especially decision-makers, from an early stage in the process 
in order to secure their buy-in and to facilitate effective uptake of  
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the findings. Table 1 outlines the main projects of  the UK Foresight 
Programme that intersect with international development.
Against the backdrop of  these large-scale studies, the UK’s Foresight 
Horizon Scanning Centre (HSC) was created in 2005 to tackle narrow 
policy questions often at the request of  a particular department. 
Horizon scanning occurs in a wide range of  UK government 
departments, including DFID. Horizon scanning, deemed ‘the 
foundation of  foresight’ by Loveridge et al. (2010), has a distinctive role 
to play in the realm of  international development, notably to support 
identification of  key issues and challenges of  the future, as in the case 
of  a scanning exercise commissioned by the UK Collaborative on 
Development Sciences (UKCDS) on behalf  of  DFID in 2010, based 
on interviews with leading international development thinkers (see 
Rhydderch 2010).
2.4 The Rockefeller Foundation
The Rockefeller Foundation has established the Searchlight function, a 
programme of  horizon scanning with a view to informing philanthropic 
decision-making. The foundation works with 12 partners which 
conduct regular regionally-focused scans across Asia, Africa and the 
Americas. According to Juech and Michelson (2012), the development 
and philanthropic sectors have generally been slow to adopt foresight 
Table 1 Projects of the UK Foresight Programme with relevance to international development
Project Collaboration Papers commissioned
Reducing Risks of Future Disasters 
(2010–12)
Expert group involved representatives 
from NGOs, academia and the private 
sector
14 papers
Global Food and Farming Futures 
(2009–11)
Politically co-sponsored by DFID and 
DEFRA
Follow-up actions4 identified for UN, 
OECD, Oxfam, Gates Foundation and 
World Economic Forum
>100 evidence papers
Migration and Global Environmental 
Change (2009–11)
Partners included UNHCR, UNICEF 
and DFID
Involved 350 experts and stakeholders, 
across 30 countries. Workshops in 
Ghana and India
70 papers and other reviews
Detection and Identification of 
Infectious Diseases in UK and Africa 
(2004–6)
Collaboration with African Union
Process involved >300 leading 
experts and stakeholders from 
nearly 30 countries (including 20 
African countries), as well as many 
international organisations
>60 science reviews, papers and case 
studies
Source Author’s own.
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practices, lagging behind businesses and government, and the 
Searchlight function represents the first systematic trend monitoring 
effort in the philanthropic and broader social sector. The Searchlight 
function ‘demonstrates how the practice of  anticipating and tracking 
trends and envisioning different alternatives for how global issues might 
evolve can be harnessed to shape the future of  human development and 
to improve the lives of  poor and vulnerable populations’ (ibid.: 439). 
One of  the organisations collaborating with the Rockefeller Foundation 
is the Institute for Alternative Futures (IAF). In 2009, the IAF convened 
a workshop of  leading foresight experts in Bellagio. The workshop 
report (Bezold et al. 2009) highlights the rationale and practice of  
pro-poor foresight – a term coined to mean foresight as applied for the 
purposes of  human development – in accelerating and enhancing 
‘smart globalisation’ and in gaining a better understanding of  foresight 
in relation to a set of  key issues that are relevant to the global South.
The Institute for the Future (IFTF) played a major role in Rockefeller’s 
Catalysts for Change project, which was based on the premise that 
collaboration on a global scale can yield unique insights into ways 
to create a more prosperous, equitable future. The project sought to 
augment the diverse horizon-scanning exercises concerning poverty 
and social change by integrating bottom-up, crowd-sourced ideas for 
innovation, using a proper visualisation tool as a common language 
and framework (Vian et al. 2012: 451). To this end, a three-day global 
collaborative foresight game was convened which engaged with 
1,600-plus people in more than 79 countries. In describing this exercise 
Vian et al. (2012: 466) observed, ‘Foresight and forecasting practices 
have their modern roots in elite institutions that often look at the 
future “from the outside in”. But in a world of  high connectivity and 
increasing transparency of  information, the capacity for participatory 
foresight practices “from within” has already changed the landscape of  
analysis and guidance of  our complex global systems.’
3 Scenarios
Scenarios offer examples of  possible futures, which are then used to 
explore how the world would change if  certain trends were to strengthen 
or diminish, or various events were to occur. These scenarios can be 
used to review or test a range of  plans and policy options; to stimulate 
the development of  new policies, or as the basis for a strategic vision; 
and as a means of  identifying ‘early warning’ indicators that signal a 
shift towards a certain kind of  future. The Foresight HSC (2009) states 
that scenario planning is for medium- to long-term strategic analysis and 
planning; it describes scenarios as narratives set in the future.
Wright, Cairns and Bradfield (2013: 561) suggest that scenario 
techniques and methods range from quantitative modelling approaches 
to qualitative narrative methods, and mixed methods that encapsulate 
both. For example, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) uses the 
International Futures (IFs) forecasting system to generate quantitative 
scenarios such as those presented in African Futures 2050 (Cilliers, 
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Hughes and Moyer 2011). A range of  quantitative, qualitative and 
mixed method scenarios can be found among those generated by 
global foresight exercises and international assessments and those 
documented in the EEA’s catalogue of  scenarios in the environmental 
field (EEA 2011a).
Gordon (2011) classifies scenarios as either adaptive or normative. 
Adaptive (or future-aligning) scenarios are developed by organisations 
and institutions in order to ensure they are fit for purpose; this includes 
the use of  scenarios as part of  organisational strategic planning 
exercises, as well as country or regional-level long-term development 
planning and visioning. By contrast, normative (future-influencing) 
scenarios, also known as visionary scenarios, are used to influence and 
shape the future. There are a significant number of  scenario sets in the 
public domain that relate to policy questions relevant to international 
development; however, their usefulness can be limited because of  
insufficient background information. The examples discussed below 
make use of  narratives, developed as part of  foresight initiatives 
conducted on a more modest scale, as compared to the large foresight 
studies associated with intergovernmental organisations.
3.1 Adaptive scenarios
There are examples of  adaptive scenario use in bilateral agencies such 
as DFID as well as international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs). According to Foresight HSC’s Scenario Planning Guidance 
Note (2009: 5), ‘DFID, the FCO [Foreign & Commonwealth Office] and 
the cross-departmental Stabilisation Unit have undertaken country and 
region-focused scenario planning to inform strategy and programmes, 
and to improve coordination.’ Neil MacDonald facilitated scenario 
processes for DFID in Sudan, Iraq and Kosovo between 2002 and 
2007 (interview, 7 April 2014). The Sudan scenario-building exercise 
was a collaboration between DFID, the FCO and the Ministry of  
Defence (MoD). It was well resourced, and it comprised a research 
phase, involving three or four researchers, as well as three days in 
Khartoum. The Iraq scenarios of  2007 were ‘more typical’ in resourcing 
terms; there was a research phase, and a workshop convened with UK 
government/DFID staff based in London. The Kosovo scenarios were 
done hurriedly and on a much smaller scale, with very little research 
input (ibid.). Scenarios have also been used by DFID Yemen and DFID 
Nepal to develop contingency plans (Foresight HSC 2009: 14–18).
DFID’s 2008 draft guidance on country and regional planning states that 
scenario planning should be included as part of  the Country Assistance 
Planning (CAP) process (DFID 2008). There is no evidence available 
on the extent to which these guidelines have been followed in practice. 
However, Foresight HSC (2009) provides two case study examples 
demonstrating ways in which scenario planning has been used for planning 
by DFID. The first example is DFID Bangladesh, which developed 
scenarios to 2020 to inform their new CAP. The two-month process was 
facilitated by external consultants; data were collected and analysed from 
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internal and external sources, interviews were conducted with external 
experts on Bangladesh (but no internal experts), and a two-day workshop 
was held. The second example is DFID Nicaragua, which led a scenario-
planning exercise as part of  their exit strategy, as a way to help the wider 
international donor community examine their policy engagement in 
the country. The three-month exercise involved international donors, 
representatives of  NGOs and civil society, the private sector and academia. 
Nicaraguan experts were involved in the analysis.
There are other examples of  scenario sets that have been commissioned 
by DFID, presumably to inform thematic priority-setting, such as 
Ballantyne, Curry and Sumner (2011) on the impacts of  the financial 
crisis, and Pickens, Porteous and Rotman (2009) on scenarios for 
branchless banking. However, limited information is available on how 
these were conducted. The Outsights (2004) project presents scenarios 
for the very poorest from 2030: research papers were commissioned; 
30 interviews were conducted with stakeholders from government, 
multilateral agencies, business, NGOs, the media and academia; and 
workshops were held.
MacDonald (2004) outlines CARE International’s experience using 
scenarios in Sudan to clarify roles and objectives. With CARE 
International UK, a three-day workshop was facilitated, which included 
people from other NGOs, government and the media; journalists were 
included for their ‘ability to grasp the bigger picture’. Scenarios were 
developed to 2023, against which they then assessed their strategic 
options. MacDonald notes also that planning has to shift from linear 
thinking to a creative and flexible response that is able to anticipate 
change early and respond. He concludes that whereas scenario analysis 
has been widely used by the private sector since the 1970s, the ‘use of  
scenarios in development NGOs is still in its infancy and there is much 
still to learn’ (2004: 119). Ramalingam (2012) argues that development 
and humanitarian agencies need to be agile in their response, and that 
this fits closely with the resilience agenda.
Literature on the application of  foresight in the humanitarian sector 
is surprisingly scarce. Humanitarian Horizons: A Practitioners’ Guide to the 
Future (Humanitarian Futures Programme 2009) presents trends and 
projections based on reports by leading thinkers in the areas of  climate 
change, globalisation, demographics and changes in the humanitarian 
system. The authors advocate the need for humanitarian agencies to 
be forward-thinking and to manage risk more proactively, rather than 
being risk averse.
Many African countries have national planning commissions, and 
have used scenario building as part of  processes to develop long-term 
strategies; examples include South Africa’s Vision 2025, Kenya Vision 
2030 and Namibia’s Vision 2030. These initiatives reflect the broad 
consensus in Africa in the early 1990s that African nations needed to 
set their own agendas and anchor them in long-term visions driven 
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by African interests and demands (Martin-Breen 2014). According to 
Professor Alioune Sall, Director of  the AFI, they have been keen to 
ensure that foresight exercises are conducted as much as possible in 
a participatory manner, in order to facilitate citizen participation in 
reflecting on and answering core questions such as: ‘Where do we want 
to get to as nations?’ (Ibrahim 2013). He goes on to say that ‘Where 
our calls [for support] have been heeded, countries have been able to 
avoid the pitfalls of  foresight exercises turning out to be another closed 
exercise led by technocrats talking to other technocrats; they have seized 
these as an opportunity to open and sustain a conversation on the 
past, the present and the future of  the nation.’ Arguably, this kind of  
scenario exercise starts to converge with the normative or visionary type 
described below.
3.2 Normative scenarios
Andreescu et al. (2013) suggest that normative foresight exercises result 
in scenarios in which there is a greater concern with the basic values, 
and procedural arrangements governing the future world depicted 
in the scenario. This is highly relevant in the example of  scenario 
processes in East Africa facilitated by the Society for International 
Development (SID). SID was instrumental in initiating processes for the 
development of  national scenarios in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 
and also at the regional level, but the processes were designed to 
maximise ownership at local and national level. Heinzen (2004a) labels 
these scenarios as public interest scenarios, concerned with developing 
skills and opportunities for public dialogue, facing uncertainty through 
collaborative learning processes, and developing capacity for political 
agreement. According to Harcourt and Muliro (2004: 2), ‘SID’s 
own interest in exploring scenario exercises in Eastern Africa in the 
mid-1990s was driven largely by the fact that far-reaching structural 
adjustments were being undertaken in various countries with seemingly 
scant concern for long-term impacts and the choices that some of  
these adjustments would inevitably foster. The absence of  broad-based 
dialogue on these key issues was one indicator (…)’. The South African 
scenarios (such as the renowned Mont Fleur scenarios – see Kahane 
(1992) and Gillespie (2004)) also provided inspiration (Muliro, interview 
7 April 2014). Whilst the special issue of  the journal Development 
(Heinzen 2004b) does not provide a detailed overview of  the specific 
tools used as part of  the scenario-building exercises, the articles do 
provide information on aspects of  the process, and especially the public 
engagement dimension. The East Africa scenarios were not the first in 
the region, but their innovation was the active involvement of  a wide 
cross-section of  interests and stakeholders, through an ambitious public 
dissemination component.
The Kenya scenarios were a conscious attempt at participative 
policymaking, in an effort to provide an alternative to undemocratic 
governance. The exercise conducted from 1998–2000 comprised a 
research component, with a small grant from the British Council; 
five workshops convened every four to eight weeks; and an extensive 
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dissemination process. SID partnered with the Kenyan policy thinktank 
Institute of  Economic Affairs (IEA) to support organisation of  the 
events held in Kenya. The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) was the main donor of  the process, with a 
grant of  US$200,000 to SID. The one-year dissemination process, 
which focused on use of  the scenarios to catalyse dialogue, comprised 
two phases (Maina and Sivi 2004): the first targeted opinion leaders 
in the public sector, private sector and civil society; the second phase 
targeted the general public. The second phase was carried out through 
partnering with credible and respected community organisations; core 
roadshow activities included a series of  participatory theatre workshops 
and presentations, as well as distribution of  a research compendium 
(with the broad facts, data and arguments behind the scenarios, and 
what was driving the trends) and a 48-page booklet which laid out the 
four scenarios in story form. The scenarios were met with enthusiasm: 
‘People wanted to listen, wanted to share their stories. Only in one place 
they were chased away by agents of  the state. In other places they were 
sent to break up the meeting but ended up staying’ (Muliro, interview 
7 April 2014).
4 Impact
Until recently there have been remarkably few evaluations of  futures and 
foresight work (Slaughter 2009: 16; EEA 2011a; Havas et al. 2010: 97), 
and there is scant literature on appropriate evaluation frameworks. 
There is a general reliance on self-evaluation; and government foresight 
activities have generally been evaluated by the agencies responsible for 
commissioning the studies, or foresight practitioners (Milojević 2013).
The foresight literature provides plenty of  examples of  the challenges of  
embedding foresight studies in policy decision-making. Sagasti (2004: 1) 
notes the oft-observed challenge of  linking ‘future-oriented exercises to 
the messiness and immediacy of  political events and decision-making’, 
and in this respect foresight shares many common challenges with 
research more generally. It is difficult for policymakers to make the 
time; policymakers may not own the process; foresight studies generally 
consider the long-term future horizon, and this may be incompatible 
with short-term political thinking; and the implications of  a foresight 
study may be unclear (Rhydderch 2013). Schultz (2006: 11) notes 
that horizon scanning’s design criteria do not augur well for its quick 
uptake and widespread dissemination in any evidence-based decision 
environment; for whilst research is expected to be authoritative, a 
horizon scan is necessarily associated with uncertainty.
Johnston (2010) notes that members of  the International Foresight 
Professionals’ Network are under pressure to demonstrate the value 
of  investments in foresight in consequent policy and planning. His 
foresight impact schema includes awareness-raising, informing, 
enabling, influencing and directing policy. Kuosa (2011: 22) considers 
tangible as well as intangible outcomes of  foresight initiatives: given 
their interdisciplinary and multi-sectoral nature, foresight exercises often 
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behave as a ‘knowledge junction’ between different areas of  research 
(EFMN 2009: 14), and impact in the form of  improved networking and 
information flows should not be ignored.
The debates around the impact of  scenarios are important because of  
their focus on transformational processes. The future is fundamentally 
unknowable, yet everyone holds implicit assumptions about the future, 
depending on their own mental model, based on experience and 
knowledge. By bringing together individuals operating within different 
paradigms, the worldview of  any one individual or organisation may be 
challenged, and thus individuals’ mental maps changed or expanded. 
This highlights the importance of  acknowledging and exploring 
uncertainty through collective process. Wack (1985: 140), a pioneer of  
scenario planning, describes the transformational process: ‘Scenarios deal 
with two worlds: the world of  facts and the world of  perceptions. They 
explore for facts but they aim at perceptions inside the heads of  decision-
makers. Their purpose is to gather and transform information of  
strategic significance into fresh perceptions. This transformational process 
is not trivial – more often than not it does not happen. When it works, 
it is a creative experience that generates a heartfelt “Aha!” from your 
managers… obliges them to question their assumptions…’. This kind of  
forward-thinking exercise with explicit consideration as to how the world 
will change may be compared to the collective design of  a theory of  
change for international development policies and programmes, where a 
range of  worldviews and assumptions may enrich the discussion and help 
to ensure that any strategy is ultimately more robust.
As in other applications of  foresight, the evidence of  use, usefulness and 
impact of  foresight initiatives in international development are largely 
anecdotal. In the organisational decision-making context, MacDonald 
(interview, 7 April 2014) considers that a key outcome is greater resilience, 
such that individuals and organisations are better prepared to face 
uncertainty and ‘to manoeuvre skilfully when life takes unforeseen turns’, 
but acknowledges that actually measuring this presents a challenge. In 
the context of  visionary public interest scenarios such as those developed 
in East Africa by SID, Heinzen (2004a) suggests that the creation of  a 
new shared language can be the marker of  successful scenario work; 
in the case of  the Tanzania scenarios, one noteworthy aspect was that 
subjects previously considered taboo, such as donor dependence and the 
supposed unity of  the country, became open discussion points when the 
scenarios were shared with the broader public (Eyakuze 2004). Heinzen 
also considers whether the foresight exercise led on to something else, 
as a measure of  success (Heinzen, interview 31 March 2014); she offers 
anecdotal evidence of  knock-on effects, explaining how individuals who 
were closely involved in (and transformed by) the process of  developing 
the Kenya scenarios with SID subsequently played a key role in the 
national government-led visioning process, Kenya Vision 2030.
Given the non-linearity and complexity of  policymaking processes, and 
the challenge of  evaluating how any subsequent decisions and policies 
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actually affect different stakeholders, and especially the poor, perhaps 
it is better to focus on assessing the extent to which the level of  futures 
literacy has changed among key stakeholders and decision-makers as a 
result of  the foresight process.
5 Conclusions and future directions
Foresight initiatives have been conducted by a range of  actors, in 
different thematic sectors, across different regions, on both a grand 
and a modest scale. Future-oriented studies are better established (and 
resourced) in certain sectors of  international development, such as food 
and agriculture, whilst no evidence was found of  foresight in relation to 
education in an international development context. There are interesting 
examples of  ad hoc initiatives and processes, such as the East Africa 
scenarios supported by SID. Yet, for the most part, futures thinking has 
not entered the mainstream of  international development in terms of  
the discourse and practice, and thus remains marginal to international 
development endeavour. This is hardly surprising, given that foresight 
is of  itself  a field still in its infancy. Whilst there are various repositories 
and databases of  foresight studies and projects, there are none dedicated 
to international development initiatives per se. With the exception of  
outputs generated by the Humanitarian Futures Programme, literature 
on foresight in the international humanitarian field is scant.
Foresight certainly has an important role to play in international 
development, to ensure that policies are robust and forward-looking, 
and that development organisations and institutions are resilient and 
agile, able to cope with change and manage increasing uncertainty 
and complexity in order to tackle the global and local development 
and humanitarian challenges ahead. Futures thinking could be more 
effectively integrated into strategy planning cycles of  international 
development institutions across the board and, in general, this would 
require greater futures literacy among international development 
actors. National-level policy thinktanks in Africa and elsewhere in the 
developing world have a particular role to play in supporting foresight 
studies, and promoting methodological adaptation and innovation 
in their various contexts. There is a great opportunity to harness 
rapid advancements in the field of  information and communications 
technology (ICT) for crowd-sourcing and collective intelligence as part 
of  foresight exercises, countering the more traditional top-down, expert-
led approaches.
Notes
* This article draws on Bingley, K. (2014) A Review of  Strategic Foresight 
in International Development, IDS Evidence Report 94, Brighton: IDS.
1 The Millennium Project, funded by the UN University, UNDP, 
UNESCO and the US Environment Protection Agency (EPA), 
describes itself  as an independent, non-profit, global participatory 
futures research thinktank that connects futurists, scholars, business 
planners and policymakers around the world to explore prospects for 
humanity as a whole.
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2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
3 http://en.unesco.org/events/all-africa-futures-forum-transforming-
africa%E2%80%99s-future (accessed 1 August 2014).
4 Source: Foresight (2011).
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Models for Foresight Use in 
International Development
Alun Rhydderch
Abstract This article sets out the components of the foresight approach 
that has been adopted by many governments in the developed world, 
and identifies elements of this ‘dominant’ approach that may hinder 
its uptake in developing countries. Instead, it suggests that a less rigid, 
more exploratory and normative approach may be better suited to many 
developing country contexts. With reference to the writings and practice of 
the creator of ‘la prospective’, Gaston Berger, it argues for an attitude that 
combines bold and inclusive thinking about how to create better futures 
with the pragmatic engagement with political and administrative systems 
that can help bring these about.
Keywords: prospective, horizon scanning, normative, participative.
1 Introduction: foresight practice and discipline
Foresight has been defined as ‘the ability to judge correctly what is going 
to happen in the future and plan your actions based on this knowledge’ 
(see dictionary definition in Box 1). We recognise this instinctively as a 
useful life skill. We all have it, to some degree. It helps us survive, avoid 
trouble, and achieve our goals.
The practice of  foresight requires scaling up this ability from the 
individual to the group level. By engaging more people to judge what 
might happen, we fill knowledge gaps, and can draw on a wider range 
of  understandings of  the factors that will shape the future. Foresight 
practice often includes oral exchanges in the form of  interviews, group 
discussions and workshops. These enable the surfacing of  underlying 
assumptions and the sharing of  tacit knowledge – intuitions as well 
as facts. Such exchanges provide a rich source of  new ideas while 
expanding the collective knowledge pool.
The discipline of  foresight, through its tools and techniques, provides 
a structured and systematic way to harness a range of  knowledge, 
experience and intuition located in different people and places. This is 
useful to generate better judgement – through a collective process – on 
what might happen in the future and how to prepare for it.
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This kind of  judgement has an obvious outlet in strategy formation and 
policymaking. When carried out in a government context, the term 
‘strategic foresight’ is increasingly used to call attention to the role foresight 
can play in improving strategic planning and policymaking processes.
The dominant foresight method that has evolved during the past 
60 years in the government and corporate domains has demonstrated 
its value and is increasingly accepted (see Section 2). It has done so 
by integrating existing sources of  knowledge and generating new 
knowledge and insights. By bringing these different sources together, 
foresight enhances strategic policymaking and planning processes.
Box 1 Definitions of ‘foresight’ and ‘horizon scanning’
Foresight (dictionary definition of  common meaning): ‘The 
good judgment to think and plan before an event, so that you 
are prepared for whatever may happen.’1
‘Horizon Scanning is the systematic outlook to detect early signs 
of  potentially important developments. These can be weak 
(or early) signals, trends, wild cards or other developments, 
persistent problems, risks and threats, including matters at the 
margins of  current thinking that challenge past assumptions.’ 
(Cuhls 2015, drawing on 2005 definition by UK Horizon 
Scanning Centre)
‘Strategic foresight is the ability to create and sustain a variety 
of  high quality forward views and to apply the emerging 
insights in organisationally useful ways; for example, to detect 
adverse conditions, guide policy, shape strategy; to explore 
new markets, products and services.’ (Slaughter 1997)
Scenario: ‘an internally consistent view of  what the future 
might turn out to be – not a forecast but one possible future 
outcome.’ (Porter 1985)
Source: Author’s own.
This article argues that this dominant model of  foresight is also 
responsible for the limited application of  foresight in a number of  other 
fields. Taking examples from the field of  international development, it 
will consider why foresight has had difficulty establishing itself  in some 
fields. By looking at successful projects in international development, the 
article will then make the case for alternative foresight approaches. It 
will conclude by suggesting further avenues for the expansion of  the use 
of  foresight in international development as well as in other fields that 
have so far attracted less foresight interest or success.
2 The dominant model of foresight
Although many developed countries include foresight as one of  their 
planning or policy tools, even in these countries the role of  foresight is 
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still often contested, and national foresight units or programmes rarely 
benefit from stable institutional support or budgets.
2.1 Characteristics of the dominant foresight model
With this important caveat, the foresight model practised most widely 
at the national government level in developed countries is outlined 
below. It is beyond the scope of  this article to consider why this 
model has become dominant.2 The model does, however, present 
two characteristics that make it a ‘good fit’ for developed country 
governments. First, it lends itself  to the creation of  risk or threat 
scenarios, the analysis of  which can lead to the development of  
policies for dealing with these risks or threats. One of  the reasons for 
the prevalence of  this characteristic is the influence of  long-range 
planning approaches used in the defence sector (for procurement or 
force development), and the military (scenarios in military strategy), 
which tend to be threat-focused. Second, it adopts a neutral, detached, 
‘evidence-based’ and ‘objective’ stance towards the data that form the 
basis for its analysis. The influence here is ‘technology foresight’ – a 
relatively stable strand of  foresight practice in some developed country 
governments since the 1970s – which tends to take a probabilistic and 
deterministic approach to forecasting, using tools such as Delphi studies 
and roadmapping.
The first of  these characteristics may reflect a sense that developed 
countries have ‘more to lose’ than developing countries. Their citizens, 
and therefore their politicians are likely to have a more risk-averse, 
protective attitude than those of  developing countries. The second 
characteristic, viewed positively, reflects the penetration of  the sciences 
(social and natural) into the policymaking processes of  governments in 
more developed countries. Foresight, if  it wishes to play a role in the 
policymaking process, is expected to meet these high (scientific) standards.
Viewed negatively though, the requirement to produce evidence, 
and the mistrust of  judgements or opinions construed as value-laden 
(‘biased’) can be seen as part of  a strategy of  risk avoidance on the part 
of  civil servants. In a culture that rewards clear, well-founded advice, 
the official charged with foresight activities is from the outset on shaky 
ground. ‘Evidence of  the future’ is hard to come by, while facts and data 
from authoritative (scientific) sources provide a crutch that can help him 
or her navigate this terrain more surely.
2.2 Structure of the dominant model
Most foresight exercises contain the following three elements:
 l A scoping or horizon-scanning stage
 l A stage of  analysis and ordering of  the data from the first stage, often 
involving scenarios
 l An ‘implications’ stage: what does this analysis mean for the topic 
being investigated?
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A fourth element, important for ensuring both the impact of  foresight 
projects and the stability of  the foresight function, is a stage of  
‘embedding’ or ‘integrating’ foresight into the organisation once the 
exercise (or series of  exercises) has been completed.
These elements, except for the last one which is often neglected, are 
common not just to ‘developed country foresight’; they can also be found 
in one form or another in approaches that are more open or ‘normative’ 
(see Section 5 for more on the normative approach). The particularity 
of  the dominant model lies rather in (a) the types of  data considered 
valuable to collect at the scoping/horizon-scanning stage; and (b) the 
way this data is analysed and ordered at the second stage.3 Specifically, 
developed countries tend to have a preference for authoritative data 
sources that can be extrapolated or modelled into the future, and, where 
such data are not available, for consensus among experts in specialist 
fields, generally from academia. Also, at the analysis and ordering stage, 
there is a tendency in developed countries to commission or produce 
scenarios that present future risks and threats, rather than opportunities.
2.3 Participation in the dominant model
In developed countries, participation in foresight processes is often 
restricted to experts from academia and policy officials. The private 
sector may be invited to join (generally through industry bodies such as 
trade associations), while civil society is less often represented.
3 Foresight in developing countries
It is an attractive idea that foresight should help guide a country’s 
development. As described above, there are enough common elements 
in the foresight approaches used by developed countries to constitute 
a ‘package’ that can be proposed to developing countries.4 In the past, 
international organisations have played a role in sharing foresight 
experience and expertise with the developing world (for example, 
UNDP and UNIDO5 supported several developing countries in the 
1990s). More recently UNDP, through its Global Centre for Public 
Service Excellence (GCPSE), has begun to provide support for foresight 
activities as part of  its mission to improve public sector capability.
Singapore’s rapid transition to developed country status, as well as its 
widespread and effective use of  foresight, helps explain why UNDP 
chose the country to host the GCPSE. Foresight exercises supported by 
GCPSE have recently been conducted in Tonga, Rwanda and Turkey. 
The activity of  this unit is likely to receive a boost from the recent 
adoption of  the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): foresight has 
been identified as an approach that, if  adopted more widely, could 
contribute to achieving SDG 16 (governance).
However, Havas, Schartinger and Weber (2010) point out that ‘foresight 
is costly in terms of  time and money in general, and this can be a decisive 
factor for emerging economies, in particular’. And in a section on ‘the 
political economy of  foresight and development’, Van de Pol et al. define 
the challenge of  implementing foresight in developing countries:
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While most countries apply futures thinking and strategic planning to 
some extent in their national policies, there is little evidence to suggest any 
widespread use of  foresighting at the national level in most developing 
countries. Likely reasons for this include limited capacities in resources, 
skills and knowledge, organisation, politics and power and/or incentives. 
[…] Conditions are even less conducive in fragile states (2014: 16).
One way to increase the use of  foresight would therefore be to improve 
economic management to enable investment in the missing resources, 
skills and knowledge; reduce reliance on foreign aid; and increase 
political legitimacy. Such steps might be accompanied by a transfer of  
know-how from developed countries where ‘vigorous regional futures 
and foresighting activities are ongoing’ (ibid.: 17).
But this is a challenging list of  requirements and begs the question, is 
there an alternative to the state-led and government-funded foresight 
approach that might be less costly and more flexible? An alternative is 
raised in the UNDP paper:
Where less formal or institutionalised regional foresighting is being 
conducted, research and practice continues to be carried out by 
independent organisations, academics, practitioners and global 
communities (ibid.: 17).
This introduces the key observation that not all foresight is state-
supported. Given the challenge in developing countries of  directing 
state funding towards long-term goals when there is pressure to address 
current needs,6 alternative approaches may be required. Specifically, 
the independent organisations, academics, practitioners and global 
communities undertaking the less formal or institutionalised foresighting 
may be of  particular value. Such activities are often supported by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) or foundations, and the foresight 
approach taken tends to be different from that supported by government 
in ways that, we will argue in the next sections, potentially makes it 
more suitable for addressing some developing country challenges.
4 Constraints of the dominant foresight model
Here, with a particular focus on its use within international 
development, some limitations of  the dominant model of  foresight are 
identified. Alternatives approached that address these limitations are set 
out in Section 5.
4.1 Method, evidence and the pull of the sciences
Loveridge, Keenan and Saritas (2010) describe foresight processes as 
being ‘method-bound’. This attachment to method, and an array of  
tools and techniques, can be understood in part as a response to the 
need to make foresight ‘rigorous’ and to produce reliable evidence. The 
New Public Management (NPM) approach7 had a strong influence on 
governments throughout the world during the 1990s; from an NPM 
perspective, policymaking is (or should be) a rational activity that 
processes well-defined inputs (i.e. evidence) to reach clear conclusions. 
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To contribute to these policy processes, the expectation is that foresight 
should provide such inputs.
Yet the use of  any foresight approach, given the irreducible uncertainty 
of  the future and the infinite number of  factors that will influence it, 
must rely to a considerable extent on discernment and judgement. 
Despite this, it has been hard to resist the pull of  standardised methods 
when justifying and using foresight in policy settings.
A second temptation has been to make the case for foresight in the 
language of  science. Foresight is an integrative discipline that uses 
information, data and evidence from a number of  different disciplines 
and sources. Many of  these can be categorised as belonging to the social 
sciences, but some – for example, environmental data, demographic 
forecasts and economic projections – incorporate precise measurement 
and data-driven modelling, associating them with the ‘hard’ sciences 
and giving them particular currency in the policy world.
Not only is this science ‘badging’ often misleading, it has arguably 
also constrained the scope of  enquiry of  some foresight programmes 
by scaling back exploratory, hypothesis-driven projects in favour of  
exercises that resemble academic research projects (and that therefore 
could be funded under regular academic programmes).
4.2 Neutrality and objectivity
In government organisations in particular, and in many other settings 
in which foresight exercises are carried out, neutrality (or lack of  bias) 
is either expected or mandated. This expectation applies not just to the 
facilitator of  the exercise, but also to participants, whose knowledge, 
ideas or views on the future are supposed to be detached from opinions, 
beliefs and ideologies. Experts are generally invited to participate in 
such exercises on the understanding that they provide this objectivity, 
but even when lay contributors are invited, it is assumed that they 
will participate in expert ‘mode’, i.e. by providing facts rather than 
opinions. Not only is neutrality in such a setting nearly impossible (even 
for facilitators and civil servants), striving to achieve it also reduces the 
space for uncovering interesting and informative elements shaping the 
future that a foresight process should explore.
4.3 Compatible cultures: selection and self-selection
Finally, even the most experienced practitioners of  foresight, implementing 
the best designed processes, will run up against the issue of  who is involved, 
who is ‘in the room’. This is not simply a question of  having a diverse and 
representative group of  people at a workshop, or ensuring that experts do 
not exclude voices that challenge the prevailing view or look at questions 
from a different perspective. It is more fundamentally about knowledge, 
capability and power. This is already a major (and under-investigated) issue 
for well-funded exercises carried out in developed countries. The challenge 
is in many cases greater and harder to resolve in developing countries, 
where there may be even more pressure to express a view consistent with 
that of  a particular group, whether social, professional or political.
(Endnotes)
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Linked to this is the question of  whether a country or culture will 
embrace or reject the foresight approach. What to developed country 
administrations (particularly Western and democratic) is for the most 
part viewed as a potentially useful complement to the policy and 
strategy toolkit, may to other governments appear as an unwelcome 
challenge to their legitimacy and control. Part of  the answer can already 
be found by looking at the way regions such as South East Asia or Latin 
America have adopted approaches to foresight that differ from the 
dominant model described above (see EFMN 2009 and Keenan and 
Popper 2008). But even in other cases, it is worth asking whether any 
kind of  foresight approach is likely to gain purchase outside an elite 
group. In some cases, a government’s sponsorship of  a foresight exercise 
may be perceived as an attempt to influence political debate and policy 
to the advantage of  one party or interest group or another.
5 Alternative approaches
What then are the alternative models that may be more suited to ‘non-
natural’ foresight territory, perhaps because they are better understood 
outside elite circles, more flexible, or more in tune with the social and 
political culture of  a country or context into which it is desired to 
introduce foresight? This section will consider two approaches that have 
already been implemented successfully, and which may also point to ways 
of  conducting foresight in countries less suited to the dominant model.
5.1 La prospective
‘La prospective’ is a foresight approach created by Gaston Berger, a French 
philosopher, industrialist, and senior government official between 
the 1930s and the end of  the 1950s. Berger developed the prospective 
approach – or ‘attitude’ as he called it – to free the pursuit of  better 
futures (political, scientific and human) from what he saw as the drag or 
dead weight of  bureaucratic process (Berger 1967).
As a senior official in the French education ministry, who also travelled 
extensively (particularly to the United States) as a cultural ambassador, 
Berger had a great deal of  respect for the role of  the state, but saw its 
instruments as insufficient to achieve the potential for positive change 
in the world characterised by rapid technological change and economic 
growth following the Second World War. Berger observed that when 
planning the future of  a country or sector, too often means were decided 
on before goals were set, and that when this happened, the means would 
often dictate (or overly influence) the goals. As Durance (2010) puts it, 
‘Man may thus give up a better condition, considered utopian, because 
the means required have not yet been discovered.’ A better approach 
would be to:
[…] bring together those who can determine what is desirable with 
those who can determine what is possible. The idea of  picturing 
possible worlds in broad strokes would not only enlighten judgment 
but also inform it early enough so that a decision would be efficient 
(ibid.).
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This idea of  ‘picturing possible worlds in broad strokes’ is recognisable 
to us as the creation of  ‘visions’ of  the future – now a standby of  
corporate consulting, even if  less frequently used by governments. This 
vision creation was and is an essential part of  the prospective approach, 
but was paired with an extremely rigorous, expert-led process to align 
policy with these possible futures.
Berger commanded respect in the French administration and his ideas 
were highly influential. The first French five-year plan launched in 1965 
was strongly influenced by prospectiviste ideas, and by the end of  the 
1960s prospective units were active in all parts of  the French government. 
There were also exchanges in both directions between France and 
the United States during the 1960s. While the prospectivistes and their 
partners in the similarly-minded Futuribles group were impressed with 
the future thinkers in thinktanks such as the RAND Institute and 
adopted some of  their approaches, the intellectual traffic was two-
way. The dominant foresight approach that emerged in the 1970s 
(particularly thanks to Frenchman Pierre Wack’s influence at Shell) is 
strongly marked with the prospective stamp.8
This separation of  ambitious vision from the means necessary to achieve 
it offers the chance to develop processes that harness the big ideas of  
imaginative people from all walks of  life. In a second stage, these ideas 
are handed over to officials to evaluate their ability to implement them, 
and to identify what resources and instruments would be needed.
The prospective approach has been influential in many countries, 
particularly in Europe and Latin America. Whether drawing or not 
explicitly on prospective thinking, many policymakers in developing 
countries have been attracted by the idea of  developing a vision of  the 
future as a prosperous, stable place. One such example of  a vision-
based exercise cited by Van de Pol et al. (2014) is that of  Botswana, 
now one of  Africa’s most stable countries, relatively free of  corruption 
and with a good human rights record. The national vision for the 
year 2016 exercise was followed by implementation of  a series of  
measures identified in a backcasting process.9 A Long Term Vision for 
Botswana was published in 1997; the document informed decision and 
policymaking by identifying major challenges and roadblocks, and the 
strategies required to deal with them.
5.2 Broad and ‘bottom-up’ participation
Bingley (2014: 9) (and citing Ramos, Mansfield and Priday 2012) sets 
out the charge:
[…] in describing processes as ‘participative’, documentation 
of  foresight initiatives often fails to distinguish between expert 
participation and ordinary citizen participation; [what is needed is 
to] make futures thinking a popular process, and to allow futures 
thinking ‘to reflect the needs of  the vast majority of  people, rather 
than the interests of  the few.’
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Foresight shares the challenge of  representation and legitimacy with 
many ‘community’ processes that aspire to speak on behalf  of  a group 
of  people. In some ways foresight can be seen to be in a particularly 
difficult position in this regard, since a common view is that to express a 
valid opinion on the future, one must belong to an expert community of  
some kind. There are, however, three reasons why a community process 
can be – and indeed has already proved itself  to be – a particularly 
good setting for foresight. The first and perhaps most important is 
that, particularly if  the process entails the creation of  a desired future, 
the people who will be part of  such a future ought to have the chance 
to express a view on what that future should be; an additional benefit 
being that they may also be inspired by that view. Secondly, the division 
of  society into those who create the structures and those who inhabit 
them – dominant in the time of  Berger – is today contested. The 
information and digital revolutions have, potentially at least, devolved 
agency from elites into the heart of  society. Those who come up with 
the ideas of  better futures will in some cases be in a position to help 
create them. Thirdly, coming together to discuss and agree common or 
shared goals, even if  agreement is not to be found on all matters, offers 
a way to bring people together, whether from within one community, or 
from across different (sometimes opposing) ones.
A powerful example of  a bottom-up approach is the series of  projects 
undertaken by the Society for International Development (SID) in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s in East Africa.10 Barbara Heinzen, the lead 
facilitator for this work, described the scenarios developed by these 
exercises – in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, and also for the East 
Africa region – as ‘public interest scenarios, concerned with developing 
skills and opportunities for public dialogue, facing uncertainty through 
collaborative learning processes, and developing capacity for political 
agreement’ (Heinzen 2004). They were designed to maximise ownership 
at the local and national level.
The reasons given for undertaking this series of  projects can be seen to 
be relevant to a number of  developing countries today:
SID’s own interest in exploring scenario exercises in Eastern Africa 
in the mid-1990s was driven largely by the fact that far-reaching 
structural adjustments were being undertaken in various countries with 
seemingly scant concern for long-term impacts and the choices that 
some of  these adjustments would inevitably foster (Bingley 2014: 19).
At the same time, Bingley’s account of  the Kenya scenarios process 
suggests why, while powerful, this type of  community-owned process with 
extensive public engagement does not take place regularly in developing 
countries. She suggests that ‘the Kenya scenarios were a conscious attempt 
at participative policymaking, in an effort to provide an alternative to 
undemocratic governance in Kenya’ (ibid.: 18). The activities of  NGOs, 
particularly when sponsored by foreign governments or NGOs, are often 
viewed with suspicion by governments in developing countries. For such 
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exercises to have an impact beyond the grass-roots level and influence the 
development of  national-level policy, it will generally be helpful, and often 
necessary, to obtain at least tacit government acceptance of  the initiative, 
and ideally to find active supporters among the political elites.
6 Way forward
The optimal role for governments, international institutions and NGOs 
who want to encourage and support the use of  foresight in developing 
countries, may therefore be to seek the best combination of  (a) support 
from developing country governments and (b) local NGO and civil 
society participation in foresight activities. This implies three elements 
of  support:
 l Advice to developing country governments on what they should (and 
should not) expect from foresight, and education of  a small team at 
ministry level that can act as the centre for commissioning foresight 
studies;
 l Identification of  existing foresight actors within a country and 
assessment of  their capabilities and the techniques they have adopted 
or developed; and
 l Brokering and supporting the development of  links between the 
foresight actors and government ministry, and helping to identify and 
design projects and other initiatives that benefit development.
One famous foresight initiative, the Mont Fleur scenarios,11 was strong 
on the first and third of  these elements (even if  the foresight process 
was led by outside actors and benefited from a very particular context). 
The SID approach described above was strong on the second element, 
bringing communities into the process, and made some headway in 
involving political actors.
There is certainly room for a range of  initiatives, and it is unlikely 
that the optimal combination of  these elements will be achievable in 
a majority of  cases. The easiest solution will often be to support the 
central government to put in place the dominant model described in 
Section 2, potentially even to provide the team to implement such a 
model. This article argues that such a solution should be resisted, and 
efforts made instead to encourage initiatives that involve local foresight 
actors (and participants) and produce outputs that are relevant to the 
concerns and aspirations of  the citizens of  the country.
7 Conclusion
This article suggests that there is a dominant foresight method and 
approach practised by developed country governments, and gives 
reasons why this approach emerged. It argues that this approach may 
not always be suited to a developing country context, and puts forward 
two alternative approaches, which have been adopted successfully in 
the past, and which it may be useful to revisit when designing foresight 
approaches in developing countries.
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The article concludes by proposing that the most promising way 
forward for foresight in developing countries may be to take inspiration 
from Gaston Berger’s prospective ideas from the 1950s. The challenge 
is to harness the energy and ideas of  creative minds, found in all parts 
of  society, and link them to a policymaking community at the national 
government level. To make this work policymakers must be open to 
receiving such forward-looking ideas and proposals from its citizens, and 
ready to transform them into implementable forward-looking policies 
and projects.
Notes
1 Macmillan Online Dictionary, www.macmillandictionary.com/ 
(accessed March 2016).
2 For more on national models within developed countries, see Kuosa 
(2011) and Rhydderch in Frank and Matyas (eds) (2013).
3 See for example Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre Toolkit (accessed 
at http://hsctoolkit.bis.gov.uk/index.htm) and Foresight HSC (2009).
4 The existence of  a dominant foresight model does not mean that 
there is necessarily a straightforward implementation schema for 
foresight in developed country contexts. For more on the options and 
trade-offs involved in designing an appropriate national-level foresight 
programme, see Rhydderch in Frank and Matyas (eds) (2013).
5 UNDP – United Nations Development Programme; UNIDO – 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
6 For example, the conundrum of  ‘services now versus institutional 
strengthening’ (Brinkerhoff 2007).
7 See Barzelay (2001).
8 What the foresight approach lost on arrival in the United States, 
probably because of  the corporate context in which it took root, was 
Berger’s insistence that the process had to start with a normative vision of  
a future, or set of  futures, that were considered desirable. The process 
of  coming up with this vision is central to the idea of  prospective, and 
Berger insisted that this should be independent of  and not subservient 
to the instruments, technologies and resources needed to achieve it.
9 See www.vision2016.co.bw.
10 Bingley (2014) provides a good summary of  the SID projects in East 
Africa. See also Harcourt and Muliro (2004).
11 The Mont Fleur process undertaken in 1991 is credited with helping 
South Africa emerge from its apartheid system without widespread 
violence or economic upheavals (see Kahane 1992).
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Agrimonde and Agrimonde-Terra: 
Foresight Approaches Compared
Marie de Lattre-Gasquet and Sébastien Treyer
Abstract Over a ten-year period, two French agricultural research 
organisations have jointly undertaken two foresight exercises. Agrimonde 
was about scenarios and challenges for feeding the world in 2050, while 
Agrimonde-Terra was about land use and food security in 2050. This article 
compares and contrasts these two exercises, in terms of context and 
objectives, method, scenarios, and how they grapple with global regions. 
The comparison illustrates how the context, the objectives and the desired 
changes influenced the choice of foresight methodology, and the results. 
While Agrimonde is focused on shifting the forefront of the debate on 
agricultural models for global food security, decision-makers at various 
geographical levels can seize the Agrimonde-Terra method and results to 
have discussions about the future uses of their land.
Keywords: policymaking, scenario, method, global, regional.
1 Introduction
Foresight is ‘a systematic, participatory and multi-disciplinary approach 
to explore mid- to long-term futures and drivers of  change’ (FTP 2014) 
that is meant to lead to change. The three philosophical precepts behind 
foresight are that the future is a realm of  freedom, a realm of  power, 
and a realm of  will (de Jouvenel 2000). Or, to cite Gaston Berger, father 
of  foresight in France: ‘Consider the future not as something already 
decided, something revealed bit by bit, but rather as something to be 
created’ (Berger 1958). Four attitudes are often found when faced with 
the uncertainty of  the future: passive (submit to change); reactive (await 
change to react); preactive (preparing for an anticipated change); and 
proactive (acting to provoke a desired change) (Godet 1994).
It is against this backdrop that two foresight exercises – Agrimonde and 
Agrimonde-Terra – were undertaken by the French agricultural research 
institutes, CIRAD (Centre de coopération internationale en recherche 
agronomique pour le développement) and INRA (Institut national de la 
recherche agronomique). Agrimonde was launched in 2006 with a focus 
on the possible futures of  agriculture and food security worldwide to 
2050. The aim was to pinpoint the fundamental questions agricultural 
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research will have to answer, so as to provide CIRAD and INRA with 
the means to anticipate and prepare for the future. The final report of  
Agrimonde was published in 2011 (Paillard, Treyer and Dorin 2011). 
Agrimonde-Terra is a foresight exercise focused on land use and food 
security to 2050. It was launched in 2012 and finished in mid-2016 
(CIRAD and INRA 2016). The two authors of  this article were involved 
– with many other colleagues – in the design and implementation of  
both foresight exercises. Marie de Lattre-Gasquet was a member of  the 
Agrimonde expert panel and one of  the coordinators of  Agrimonde-
Terra. Sébastien Treyer was a coordinator of  Agrimonde and a member 
of  the Agrimonde-Terra Scenario Advisory Committee.
This article compares and contrasts these two foresight exercises, with 
a particular focus on the methods used. Subsequent sections discuss the 
contexts, objectives and theories of  change of  the studies, the methods 
used for building the scenarios, the resulting scenarios, the geographical 
approach, and lessons learned.
2 Context, objectives and theories of change
The objective of  Agrimonde was to inform research programming 
(Schoen et al. 2011), and focused on a specific international policy debate 
(what innovation pathways in agriculture and food could assure global 
food security?). In contrast, Agrimonde-Terra sought to inform policy, to 
embed participation in policy processes (Da Costa et al. 2008) by proposing 
a process and results that serve to prepare new land use scenarios at 
various geographical scales. Both exercises aimed at broadening the 
discussion of  methods for thinking about futures scenarios.
2.1 Agrimonde: new research questions and contributing to global debates
The Agrimonde1 initiative reflected ongoing changes in the early to 
mid-2000s. It was influenced by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(2005), which drew scientific and public attention to the implications of  
ecosystem change for human wellbeing, and the need to use the earth’s 
ecosystems sustainably. The first plenary meeting of  another important 
global initiative – the International Assessment of  Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD 
2009) – took place in September 2004. Several French researchers 
were involved in the IAASTD, and the Agrimonde foresight exercise 
was meant to help them take a more proactive stand in this expert 
process, possibly contributing to pluralise the visions and the scenarios 
discussed in this arena. Also, in the mid-2000s, the French government 
was setting new objectives for INRA and CIRAD, and seeking a closer 
relationship between these organisations. The competitiveness of  
agri-food markets; the conservation of  natural resources; the high prices 
of  fossil fuel; the quality of  human food and nutrition; and climate 
change were all recognised as key challenges. After a period of  neglect, 
agriculture and investment in international agricultural research were 
also moving up the development agenda. In this context, what might 
be the new innovation pathways for agriculture? CIRAD, through its 
scientific director Michel Griffon, had been associated with the vision of  
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a ‘doubly green revolution’ (Conway 1997) in the mid-1990s. Was this 
vision relevant in the mid-2000s and beyond?
Thus, Agrimonde was launched in 2006 with three objectives. First, 
to explore different possible futures of  food and farming systems to 
2050. Second, to guide INRA and CIRAD’s research in the field of  
agronomy and food, broadly speaking. Third, to structure discourse 
within CIRAD and INRA on global food security, and to build capacity 
so that French experts could participate more effectively in international 
debates on the futures of  agriculture (Paillard et al. 2011; Treyer 2011). 
To meet these objectives there was an interest in comparing a business-
as-usual scenario with an agro-ecological scenario built on hypotheses 
and calculations done by Michel Griffon in his book Nourrir la planète 
(Griffon 2006). Two questions were at centre stage: how and through 
what innovation pathways could a population of  9 billion people be 
adequately fed, while preserving ecosystems integrity? What should be 
the priority issues for agricultural research?
Agrimonde was also intending to pluralise not only the substance 
of  the scenarios considered, but also the methods to develop and 
represent them. Its methodological design was intending to question the 
dominance of  economic models of  global commodity markets as the 
basis for assessing global food security. These models, and in particular 
the IMPACT model developed at IFPRI2 (Rosegrant et al. 2008) were 
highly influential because they modelled the link between scarcity, 
prices and technological progress. In order to account for different 
types of  technological progress (e.g. conventional versus agroecology) 
through more transparent assumptions, Agrimonde developed an 
alternative quantitative framework, based on physical balances between 
biomass resources and uses (Dorin and Le Cotty 2011). Four years after 
launching the Agrimonde foresight exercise, the results were published 
in the book Agrimonde. Scenarios and Challenges for Feeding the World in 2050 
(Paillard et al. 2011).
2.2 Agrimonde-Terra: participation, land use policy and improved food security
Agrimonde-Terra3 is essentially a continuation of  Agrimonde. However, 
the focus shifted to land use and its implications for food security. 
Launched six years after Agrimonde, the context for Agrimonde-Terra 
was already quite different. Demographic and economic growth and 
growing demand for meat and for renewable energy were resulting 
in increased competition for land. The Fourth Assessment Report of  
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007) drew 
attention to the need to integrate climate change and sustainable 
development policy, as well as to the links between mitigation and 
adaptation. The notion of  ‘planetary boundaries’, first introduced in 
2009, was by 2012 increasingly accepted (Rockström et al. 2009). The 
Sustainable Development Goals and COP21 were being prepared. 
Finally, there was increasing concern about the loss of  natural habitat 
and biodiversity associated with the intensification of  agriculture 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). At the same time, many 
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regions of  the world were continuing to suffer from nutritional 
deficiencies due to diets based on relatively few species (WHO 2008). 
Diet-related chronic diseases in developing countries were the subject of  
increased research and policy attention.
In this context, Agrimonde-Terra set out to address a series of  questions 
including: what impacts will population growth, urbanisation, lifestyle 
changes, climate change and growing energy and meat demands have 
on land use to 2050? How can we ensure that land use will provide 
nutritional and food security for all to 2050? How should land, water and 
biodiversity be used to meet the demands of  the planet’s inhabitants in 
2050? How can we ensure that the land will provide sustainable incomes 
for farmers and affordable prices for consumers? Which public policies 
should be implemented at different scales and in the different sectors?
The aim of  Agrimonde-Terra is to prepare rigorous and coherent land 
use scenarios with a stepwise and participatory process that will (a) help 
develop a shared understanding of  the links between the natural and 
human processes at different levels; (b) contribute to international debates 
on land use and food and nutrition security; (c) help international, 
regional and national decision-makers in their discussions on public 
policies and investments relating to land use with a focus on food and 
nutrition security; and (d) help identify relevant questions for future 
research. The scenarios were seen as constituting ‘learning machines’ 
(Berkhout, Hertin and Jordan 2002), i.e. tools to raise awareness and 
encourage debate. The foresight exercise was designed not only to 
explore a range of  possible futures, but also to provide the public and 
decision-makers with a tool that could be used to facilitate conversations 
about future land use in particular regions or countries. A workshop was 
held in Tunisia to see if  the Agrimonde-Terra method and results could 
be easily adapted to a country’s situation to build local scenarios. The 
resulting scenarios are currently used for discussions on research strategy 
which is a sign of  usefulness.
Agrimonde-Terra also had the objective of  demonstrating how a step-
by-step foresight process, using a pluridisciplinary approach of  systemic 
inspiration, integrating the long-term dimension, past and future, as 
well as breakdowns (de Jouvenel 2004), and linking qualitative and 
quantitative approaches could be useful when thinking about the futures 
of  a complex question such as land use.
3 Methods for scenario building
The two programmes used different methods to build scenarios. 
Agrimonde was designed as a platform for discussion among French 
researchers, whereas Agrimonde-Terra was conceived as a forum for 
discussions among French and international researchers, policymakers 
and representatives of  the civil society. Moreover, in Agrimonde the 
quantitative work came first and was complemented by a qualitative 
analysis, while in Agrimonde-Terra the focus was on system analysis and 
causal relationships.
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3.1 Agrimonde: a platform for collective analysis
Agrimonde was designed as a platform for the preparation, analysis 
and discussion of  scenarios to facilitate the collective analysis of  
the challenges facing the world’s food and agricultural systems. The 
platform (Figure 1) consisted of:
 l A project team representing six full-time staff for two years from 
INRA, CIRAD and AgroParisTech;
 l An expert panel of  17 French researchers and decision-makers who 
met once a month over an 18-month period;
 l A steering committee consisting of  two staff from INRA, two 
from CIRAD and a representative of  the French Initiative for 
International Agricultural Research (FI4AR).
The platform was designed to respect the basic principles of  a 
foresight approach (Paillard et al. 2011). Among these principles are the 
inclusion of  a plurality of  worldviews and a diversity of  scientific and 
institutional positions. Other important principles are the recognition 
and integration of  uncertainty; collective learning by actively involving 
experts and stakeholders; and transparency through reference to the 
best scientific studies, and being explicit about the simplifications and 
assumptions made.
Agrimonde started with a review of  the world food economy over four 
decades (1961–2003) including human population, food consumption, 
land use, food production and productivity, food use and food trade. 
This proved a very useful exercise and constituted an important output. 
Subsequent scenario building consisted of  three main steps: (1) choosing 
the scenarios and the principles underlying their construction; 
(2) building quantitative scenarios and checking the consistency of  
major assumptions; and (3) building complete scenarios, by integrating 
quantitative scenarios with qualitative assumptions. This method, not 
commonly used, puts the emphasis on the quantitative framework for 
comparison between the scenarios, both at global and regional scales.
Figure 1 Agrimonde: a three-component platform
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Step one – choosing scenarios and principles: One of  the specificities 
of  Agrimonde was the strong relationship with the four scenarios 
of  the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter et al. 2005). 
These scenarios are distinguished by their geopolitical framework 
(regionalisation versus globalisation) and by the proactive or reactive 
nature of  policies and regulations towards ecosystem protection. They are 
characterised by different societal priorities, especially in terms of  poverty 
alleviation and the protection of  ecosystems and natural resources. Their 
principles were not necessarily the most relevant for discussing the future 
of  food and agricultural systems, but the interplay of  ecosystems and 
human activities was certainly relevant for the questions that Agrimonde 
sought to explore. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) scenarios 
were therefore used as reference scenarios, to which the alternative 
scenarios developed in Agrimonde could be compared.
In order to build two quantitatively comparable scenarios, Agrimonde 
adopted two principles. In both scenarios, each major region of  the world 
had to try to satisfy its own food requirements in 2050. Inter-regional 
trade would be considered only after the evaluation of  the extent to 
which agricultural production in each region covered local needs. Also, 
future demographic trends could not be masked by migratory flows. 
The implications of  expected population growth, mainly in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Asia and Latin America were thus fully examined with regard to 
each region’s capacity to feed its own population.
Step two – building quantitative scenarios: A specific quantitative 
tool called Agribiom was developed and used to produce quantitative 
scenarios concerning world food production, trade and use of  biomass 
(Dorin and Le Cotty 2011). The data used relate to human population, 
national production of  plant, animal and aquatic products which were 
transformed into kilo calories and areas of  land cultivated for food and 
non-foodstuffs. Physical balances (past and future) between food biomass 
resources and their use are at the heart of  Agribiom. Such balances 
were reconstructed from the 1960s and simulated for six regions of  the 
world (the same ones used by the MA – members of  the OECD4 in 
1990; the Former Soviet Union; Latin America; sub-Saharan Africa; 
the Middle East and North Africa; and Asia). To assess biomass uses a 
number of  explicit assumptions had to be made. The two quantitative 
scenarios were built as the result of  the interaction and adjustments 
between the modellers of  Agribiom and the expert panel.
Step three – building complete scenarios: The variables considered in 
the Agrimonde scenarios were: global context, international regulations, 
dynamics of  agricultural production, actors’ strategies, knowledge 
and technologies, and sustainable development. When the experts 
formulated assumptions on diet, land use, yields or inter-regional trade, 
they had to analyse all their implications and ramifications. Through 
this process, they enhanced the basic quantitative assumptions. More 
specifically, the quantitative scenarios were analysed for each region 
in relation to three groups of  questions: (a) Is the quantitative scenario 
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consistent with the scenario-building principles defined at the outset? If  
not, which qualitative assumptions would make it consistent? (b) What 
does the comparison of  the various scenarios teach us? What qualitative 
assumptions would be needed to ensure that they represented clearly 
different pictures of  the future? (c) What are the main challenges of  this 
scenario? What are the main drivers of  change that should be activated 
for it to become reality? This analysis enabled the experts to consider 
qualitative assumptions for each of  the Agrimonde variables and then to 
produce complete scenarios.
3.2 Agrimonde-Terra: system analysis with an international forum
The Agrimonde-Terra foresight exercise was conceived as a forum for 
discussion between researchers and decision-makers, and the forum was 
animated by a project team of  staff from CIRAD and INRA, assigned 
to the project for three years (de Lattre-Gasquet, Le Mouël and Mora 
2016). Initially four thematic workshops were organised, on urban–rural 
relationships, farm structure, cropping systems, and livestock systems. 
Eighty international experts participated and helped frame the issues 
and prepare the micro-scenarios on direct causes of  land use change. 
A Scenario Advisory Committee made up of  15 researchers and 
policymakers met four times to give advice to the project team about the 
scenarios.
Agrimonde-Terra considered that land use systems, which are 
characterised by bio-physical and socioeconomic factors (Stomph, 
Fresco and van Keulen 1994), influence food and nutrition security. 
The method for scenario building involved four steps: description of  
the land use system; building micro-scenarios of  each cause (or driver) 
of  change; combining micro-scenarios to develop contrasting land use 
scenarios and building scenarios for global regions; and carrying out 
a qualitative and quantitative impact analysis of  each and all land use 
scenarios on food security at global and regional levels. The approach 
was systemic in that it recognised complexity and established causal 
relationships between the variables.
Step one – describing the land use system: Retrospective analyses of  
land use and literature reviews were carried out to identify the main 
direct (5) and indirect (3) causes of  land use change. Emerging trends 
and potential disruptions were identified. In terms of  direct causes, the 
focus was on agriculture and forestry (cropping, livestock and forestry 
systems); structures of  production; and urban–rural relationships. Indirect 
causes included climate change, diets and the global context (i.e. political 
governance, economic development including trade, resources including 
energy, and human development including demography). A brief  analysis 
of  civil society actors, policy actors, economic, business, and research and 
innovation actors who influence changes in land use was also carried out. 
As shown in Figure 2, land use change (a) may be characterised using 
five complementary and interlinked dimensions; (b) results from complex 
interactions between indirect and direct causes; and (c) have an impact on 
food security at different scales ranging from household to global.
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Step two – building micro-scenarios using morphological analysis: 
For the four direct causes, micro-scenarios were built during thematic 
workshops with international experts. In the case of  the indirect 
causes, micro-scenarios were built on the basis of  literature reviews. 
To build the micro-scenarios, a morphological approach was used 
based on that developed by Fritz Zwicky in the 1940s as ‘a general 
method for structuring and investigating the total set of  relationships 
contained in multi-dimensional, usually non-quantifiable, problem 
complexes’ (Ritchey 1998; see also Godet 1997; de Jouvenel 2004; 
Álvarez and Ritchey 2015). The analysis consisted of  identifying and 
analysing a range of  variables influencing each cause of  land use 
change. Hypotheses of  how each variable might evolve were imagined. 
A morphological box was constructed, with each line devoted to a 
variable. Within a line, each cell contained one of  the hypotheses. The 
micro-scenarios were built by combining one or several hypotheses per 
variable in the most logical fashion, respecting causal relationships. The 
Scenario Advisory Committee reviewed all of  the micro-scenarios.
Step three – building land use scenarios: Contrasting land use 
scenarios were also built with the help of  a morphological box by 
combining micro-scenarios for each direct and indirect cause in the most 
logical fashion. The land use scenarios were built in close collaboration 
with the Scenario Advisory Committee. They were called ‘generic 
Figure 2 The Agrimonde-Terra land use and food security system
Source de Lattre-Gasquet et al. (2016).
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scenarios’ because they do not apply to a specific region. The generic 
scenarios are described through narratives. Scenario building started 
with a representation of  the current situation and an analysis of  the 
long-term dynamics. Some events are seen to create pathways of  change. 
The final picture presents the situation in 2050. The representation of  
the current or initial situation, as well as the final land use scenarios are 
described according to the five dimensions of  land use change. Land use 
scenarios for the global regions were also built and these were described 
through short narratives and the consequences of  each scenario were 
illustrated with the GlobAgri-AgT platform. For the quantitative 
scenarios it was assumed that all regions followed the same scenario.
Step four – analysis: When examining the impact of  each scenario on 
the four dimensions of  nutrition and food security Agrimonde-Terra has 
been at pains to take scale fully into account. The governance of  land 
use tends to be local or national, although the international scale can be 
important, while the governance of  food security is both national and 
international. Agrimonde-Terra has also used a quantitative platform 
called GlobAgri for generating databases and biomass balance models 
from FAOStat5 and other data. Biomass balance models provide a balance 
between resources (domestic production plus imports minus exports) 
and utilisation (food, feed, other) for each region and each agri-food 
product. The system of  balance equations can simulate land use change 
and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions induced by changes in the uses 
of  agri-food products, provided hypotheses on the evolution of  a set of  
variables are available. The GlobAgri platform has been used to generate 
a database and a biomass balance model which are specifically customised 
for Agrimonde-Terra. It is named GlobAgri-AgT and it considers 32 
aggregates of  agri-food products (25 plants and 7 animal aggregates) and 
covers 14 broad regions. GlobAgri-AgT is used to conduct quantitative 
analysis of  the impact of  each scenario on food availability and utilisation 
on a global and regional level. A qualitative analysis is conducted on the 
impact of  each scenario on food access and stability.
4 The scenarios
Whereas Agrimonde built two contrasted scenarios, one baseline and one 
normative, Agrimonde-Terra has explored a wider range of  possible futures.
4.1 Agrimonde: two contrasted scenarios
In order to contribute to debates on innovation pathways to ensure 
global food security, the two scenarios chosen for Agrimonde were:
 l A business-as-usual scenario, Agrimonde GO, for which assumptions 
were taken from the ‘Global Orchestration’ (GO) scenario of  
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), assuming green 
revolution-type innovation and no structural change in food systems;
 l An alternative scenario, Agrimonde 1, for which assumptions were 
inspired by the ‘doubly green revolution’ scenario of  Michel Griffon 
(Griffon 2006), assuming agroecology innovation with the possibility 
of  structural changes in the food system.
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For the business-as-usual scenario, the expert panel decided to ensure 
comparability with the scenarios of  the MA and particularly ‘Global 
Orchestration’. This scenario starts from the current situation and is 
trend-based, i.e. it assumes continued liberalisation of  trade and major 
technological advances. Priority is given to economic development, and 
management of  ecosystems and environmental problems is reactive. It 
is characterised by a sharp rise in crop yields between 2000 and 2050, 
both in developed and developing countries, owing to major investments 
in agricultural research, a vast increase in irrigated areas, more efficient 
use in water and energy, and investments in support infrastructure. 
New technology includes genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
more intensive crop farming and increased use of  fertilisers. Almost all 
farms, small and large, become highly mechanised. Farmers who do 
not practise intensive farming – either by choice or because they are on 
marginal land – have very little weight in their country’s agricultural 
sector. Local knowledge is replaced by standardised methods and 
practices. Environmental problems are approached with the certainty 
that they can always be overcome once they become acute, and trade is 
not regulated (Paillard et al. 2011: 124).
The experts chose to construct only one other scenario, ‘Agrimonde 1’, 
which applied the principles of  sustainable development but also 
included nutrition. This scenario tested the possibility that the ‘doubly 
green revolution’ would constitute a better model to deliver jointly 
ecological, social and economic performance. Agrimonde 1 is a 
normative scenario that proposes ecological intensification and a 
reduction in the current inequalities as regards consumption. As such 
it entails radical change in food production and in food consumption. 
This scenario assumed that by 2050 the world would be able to 
create sustainable food and agricultural systems. The aim was to 
provide insight into such a development pathway including dilemmas, 
challenges, changes and discontinuities.
Both Agrimonde scenarios pointed to a future where it would be 
possible to feed the world. But each scenario highlighted weaknesses: 
the business-as-usual scenario because it seems over-optimistic in 
relation to yield increases, the alternative scenario because it relies on 
a radical change in food consumption patterns. But interestingly, in 
both scenarios, three regions – sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and North 
Africa/Middle East – would become net structural food importers by 
2050, although the scenarios were first built on the basis of  regional 
self-sufficiency. Both scenarios also pointed out the importance of  
changes in food consumption patterns, which influence production 
choices, as well as the organisation of  the agro-food industry (Hubert 
and Caron 2009). The contrast between the two scenarios highlights the 
fact that the agroecology paradigm should receive as high a priority in 
agronomic research as the green revolution paradigm (ibid.).
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4.2 Agrimonde-Terra: exploratory scenarios
The Agrimonde-Terra scenarios are exploratory and are illustrated 
quantitatively as a means of  validation. Five scenarios have been built to 
demonstrate that there is a vast array of  possible futures that we cannot 
see because of  ideologies, mental constructions, etc.
The scenario ‘Land use driven by metropolisation’ is an ongoing 
scenario in many regions of  the world. The main driving forces of  this 
scenario are market forces and international trade, agri-food companies 
proposing ultra-processed foods, large metropolitan regions, and rapid 
climate change. Four other scenarios have been imagined.
Land use for food quality and healthy nutrition: The main triggers 
of  the scenario are globalisation and cooperation, stabilisation of  
climate change, and changes in diets due to public policy and consumer 
awareness about health. In 2050, diets are lower in fats, ultra-processed 
foods, sugars and sweeteners, and higher in fresh products, coarse 
grains, and pulses. In developed countries, the proportion of  animal 
products has decreased but it has increased in certain developing 
countries. Crop systems have diversified, incorporating techniques 
from agroecology, and livestock systems are re-associated with crop 
production. This array of  measures contributes to both limiting 
agricultural GHG emissions and increasing carbon storage in soil, 
increasing per hectare yields. Better organised food systems have also 
reduced food losses and waste, particularly by improving food storage 
and preservation capacities in countries in the global South.
Land use for regional food systems: Regional agreements and 
regional food systems are the main triggers of  this scenario. In 2050, 
each region has broadened the range of  foods offered. Food industries, 
in collaboration with agricultural cooperatives and other actors, have 
adapted to local food products and habits. Production and consumption 
of  roots and tubers, coarse grains, pulses, fruits and vegetables has 
increased. Crop and livestock systems are transformed. Animal feed is 
expressly sourced from regional plant production, and trade in organic 
fertiliser between livestock and crop farms is organised on small and 
medium scales. Farmers use varieties adapted to local agro-climatic 
conditions. These changes have positive impacts on agricultural 
revenues and for rural development.
Land as commons for rural communities in a fragmented world: 
The main triggers for this scenario are the fragmented world context 
which has led to the development of  smaller towns and new forms 
of  farm organisation. Due to crises, in 2050 land use has become 
highly diversified from one region to another. Low yield increases have 
contributed to deforestation in certain regions. Through self-governing 
institutions defining rules for managing common property, local 
communities ensure a certain level of  food security by turning to agro-
ecological practices. Conversely, regions with subsistence farming face 
repeated episodes of  food insecurity.
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Land use for multi-active and mobile household: The main triggers 
of  the scenario are the context (globalised, dynamic but unstable 
because non-state players gradually supersede the power of  sovereign 
governments) and urban–rural relations (high mobility within 
households to diversify sources of  income). In 2050, households aim 
at the resilience of  farming structures to maintain productive capital 
for all generations. Farming systems are flexible and farming structures 
are diverse, ranging from small farms with family labour to large, 
highly capitalised farms. Production systems are intensive, either due 
to greater use of  cutting-edge technologies, or because of  techniques 
relying on a plentiful supply of  labour (e.g. agroecology) in response to 
public demand.
5 Global and regional views
Whether we will be able to feed the world in 2050 is at the heart 
of  Agrimonde and Agrimonde-Terra. But the answer rests in the 
situation and practices of  territories, countries and regions and their 
relationships. Therefore, both Agrimonde and Agrimonde-Terra had 
a regional approach: Agrimonde is focused primarily on quantitative 
upscaling whereas Agrimonde-Terra is focused on the ongoing trends in 
each region.
5.1 Agrimonde: quantitative assumptions at regional level
For the Agrimonde scenarios, the quantitative assumptions were first 
developed at regional level. For example, assumptions for human 
populations and food consumption per inhabitant were developed at 
regional level by analysing past trends, existing data and references 
in the literature, as well as the assumptions of  scenarios of  the MA. 
Agrimonde’s assumptions for the alternative scenario were then 
developed (Chaumet, Ghersi and Rastoin 2011). Once a scenario was 
built and tested for its internal coherence for each region and globally, 
the qualitative dimensions left undetermined by the quantitative analysis 
were presented mainly at a global scale (i.e. no regional narratives were 
written).
5.2 Agrimonde-Terra: regionalised global scenarios
The analysis of  past and ongoing trends in different regions for all 
direct and indirect causes of  land use change were the basis for the 
construction of  the five ‘generic scenarios’, i.e. scenarios that identified 
the drivers and pathways of  change and the interactions between 
the direct and indirect drivers (of  change). The regionalised global 
scenarios were built by looking at current and emerging trends towards 
each scenario and potential disruptions in each region. There is a 
presentation of  the dimensions of  land use in 2050 for each region. 
The agronomic potential, access to land and land use intensity depend 
on the hypotheses of  the scenario. Distribution of  land is the result of  
the quantitative simulations, and services provided by the land are also 
the results of  the scenario. The four dimensions of  food security in each 
region in 2050 are also presented. Utilisation depends on the food diets 
in the region, and availability is the result of  the scenario simulation.
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6 Lessons learned
Above all, a foresight exercise is a process, and three lessons can be 
drawn from the comparison of  Agrimonde and Agrimonde-Terra.
6.1 The foresight process depends on the objectives and the desired 
changes
The first lesson is that the foresight method is closely linked to the 
objectives set by the commissioning body and the desired changes. 
Future studies are a mosaic of  approaches, objectives and methods 
(FTP 2014), and the two Agrimonde foresight exercises demonstrate 
that the methods should be chosen in relation to the objectives. This is 
not always done, nor is it necessarily easy. As far as global food security 
is concerned, most foresight is done with quantitative models so that at 
the 2nd Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development 
(GCARD2) in 2012, the necessity of  a plurality of  foresight approaches 
was acknowledged to feed global debates on innovation pathways.
Agrimonde’s objectives were set by a leadership of  INRA and CIRAD 
to help programming and inform research policy at national and 
global levels. The method led to two contrasting scenarios from the 
comparison of  which it was rather easy to draw lessons. The alternative 
agroecology scenario appeared sufficiently relevant to inspire research 
agendas built around agroecology as a priority at both INRA and 
CIRAD (see also SCAR 2011). Furthermore, the two scenarios drew 
an explicit link between changing food consumption patterns and 
challenges to agronomic research in terms of  agricultural production, 
yields, areas cultivated, etc. (Hubert and Caron 2009; Treyer 2011). In 
recent years, the idea that trends in demand for food need to be open 
to public debate has become increasingly accepted, which provides an 
opening for agronomic research and policy debate. Agrimonde-Terra’s 
objectives were also set by the institutions’ leaderships, but the Scenario 
Advisory Committee played an important role in linking the foresight 
exercise to policy discussions. Therefore, the goal of  informing policy 
and embedding participation in policymaking became more important 
over time. The range of  scenarios facilitates the participation of  some 
members of  civil society in the policy process.
6.2 A foresight process occurs on a ‘sea’ of expectations
The second lesson is that foresight necessarily occurs on a sea of  
expectations (van Lente 2012) which can lead to creativity but also 
to vulnerability, i.e. not adding much new because of  the necessity to 
compromise. In both Agrimonde and Agrimonde-Terra, there was a 
leadership team, a steering committee, a group of  participants, and each 
participant had expectations, i.e. ‘images of  the futures where technical 
and social aspects are tightly intertwined’ (Borup et al. 2006) which were 
not necessarily shared. The exercises drew on existing ‘repertoires’ and 
were able to generate alternative ideas. The participatory approach 
facilitated ‘new combinations’ between elements of  the repertoires, thus 
enlarging the range of  futures.
50 | de Lattre-Gasquet and Treyer Agrimonde and Agrimonde-Terra: Foresight Approaches Compared
Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’
Behind the understanding that different visions of  innovation pathways 
in agriculture and food systems need to be explicitly discussed, some 
of  the participants in Agrimonde had strong views about ecological 
intensification and its potential contribution to global food security. 
They managed to discuss, share and improve these ideas during the 
course of  Agrimonde but also in other instances such as IAASTD, 
the European Union’s Standing Committee on Agricultural Research 
(SCAR) and the GCARD, where some of  them were simultaneously 
involved. In Agrimonde-Terra, the international experts and committee 
members brought a wide diversity of  points of  view which contributed 
to the construction of  the scenarios. Some had expectations about 
getting out of  a purely agricultural point of  view on land use, on 
regional approaches based on ongoing trends, and on usefulness to 
policymaking. The scenarios approach not only enables thinking outside 
the box but in new boxes (de Brabandere and Iny 2010).
6.3 The attention given to actors’ strategies has been insufficient in both 
processes
In the French foresight community, the analysis of  the strategies of  
actors is considered important (Crozier and Friedberg 1980; Hatem 
1993; Godet 1997; de Jouvenel 2004). Michel Crozier and Erhard 
Friedberg, in their book Actors and Systems (1980), consider not only the 
set of  factors but also the actors as essential to any futures-thinking 
exercise. If  the future is a ‘realm of  power’, then there is the question of  
the coexistence of  various actors who exercise different powers – some 
conflictual – simultaneously. The power of  various actors is unequal, and 
the distribution and growth of  power influences strategies of  alliances 
and conflicts. Despite the fact that they knew and explicitly stated that 
the analysis of  actors’ strategies was important, the Agrimonde and 
Agrimonde-Terra methodological frameworks insufficiently covered 
this critical dimension. In Agrimonde, a specific workshop was devoted 
to past trends and future changes in power relations within global food 
value chains. However, the resulting chapter of  the report, though 
important for the consistency of  the whole scenario exercise, has never 
been considered a central point of  discussion. In Agrimonde-Terra, 
power relations around local land access and management systems – 
and more broadly – were also put at the centre of  the analysis from the 
beginning. The Agrimonde-Terra narratives help to illustrate that similar 
exercises cannot avoid looking at these power relations at different scales. 
Nevertheless, the Agrimonde-Terra scenarios do not themselves give 
enough attention to issues around power.
Both exercises have opened space for more diverse visions in global and 
national debates on food security and land use change. To do so, they 
were designed to maintain a link and some comparability with widely 
used global quantitative modelling exercises (Labbouz 2014). A next 
useful step would be to design foresight exercises incorporating as the 
central feature the capacity to describe and discuss the critical role of  
actors’ strategies and power relations, thus focusing more on pathways 
than on the descriptions.
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Notes
1 Agrimonde was a CIRAD and INRA project under the responsibility 
of  a steering committee composed of  Patrick Caron (CIRAD), 
Catherine Esnouf  (INRA), Hervé Guyomard (INRA), Bernard 
Hubert (INRA) and Alain Weil (CIRAD). The project leader was 
Sandrine Paillard (INRA) and the methodological coordinator 
Sébastien Treyer (AgroParisTech), and the team was composed of  
Maryse Aoudaï (INRA), Jean-Marc Chaumet (INRA), Bruno Dorin 
(CIRAD), Tristan Le Cotty (CIRAD) and Tévécia Ronzon (INRA), 
with the collaboration of  Rémi Barré (INRA and Cnam), Isabelle 
Karcher (INRA) and Laurent Parrot (CIRAD).
2 International Food Policy Research Institute.
3 Agrimonde-Terra is also a joint project of  CIRAD and INRA. The 
concepts presented here have been developed by the project team 
composed of  Marie de Lattre-Gasquet (CIRAD, coordinator), Chantal 
Le Mouël (INRA, coordinator), Olivier Mora (INRA, organiser 
for scenario building), Catherine Donnars (INRA), Patrice Dumas 
(CIRAD) and Olivier Rechauchère (INRA), in collaboration with 
Marco Barzman (INRA), Thierry Brunelle (CIRAD), Agneta Forslund 
(INRA), Elodie Marajo-Petitzon (INRA), Stéphane Manceron (INRA), 
Pauline Marty (INRA) and Clémence Moreau (CIRAD).
4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
5 FAOStat offers free and easy access to data for 245 countries 
and 35 regional areas from 1961 through to the most recent year 
available. See http://faostat.fao.org/.
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A Foresight Scenario Method 
for Thinking About Complex 
Sustainable Development 
Interactions
Dominic Glover, Kevin Hernandez and Alun Rhydderch
Abstract In this article, we describe an innovative foresight approach, 
which we used to examine the interactions among three themes that are 
likely to be significant for international development policy and strategy 
in the coming decades. We adapted existing foresight scenario methods 
(drivers of change analysis, scenarios, wind-tunnelling) to investigate 
possible trade-offs, tensions and synergies that may exist among competing 
international development goals of reducing inequalities, accelerating 
sustainability and building more inclusive and secure societies. Our method 
combined foresight methods with programme theory analysis, an approach 
commonly used in impact evaluation. We describe our approach in detail 
and discuss its strengths and weaknesses.
Keywords: foresight, scenarios, sustainable development goals, SDGs, 
trilemma.
1 Introduction
Development studies and policy are necessarily concerned with the 
future – with trying to anticipate it and trying to influence it. The 
methods of  foresight should therefore be intrinsically interesting 
to development scholars, policymakers and practitioners. Foresight 
methods have been applied to development policy questions and 
problems by national governments and international agencies, 
philanthropic foundations, intergovernmental organisations and 
international assessment exercises covering sectors such as energy, the 
environment and climate change (Bingley 2014; Heinzen 2004).
In this article we describe an innovative adaptation of  a commonly used 
foresight approach, namely scenario building, which we used to examine 
the interactions among three important themes that may be expected 
to be significant for international development policy and practice in 
the coming decades. We wanted to explore possible trade‑offs, tensions 
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and synergies that might exist among competing goals of  human 
development. The multiple aims and simultaneous goals of  development 
policy – expressed for example in the eight Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) of  2000–15, and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), replete with 169 individual targets, which succeeded them 
in 2016 – may seem like a utopian list of  harmonious and mutually 
reinforcing wishes. What if, in reality, some of  the many individual goals 
and targets are in tension with one another? Could there be inevitable 
or likely trade‑offs between different desirable outcomes? Might progress 
towards one goal impede progress towards another? Policymakers and 
practitioners probably need to think about how their strategies need to 
be sequenced or balanced in order to achieve the best progress they can 
towards multiple desirable goals at the same time.
Scenario building is a commonly used foresight method that can 
enable a group of  stakeholders and experts to identify major trends 
and drivers of  change, risks, opportunities, threats, hopes and fears 
relating to a topic of  interest (Wright, Cairns and Bradfield 2013). 
A typical approach to scenario building involves the construction of  a 
two-dimensional matrix in which two intersecting axes, x and y, create 
four spaces in which contrasting scenarios may be developed. Important 
properties or parameters of  each of  the four scenario spaces are defined 
by the intersecting axes, and differences among the scenarios are 
determined by their contrasting positions in relation to the two axes. 
The axes might represent binary variables (yes/no, positive/negative, 
presence/absence) or continuous variables (ranges from high to low or 
maximum to minimum values, including positive and negative values).
Evidently, much depends on which features are chosen as axes to create 
the scenario matrix. A common procedure for identifying and selecting 
the axes begins with a brainstorming exercise to generate a longlist of  
major trends and ‘drivers of  change’, which participants believe are 
already having or are likely to have a strong influence over the future. 
These trends and drivers may be grouped into categories such as social, 
technological, economic, environmental, political and sometimes legal and 
ethical (STEEP or STEEPLE). Participants are then asked to order these 
numerous factors against two indices: first according to their perceived 
relative importance as trends or drivers of  change and second according 
to the degree of  uncertainty participants experience with regard to the 
specific ways in which the trend or driver in question may unfold.
Through expressions of  individual opinion and collective discussion, 
with an eye to the overarching topic of  interest – global energy systems, 
conflict, or whatever it may be – two of  the identified trends or drivers 
may emerge as particularly significant. In practice the facilitator of  the 
exercise often plays a decisive role here, since she or he needs to select two 
major drivers that can be used to define the scenario matrix. To serve this 
purpose, the drivers or trends have to be expressed as axes, that is, a scale 
or dimension consisting of  a binary (or categorical) variable or, occasionally 
and as appropriate, a continuous variable. For example, the important 
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and uncertain driver demographic change might be transformed to the axis 
population growth with the binary values high/low or indeed positive/negative.
Participants sometimes object at this stage, out of  concern that the 
great majority of  the drivers and trends painstakingly generated up 
to this point are about to be discarded, including many that have 
been judged to be very important and highly uncertain. This seems to 
undermine the participatory process that has carried the group to this 
stage. However, our experience is that most if  not all of  the drivers of  
change discussed in the first phase reappear within individual scenarios 
and certainly across the set of  four scenarios, so in practice none of  the 
creative work or discussion done before this step is wasted.
At this stage, workshop participants are typically divided into four small 
groups to work on one scenario each. The activity moves into a creative 
phase where the emphasis is on imaginative storytelling. The purpose of  
this narrative-building is not to predict the future – because the future is 
fundamentally unpredictable – but to make explicit and draw attention 
to all sorts of  issues, factors, relationships and interactions that should 
be helpful to planners and policymakers when thinking about the kind 
of  future they expect or fear, or the one they want to create.
The geometry of  the two‑dimensional matrix defines key parameters 
which ensure that the four scenarios will be different from each other in 
key respects that the scenario-builders have judged to be important, and 
that the set of  four scenarios together will open up and test a broad range 
of  possible outcomes that might plausibly emerge from initial conditions 
of  high uncertainty. So long as the chosen axes are considered important 
and uncertain they can provide a structure in which insightful and 
thought-provoking scenarios can be developed. Which particular axes 
are selected for the exercise is to some degree arbitrary, since many other 
trends, drivers of  change and other components will be incorporated as 
building blocks for the scenarios. In this way the scenarios do the real 
work, teasing out and bringing to light the diverse factors and dynamics 
which participants believe will be salient to the future of  the topic under 
consideration. In this situation, the two-dimensional matrix with four 
scenario spaces serves its purpose well.
In our recent project, we were faced with the challenge of  thinking about 
the interaction among three themes that had already been identified as 
important for the next few decades of  international development policy 
and practice. Moreover, they were three themes on which substantial 
conceptual thinking had already been brought to bear on their past, 
present and future. Our work focused on the development goals of  reducing 
inequalities, accelerating sustainability and building more inclusive and secure societies. 
This language happens to be taken from the five‑year thematic priorities 
adopted in 2015 by the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS 2015), but 
these three themes have much wider relevance as goals for sustainable 
and equitable global development. The ambition to create a more 
equal, sustainable, inclusive and secure world is central to the SDGs, for 
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example, as well as other development strategies, policies and programmes 
at national and international levels. Arguably, however, less attention has 
been given to how these strategic priorities relate to one another and 
interact. Are they essentially harmonious, as many development planners 
and campaigners might hope? Or can they sometimes be antagonistic? 
Our project was designed to explore these questions.
We felt that foresight methods could be useful in exploring the 
interaction between these three themes, but we needed a way to 
visualise and explore the intersection of  three dimensions rather 
than two. Adding a third dimension to a classic scenario grid would 
produce a cube with no fewer than eight scenario spaces. To fill each 
of  these with a unique scenario would require a significant investment 
of  resources and produce a complex picture that would be hard to 
interpret and analyse. We needed a more practical tool.
We also faced the problem that our three dimensions (axes) were 
pre‑determined by the goals of  the project. This contrasts with what 
happens during a typical scenario exercise, as described above, which 
generally begins with a brainstorming exercise in which a diverse set 
of  people, chosen for the relevance of  their knowledge and experience, 
generates a longlist of  drivers of  change through an open-ended and 
participatory process. This activity is important not only for the list of  
drivers it generates, but also because it serves to engage and energise 
the participants, stimulating their thinking around the many trends 
and drivers of  change they will need to draw on during the scenario-
building phase of  the process. We needed to introduce an alternative 
activity that could serve a similar function as the STEEPLE exercise, 
stimulating participants’ thinking and bringing them up to speed with 
some background material, while allowing us as facilitators to keep the 
exercise focused on axes that had already been selected.
This article describes how we designed and implemented a set of  
participatory scenario-building exercises to meet these requirements. 
We convened three separate scenario workshops, each of  which focused 
on one of  the main themes of  the project while also bearing in mind 
the interaction with the other two themes. The decision to hold three 
separate workshops rather than a single one was motivated partly by 
convenience and partly to ensure that each individual topic would receive 
close and independent examination. Participants in each workshop were 
recruited on the basis of  their specialised knowledge of  and interest in the 
topic in question. It was our job as convenors and facilitators to collect 
the discussions from each workshop and consider them as a set.
Each workshop had three main phases, as follows:
1 A modified drivers of  change exercise in which we primed the 
discussion using diagrams to summarise the implicit programme 
theories we found in three source documents, each of  which 
addressed one of  the three pillars under consideration in the project.
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2 A scenario‑building exercise. The scenarios were given a triangular 
framework called the trilemma, which we adapted from a previous 
exercise by the energy company Royal Dutch Shell (2005). The 
trilemma allowed us to focus on the interaction among three different 
themes, while giving primary attention to one theme in each workshop.
3 A final phase loosely based on the foresight method of  ‘wind‑
tunnelling’ (Rhydderch 2009). Wind-tunnelling can be used to 
evaluate the ‘fitness’ of  a given strategy within the scenarios that have 
just been generated, but we emphasised its alternative use as a way 
of  thinking about policies and strategies that might be used to steer 
towards a desired future.
In the following sections we describe in more detail how we designed 
and implemented each of  these stages. Our description takes into 
account some of  the lessons we learned along the way, and we have 
streamlined some details for the sake of  clarity.
2 Priming the drivers of change discussion with programme theory 
analysis
Our first innovation was to use a participatory discussion around 
programme theory as a substitute for the brainstorming exercise that 
might otherwise be used to generate a longlist of  trends and drivers of  
change. This was designed to prime the workshop participants with 
information about the topic of  the workshop, engage them in discussion 
and stimulate their thinking.
Evaluators of  project and programme impacts often develop some kind 
of  programme theory to create a basis for their analysis. The core idea is 
that evaluators (as well as programme designers and managers) require 
an explicit theory about how the intervention under examination is 
supposed to produce its desired outcomes. The programme theory tells 
programme managers and evaluators what mechanisms and indicators 
to monitor in order to assess whether the intervention is working as 
expected. The procedure often involves the generation of  a logical 
framework or outcome map that illustrates precisely how and why the 
inputs of  a programme are expected to lead (through one or more 
intermediate steps) to the desired outcomes (Funnell and Rogers 2011).
We turned to programme theory with a special purpose in view. We 
interpreted our three international development goals as programmes 
of  action and selected three documents to exemplify the thinking that 
informed the programme of  action – i.e. the programme theory. As 
part of  the work done within IDS to elaborate the Institute’s thematic 
priorities, three working papers were published in 2015, as follows:
 l Justino, P. and Moore, M. (2015), Inequality: Trends, Harms and New 
Agendas, IDS Evidence Report 144, Brighton: IDS
 l Luckham, R. (2015) Whose Security? Building Inclusive and Secure Societies in 
an Unequal and Insecure World, IDS Evidence Report 151, Brighton: IDS
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 l Schmitz, H. and Scoones, I. (2015) Accelerating Sustainability: Why 
Political Economy Matters, IDS Evidence Report 152, Brighton: IDS
We took these three documents as source materials for our programme 
theory analysis. We were taking liberties here, of  course; the authors 
of  the three documents were not in positions of  executive power 
or authority in relation to the global goals of  sustainable, equitable 
and inclusive development. They were not programme designers or 
managers in a strict sense. However, as experts in their respective fields, 
who were given a mandate to review the development challenges within 
the distinct arenas of  reducing inequalities, accelerating sustainability and 
building more inclusive and secure societies, their analyses could be seen to 
share some relevant characteristics with programmes, including features 
such as problem diagnosis, analysis of  mechanisms and relationships, 
priority-setting and strategy development.
We used the software package NVivo (v.11, QSR International Pty 
Ltd., 2015) to analyse the contents of  each of  the three documents. We 
used an open‑ended coding system recursively to identify and refine the 
major themes, key concepts and relationships mentioned by the authors. 
We paid particular attention to any statements concerning mechanisms 
or causal relationships, as well as the key actors/agents or structural 
conditions identified by the authors as playing key roles.
To supplement the documentary analysis, we also interviewed at least 
one author from each of  the source documents using the foresight 
interview technique known as Seven Questions. In this method, a 
set of  future-oriented questions, which may be adapted as necessary 
Box 1 Seven Questions interview template
1 What would you identify as the critical issue for the future?
2 If  things went well, being optimistic but realistic, talk 
about what you would see as a desirable outcome.
3 If  things went wrong, what factors would you worry about?
4 Looking at internal systems, how might these need to be 
changed to help bring about the desired outcome?
5 Looking back, what would you identify as the significant 
events which have produced the current situation?
6 Looking forward, what would you see as priority actions 
which should be carried out soon, if  you were responsible?
7 If  all constraints were removed and you could direct what 
is done, what more would you wish to include?
Source: HM Government (2014: 17).
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to fit the topic in focus, are used as a rapid and effective way to 
encourage knowledgeable individuals to articulate thoughts, beliefs and 
expectations about the future, which they may not yet have expressed 
(HM Government 2014: 17) (Box 1).
We used the insights from our analysis of  the source documents and 
interviews to generate diagrams that would represent the contents of  
the documents as clearly and faithfully as possible. Our first attempt 
was to develop outcome chains for each document; however, this effort 
produced extremely complex diagrams that were very hard to interpret. 
In our second attempt we distilled the central messages of  each 
document into a simplified visual representation.
Another team of  researchers, or indeed the authors of  the documents 
themselves, might well have come up with different summaries of  
the three documents, but our purpose was not to offer a perfectly 
objective and complete summary of  the contents of  each paper. The 
diagrams were designed to offer participants an accessible summary of  
the documents’ main arguments and key insights, so that they would 
stimulate reactions, critiques and discussion. In this way, they took the 
place of  the brainstorming exercise that might otherwise be used at 
the beginning of  a scenario workshop to generate a list of  trends and 
drivers of  change. An example is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Programme theory diagram
Source Luckham (2015).
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We printed copies of  the three diagrams in full colour, including some 
small poster-sized versions, for use in our workshops. We also displayed 
the diagrams to the participants as slides prepared in Microsoft 
PowerPoint, and presented the images orally in detail, explaining 
them and drawing attention to their key features. This led directly 
into an open discussion. After a few minutes, participants were invited 
to reflect individually on their reactions to the diagrams and to add 
their comments and annotations to the poster versions, using sticky 
notes (Figure 2). Finally we gathered around the poster versions of  the 
diagrams, which had been heavily annotated with sticky notes, so that 
individuals could point out and explain their own contributions.
This stepwise process led the participants to engage in detail with the 
diagrams and there was considerable discussion and sharing of  views. 
The process ensured that we maintained a strong participatory element 
centrally within the process despite not beginning with an open-ended 
brainstorming session to generate drivers of  change. The discussion and 
critique of  the diagrams brought out many factors and dynamics that 
later resurfaced within the scenarios that the participants created. The 
process of  deconstructing and critiquing the programme theory diagrams 
was successful in stimulating thoughtful reflection among the participants 
and motivating them to improve on the materials we had prepared.
3 Framing the scenarios using the trilemma triangle
Our second move was to use a triangular framework in which scenarios 
could be created, rather than the typical square matrix. This allowed 
us to explore the interaction among three major factors or axes, rather 
than the conventional two, and to do so without entailing a need for 
as many as eight different scenarios to be elaborated. We based this 
framework on the ‘trilemma triangle,’ a concept used previously by 
Figure 2 Workshop interaction with the programme theory diagrams
Photo credit Kevin Hernandez.
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Shell, the Anglo-Dutch energy company (Royal Dutch Shell 2005). In 
Shell’s own foresight study, the trilemma triangle posited a situation 
in which there were three competing principles or forces: market 
incentives, regulation and community values. These forces were 
assumed to be striving towards different objectives – efficiency in the 
case of  the market, security in the case of  regulation, and social justice 
and cohesion in the case of  community.
Interestingly, Shell’s approach assumed that there were necessary 
trade‑offs among the three principles; society could only maximise 
two of  them at the expense of  the third. We did not want to make 
a prior assumption that such a trade‑off must exist among the three 
development goals of  reducing inequalities, accelerating sustainability and 
building more inclusive and secure societies, yet we wanted a structure that 
would draw out tensions, conflicts and trade‑offs between these goals, 
if  they existed. Indeed, a key part of  our purpose was to test the 
complacent assumption that sustainable development strategies must be 
mutually compatible and harmonious. The Shell experience with the 
trilemma indicated that the triangular geometry could serve us quite 
well, although we had to be careful not to preclude the possibility that, 
after all, the three goals might be mutually supporting or synergetic.
Figure 3 illustrates the trilemma framework we used and highlights 
some of  its key characteristics. The shaded triangle illustrates the basic 
interaction among the goals of  equality, sustainability, and security/
Figure 3 Key features of the trilemma framework 
Insecure and exclusionary Sustainable Unequal
 Equal Secure and inclusive
 Unsustainable
Source Authors’ own.
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inclusion. Each corner of  the triangle is in a direct relationship with the 
other two corners. A given situation or scenario might be interpreted as 
being situated somewhere within the shaded zone but, as emphasised 
by Shell in their treatment of  the trilemma triangle, potentially closer to 
one or two of  the poles than the other(s).
As with the conventional scenario exercise, described at the beginning 
of  this article, it is helpful to transform the singular poles of  equality, 
sustainability and security/inclusion into axes extending, respectively, 
from equal to unequal, sustainable to unsustainable and secure/
inclusive to insecure/exclusionary. These axes are depicted in the 
diagram by the dotted lines that extend from each corner of  the shaded 
triangle and bisect its opposite side. The points where these axes cross 
the sides of  the shaded triangle resemble the intersection point between 
the two axes in a conventional two-dimensional matrix, except that, 
in this case, the axis (e.g. equal–unequal) is shown interacting with two 
other, qualitatively different principles (e.g. sustainable and secure/
inclusive) rather than a single axis that has a positive and negative pole.
The extension of  the three axes beyond the edge of  the shaded triangle 
allowed us to depict the shaded triangle’s opposite case in which the 
negative poles – unequal, unsustainable and insecure/exclusionary – define a 
larger, dystopian triangle, shown with a dotted background, where all 
the dimensions are negative.
A useful feature of  our trilemma framework is that it allows us to think 
systematically about interactions between positive and negative themes. 
For example, each side of  the larger triangle connects two negative poles 
(e.g. insecure/exclusionary and unsustainable) with one positive pole 
(e.g. equal). Alternatively, each corner of  the large triangle represents 
a negative pole (e.g. unequal) in a relationship with two positive poles, 
located at corners of  the shaded triangle (e.g. sustainable and secure/
inclusive). (Another way of  expressing this is to interpret the three small 
dotted triangles, outside the shaded zone, as spaces where one of  the 
poles is negative while the other two are positive.) This feature of  the 
diagram was beneficial for our scenario deliberations because it forced 
participants to contemplate potential negative interactions (such as 
tensions and trade‑offs) as well as positive interactions (as defined by the 
shaded triangle). We will return to this point in a moment.
Helpfully, the diagram in Figure 3 can be read in several different 
ways. This multiplicity of  readings can be illustrated by focusing on the 
points within the diagram where lines intersect. As discussed above, 
for example, the axes of  equal–unequal, sustainable–unsustainable 
and secure/inclusive–insecure/exclusionary each cross the sides of  the 
shaded triangle. This property can be used to show how a range of  
positive or negative outcomes on one scale (e.g. un/equal) might exist, 
in principle, with a positive outcome in two others (e.g. sustainable and 
secure/inclusive).
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The very centre of  the diagram depicts the intersection between all 
three of  the axes in which we are interested. This successfully illustrates 
the idea that a given situation or scenario might have any of  a range of  
positive and negative values on each of  the three axes, so that in principle 
it might be plotted in a specific location in three‑dimensional space. 
However, the diagram could be read as implying that a perfect balance 
among the three goals would be found at the centre point of  the diagram 
yet this is also, logically, the point where all three axes are at their zero 
value. In other words, the geometry of  the diagram implies that it is 
impossible to optimise the three competing goals at any value above 
zero. This is the drawback we touched on above, namely the structural 
implication that there must be a trade‑off among the three desired goals. 
To play down this feature, we began to refer to the entire shaded triangle 
as the favourable zone within which development actors should strive to 
achieve a positive balance among the three development goals.
If  the three sides of  the shaded triangle were imagined as folds 
in an origami model, the shaded zone would form one plane of  a 
tetrahedron (three-sided pyramid) and the goal for development policy 
or strategy would be to steer towards a position somewhere on that 
plane. This model would imply that the three (negative) points of  the 
large dotted triangle in Figure 3 would come together to form a single 
corner or apex of  the tetrahedron, thus seeming to unite inequality, 
unsustainability and insecurity/exclusivity in one place.
It is immediately obvious that by reversing the polarity of  the axes 
within the trilemma we could have used the tetrahedron to illustrate 
the bringing together of  the positive goals of  development instead 
– equality, sustainability and security/inclusion. Had we done this, 
any sub-optimal alignment of  the three goals would have produced 
a scenario that could be located geometrically at a point somewhere 
within the three-dimensional space of  the tetrahedron. As well as being 
situated at some to-be-determined distance away from the triple-positive 
apex, such a scenario would also be displaced laterally from the central 
axis of  the tetrahedron, as determined by its relationship to each of  the 
three negative apexes at the corners of  the opposite plane (i.e. the plane 
we have referred to as the ‘shaded zone’ above, but now with negative 
instead of  positive characteristics).
This visualisation might have been helpful to some of  our workshop 
participants, although depicting and discussing three-dimensional 
space is generally quite difficult. With sophisticated video graphics we 
might have achieved it, albeit at some expense. A potential drawback 
of  visually modelling the union of  three desirable development goals 
in a single apex of  a tetrahedron is that it could have undermined the 
emphasis we wanted to bring to the potential for trade‑offs and tensions 
to exist among the three competing goals.
We used the trilemma framework in the following way. After the 
discussion of  the programme theory diagrams and drivers of  change, 
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we introduced the trilemma framework and discussed its basic features 
and characteristics, as outlined above. We then set up the scenario-
building exercise. For this part of  the process, we wanted participants 
to focus at first on possible negative scenarios for the goal in which they 
were particularly interested. For example, we wanted participants in the 
‘reducing inequality’ workshop to explore scenarios of  high inequality. 
Correspondingly, we wanted the participants to address the possibility 
of  scenarios in which negative outcomes for the goal in which they 
were most interested could be associated with positive outcomes for 
the other two goals (e.g. sustainable and secure/inclusive). We asked 
the participants to undergo this discomfiting mental exercise in order 
to ensure that our process would achieve the objective of  teasing out 
possible negative associations or relationships that might be envisaged.
We illustrated this approach using Figure 4. The bold dark grey lines 
in this diagram delineate a kite-shaped scenario space, which is divided 
by the dashed line into two triangles. Both the kite and the triangles 
contain an area that falls within the shaded zone, but at first we asked 
participants to concentrate on the dotted portion, where negative 
interactions would come to the fore.
To ensure that the interaction with each of  the secondary themes of  
the workshop received proper consideration, we divided our workshop 
participants into two small groups and each group focused on one of  the 
triangles. Each small group generated the outlines of  a scenario that was 
Figure 4 Scenario spaces (example for the (in)equality scenario exercise)
Insecure and exclusionary Sustainable Unequal
 Equal Secure and inclusive
 Unsustainable
Source Authors’ own.
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dystopian to some degree. Some participants found this quite challenging 
and uncomfortable, although the exercise also created moments of  black 
humour that were helpful to the creative and imaginative atmosphere we 
wanted to sustain. The exercise also forced participants to confront some 
unpalatable possibilities in which development progress in some areas 
might not be accompanied by success in other areas and might even 
come at their expense. (For example, a world that achieves substantial 
equality in material wealth might also have levels of  consumption that 
are incompatible with ecological sustainability; or a world that achieves 
high levels of  economic security and inclusion might be highly unequal 
in the distribution of  wealth.)
The two small groups presented their dystopian scenarios to each other, and 
these were discussed for a short time before we moved to the final phase. In 
the final phase the two groups came together again and the whole group 
elaborated a third, unified scenario that integrated the interactions between 
the axis of  principal concern and both of  the other axes – in other words, a 
single scenario occupying the space of  the entire kite in Figure 4.
At this stage, our process blended the construction of  a vivid and plausible 
scenario with a discussion of  strategies, processes and policies that might 
help to steer away from dystopian or unsatisfactory scenarios towards the 
shaded zone. The shaded zone represented the future that development 
policymakers, practitioners and researchers should strive for: one that is 
secure and inclusive, sustainable, and more equal than today.
We based this part of  the workshop on the foresight method known 
as ‘wind-tunnelling’, which often concludes a scenario-building 
exercise. Wind-tunnelling may be used to assess the likely usefulness or 
effectiveness of  policies or strategies that might be adopted within the 
future scenarios that have just been created. Put another way, wind-
tunnelling can be used to think about ways to steer society towards 
desirable scenarios and away from undesirable ones (Rhydderch 2009). 
Thus, simultaneously with the construction of  the unified kite scenario 
the participants considered what it would take to navigate successfully to 
the shaded zone. As a result, rather than painting a snapshot of  a future 
world, the scenarios emphasised steps, processes and developments that 
could plausibly lead from today’s world to a desired future world that 
will be more equitable, sustainable, secure and inclusive. Our scenarios 
were set 30 years into the future, around the year 2046.
One of  our three workshops deviated from the process described 
above because, due to inconvenient scheduling and illness, we had 
fewer people in the room on the day than we had intended. To handle 
this situation, instead of  dividing the participants into two groups 
to consider the two triangular scenario zones (depicted in Figure 2) 
separately, we worked with a single group. Still focusing on the outer, 
dotted portion of  the kite at first, participants were asked to build 
a scenario for a future that would be insecure/exclusionary yet also 
sustainable and equal. This proved quite challenging but, nonetheless, 
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the workshop moved very smoothly and the participants successfully 
built a scenario that brought to the surface the interactions we wanted 
them to explore.
4 Discussion
The substantive outcomes of  our scenario workshops will be reported in 
a forthcoming project report. From a methodological point of  view, the 
workshops were very successful in generating a set of  vivid and thought-
provoking scenarios, but their chief  value emerged from the richness 
of  the discussions and debates that took place during three lively and 
stimulating days. Our process was praised by several participants, who 
found the experience enjoyable and useful to their own work.
We demanded a lot from our workshop participants. We depended 
heavily on their willingness to go along with a scenario-building process 
in which several parameters were fixed in advance, and which required 
them to perform some challenging mental gymnastics. Our experience 
was that the participants accepted these constraints and were willing 
to trust the process we had designed, even when aspects of  the exercise 
seemed contrived or uncomfortable. We believe that part of  our success 
stemmed from our ability to demonstrate that we had prepared carefully 
and in depth, and we took the time to explain our process in detail, 
allow time for discussion, and seek consent to move forward with each 
step. The programme theory diagrams we prepared served not only 
to inform the participants and prime the discussion, but also to show 
that we had made careful preparations before the workshop began. 
Several participants said that they found the diagrams informative and 
stimulating, and they appreciated the effort invested in creating and 
explaining the images.
In this regard we were helped by the richness of  the source documents 
and their suitability, as we expected, as a basis for programme theory 
analysis. It was also helpful that our workshop participants were drawn 
from among development scholars within IDS and the University of  
Sussex, most of  whom knew one another at least a little even if  they 
came from different schools or units. They shared an institutional as 
well as a professional interest in exploring the development policy 
themes discussed during the workshops, which was a source of  goodwill 
towards the process we designed.
Our two key innovations were to use programme theory analysis to 
prime the drivers of  change exercise in each scenario workshop, and to 
use the trilemma framework as a means of  focusing the scenarios. The 
programme theory analysis worked by feeding existing information into 
the process in a way that ensured participants focused on the three themes 
under consideration, while stimulating debate and still allowing plenty of  
scope for participants to bring their own insights and concerns into the 
discussion. The trilemma triangle successfully framed the scenarios as 
spaces in which to explore the interaction among the three themes and 
avoided multiplying the number of  scenarios to an unhelpful degree.
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The trilemma triangle was particularly successful in forcing participants 
to confront the possibility of  trade‑offs and tensions among the three 
themes, which helped to expose some of  the difficulties and challenges 
which might be faced in international development in the coming 
decades. The concept of  the ‘shaded zone’ and the wind‑tunnelling 
aspect of  the final scenario helped to crystallise some of  the key policy 
areas, mechanisms and intervention opportunities that might be used by 
development scholars, policymakers and practitioners to achieve their 
goals in international development.
During the scenario exercise, some participants expressed a preference 
to focus on a positive outcome for their topic of  personal interest in 
interaction with negative outcomes for the other two themes, whereas 
we asked them to take the opposite approach (as illustrated by the 
shaded/dotted kite in Figure 4, which addressed the interaction of  
inequality with sustainability and security/inclusion). We could easily 
have accommodated this preference by reversing the polarity of  the 
three axes within the trilemma. As discussed above, this might have 
worked particularly well if  we had used a tetrahedron, but that would 
have brought its own problems.
Our use of  the trilemma triangle differed from the one adopted by 
Shell. Whereas their model assumed that there must be a trade‑off 
between three forces that were mutually in tension, it was important 
for our purposes that we allowed for the possibility of  mutual harmony 
among goals while not neglecting the possibility that they might be 
antagonistic or in competition with each other.
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Food Insecurity: The Future 
Challenge*
Robin Bourgeois
Abstract At a time where the amount of food produced worldwide is 
sufficient to feed all, the number of food-insecure people remains high. 
This article presents an analysis of a number of futures studies on food 
and agriculture, at both local and global scale, and using quantitative and 
qualitative methods, with a specific focus on how they frame and address 
food security. After identifying future key drivers of change, implications 
for food security are discussed. The results show that futures studies in 
agriculture are entering into a third generation where key drivers of change 
include social and political forces as potential sources of discontinuities. It is 
proposed to move the field of futures studies from the exploration of food 
security to the exploration of food insecurity, whose multiple roots are 
anchored in social, political, economic and institutional dimensions, and to 
focus these future studies on ruptures and discontinuities rather than trends.
Keywords: Food security, futures studies, agriculture, policies, 
societal values.
1 Introduction
In 2013, at the Special Joint Meeting of  the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Economic and Financial 
Committee (EFC) of  the General Assembly on ‘food security and 
nutrition’, 11 recommendations were made to address the challenges of  
hunger and food security. These emphasised the need for an integrated 
approach to link food security with the three economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of  sustainable development. It was also 
acknowledged that the ‘global food production is sufficient – the world 
needs to focus on improving access to food and reducing food loss and 
waste’, and advocated hunger eradication as a priority for the post-2015 
development agenda (ECOSOC 2013: 5). It is against this background 
that this article discusses future perspectives for food security through a 
review of  foresight studies in this field.
Futures studies have been defined as ‘a trans-/multidisciplinary field 
of  research with a diversity of  schools of  thought, qualitative and 
quantitative methods, approaches and applications’ (Patokorpi and 
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Ahvenainen 2009: 128). Such studies commonly use one of  two 
perspectives: ‘explanatory-predictive’ or ‘proactive-creative’ (ibid.: 2009: 
129). For the purpose of  this article a futures study is considered as ‘any 
study that provides a systematic exploration of  possible futures’. This 
definition encompasses a wide range of  forward-looking approaches 
such as projections, forecast, scenario building, foresight and visioning.
The 2nd Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development 
(GCARD2) in Punta del Este, Uruguay in 2012, included a session on 
foresight (Holderness, Palmier and Strange 2013). The objective was to 
introduce and share experiences with the use of  foresight in relation to 
issues around food and agriculture. Preparation for the session included 
a review of  available foresight studies. This article presents the main 
findings of  that review. Section 2 presents the methods used for the 
review, and Section 3 presents the results. Implications and suggestions 
for further research are discussed in the final section.
2 Methodology
Foresight work around food and agriculture was identified by searching 
websites, identifying and collecting relevant documentation, and through 
a worldwide survey. The survey was prepared in seven languages and 
included questions about activities related to the future of  agriculture 
and rural development over a 20-year time horizon. It was administered 
through a web-based survey provider and invitations to participate were 
sent to 5,848 organisations or individuals which included all GFAR and 
Institutional Learning and Change Initiative of  the CGIAR (ILAC) 
partners.1 The survey remained accessible online for seven weeks and 
three reminders were sent during this period. The vast majority (93 per 
cent) of  the email invitations were successfully delivered. In total 1,136 
surveys (20 per cent) were submitted, of  which 620 were complete and 
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Table 1 Titles in the ‘The Futures of Agriculture’ series
Global studies
Brief No. 01: Sustainable Food Consumption and Production in a Resource-constrained World (SCAR3)
Brief No. 02: A Table for Seven Billion: Six Billion have Enough to Eat – (Only) One Billion to Go (Oxfam)
Brief No. 09: Biofuels and Agricultural Markets: Implications for Food Security (IFPRI Biofuel)
Brief No. 13: Towards Sustainable World Food Systems: Drivers, Key Issues and Research Needs (Dualine)
Brief No. 15: Does Less Meat for Some Mean Cheaper Food for Others? (IFPRI Changing Diets)
Brief No. 16: Exploring the Limits of Food and Farming Systems: The Agrimonde Scenarios (Agrimonde)
Brief No. 17: World Food Supply in a Context of Environmental Change and Increasingly Competing Claims on Natural 
Resources (PBL)
Brief No. 21: Debunking the Water Scarcity Myth: Understanding Future Water Use Challenges (BFP/CIAT)
Brief No. 38: What are the Likely Developments in World Agriculture towards 2050? (FAO AT2050)
Brief No. 40: What Challenges is Agriculture Facing? Five Scenarios for 2050 (SUAS2050)
Brief No. 42: The Future of Food and Farming (UKForesight)
Brief No. 43: The Livestock–Climate–Poverty Nexus (ILRI)
Regional studies
Brief No. 03: No Foresight, No Food? Regional Scenarios for Africa and South Asia (CCAFS)
Brief No. 05: Foresight Prompts Researchers in Pest Management to Look Beyond Research (Endure)
Brief No. 07: The Future of Rural Europe: Lessons from a Multi-scale Modeling Approaches (Eururalis)
Brief No. 08: Shaping French Transdisciplinary Research Priorities for the Mediterranean (PARME)
Brief No. 11: Food Security in the Mediterranean in 2030: From Foresight to Research Priorities (SAMAQQ)
Brief No. 14: How Might Agriculture Develop in Southern Africa? Making Sense of Complexity (SASP)
Brief No. 19: Evolving Towards a Low-Carbon Society (APEC-LCS)
Brief No. 25: Tres escenarios y un ‘trilema’ (FONTAGRO)
Brief No. 28: Posibles escenarios para la investigación, la innovación y el desarrollo en los países de Cono Sur (CONOSUR)
Brief No. 31: I’d Rather be Foresighted than Myopic: Foresight Exercises for Agriculture, Food Security, and R&D in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC_Foresight)
National/local studies
Brief No. 04: Teagasc 2030: Creating Knowledge for Ireland’s Bioeconomy (Teagasc2030)
Brief No. 10: Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy (BFAP): Your Partner in Decision Making (BFAP)
Brief No. 18: Seeking Harmony: Scenarios for Nature Conservation and Agricultural Development in Kapuas Hulu District, 
Indonesia (CoLUPSIA1)
Brief No. 20: Shaping the Future for Agriculture in Taiwan (Taiwan2025)
cont./
74 | Bourgeois Food Insecurity: The Future Challenge
Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’
Table 1 Titles in the ‘The Futures of Agriculture’ series (cont.)
Brief No. 23: Fallen, Wild or Planted? The Future of Thai Agriculture (Thai2020)
Brief No. 26: Preparing for Emerging Challenges to Animal Health in Canada (Fore-Can)
Brief No. 27: A Quarter Century of Forward-looking Policy Analysis (FAPRI-MU)
Brief No. 30: Can Climate Change Affect the Future of Crop Production in Brazil? (SCAF Brazil)
Brief No. 32: El futuro ambiental de una provincia: Mendoza al año 2030 (Mendoza2030)
Brief No. 33: Can Brazil Feed the World? Not Yet, But it has the Potential! (IPEA)
Brief No. 34: Chile agroalimentario, forestal y rural al 2030 (Chile2030)
Brief No. 35: Securing and Building the Future of Quebec Agriculture and Agrifood (Quebec)
Brief No. 36: Building the 5th Strategic Plan of Embrapa 2008–2023 (EMBRAPA5SP)
Brief No. 37: Innovar para un agro colombiano competitivo (AgroColombiano)
Brief No. 39: Building a Shared Vision: Scenarios for Collaborative Land Use Planning in Seram Island, Central Moluccas 
Regency, Indonesia (CoLUPSIA2)
Brief No. 41: Agriculture 2030: A future for Morocco (Morocco2030)
Source: Author’s own.
included in the analysis. This rate of  response was considered acceptable 
given the very specific nature of  the survey and the fact that invitations 
were sent to a broad list of  individuals and organisations.
A total of  411 respondents indicated that they had engaged in 
foresight activities related to agriculture, rural development or farming 
systems. They were all subsequently contacted and asked to provide 
documentation of  this work. This documentation was screened by a 
group of  12 foresight specialists drawn from international research 
centres (4), universities (3), national research centres and organisations 
(5), and representing eight different countries.
Only studies that met the following three criteria were included in the 
analysis: (1) the work was recent (published or completed less than five 
years before the survey); (2) the time horizon of  the study was at least 
ten years ahead; and (3) the core issues related to agriculture, rural 
development and/or farming systems.
Survey respondents were also asked to identify any other relevant 
studies of  which they were aware. Simultaneously, a multilingual group 
of  interns conducted a literature and web search for additional studies 
that met the same three criteria.
Altogether 65 studies were identified that met these criteria. Authors 
of  these studies were invited to attend one of  three workshops at which 
they would be assisted to produce a short four-page summary or brief  
of  their study. All the briefs shared a common format covering: content, 
process, impact and lessons learned. Some authors who could not 
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attend a workshop accepted to work remotely on their brief. In total, 
38 briefs were produced and published in an open access series called 
‘The Futures of  Agriculture’ (Table 1).2
The whole process is outlined in Figure 1. The analysis provided in the 
remainder of  this article is based on the 38 briefs.
3 Findings
The scale of  the 38 studies ranged from global (12) or regional (10) 
to national (12) or sub-national (4). The methods used in the original 
studies, reflecting the nature of  the data used and the knowledge 
generation process, were grouped as either quantitative, qualitative or 
mixed. Quantitative studies use exclusively methods such as projections, 
trend analysis and modelling, while qualitative studies use exclusively 
methods such as exploratory scenarios, Delphi and horizon scanning. 
Mixed studies combine quantitative and qualitative methods. In total, 
four studies used quantitative methods, 12 used mixed methods and 22 
used qualitative methods (Figure 2).
Analysis of  the distribution of  key topics addressed by these studies 
shows that food security was the most important topic at the global and 
regional scales, while productivity and sustainability are more important 
at national scale (Table 2).
Drivers are defined as ‘factors causing change, affecting or shaping the 
future’.3 Analysing drivers is important because it helps understand what 
forces have been, and could be at play with a potential to transform the 
current situation into alternative and plausible futures (Godet 1986; 
Saritas and Smith 2011). Drivers are related to the analysis of  the causal 
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relations behind an observed phenomenon (hunger in this case) and 
unveil the worldviews on which futures studies are designed by their 
authors (Inayatullah 1998). In the 38 studies eight clusters of  drivers 
were identified, which are described in turn below.
Climate change: Twenty-two studies refer to climate change as a global 
constraint to be taken into consideration through adaptation strategies. 
Nine of  them are global studies; seven are regional studies and five are 
national studies. However, four global studies (Briefs 21, 40, 42, 43), 
two regional studies (Briefs 11, 19) and three national/local studies 
(Briefs 23, 30, 34) directly and explicitly integrate climate change as 
a key driver. Most integrate climate change into their scenarios and 
analyse its implications for food and agriculture (Briefs 11, 19, 21, 23, 
30, 34). A key challenge is coping with increasing uncertainty due to 
more frequent and unpredictable weather events. In the worst scenarios, 
major disruptions from climate change reduce agricultural outputs 
and threaten the lives of  the most vulnerable population. Most studies 
assume that timely corrective actions can prevent or mitigate negative 
impacts, but such actions will require significant change in policy and 
social behaviour. The concept of  ‘no regret’ actions (actions which 
would be beneficial even in the case of  no climate change) is proposed 
in Brazil (Brief  30); while in Asia, it is assumed that greater accuracy 
of  climate modelling due to increased computer processing power will 
facilitate movement towards a low carbon society (Brief  19).
Demography: Five global, four regional and three local studies give 
prominence to demography. The most frequently cited issue is population 
growth (Briefs 07, 08, 17, 21, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42) followed by variables 
linked to the distribution of  population such as urbanisation, migration 
and density (Briefs 08, 11, 21, 31, 41) and structure of  the population, 
including ageing (Briefs 08, 11, 21, 31). Five studies explicitly take 
demographic variables as key drivers of  change (Briefs 07, 17, 21, 38, 40). 
The main challenge seen to arise from population growth and distribution 
is total food availability. These studies also highlight local conditions and 
dynamics linking demography and food security (Briefs 07, 38, 40).
Trade and markets: Nineteen studies included trade and markets 
in their analysis. Seven of  them (one global, three regional and three 
Table 2 Distribution of topics according to the scale of the studies
Topic
Scale Food security Productivity Sustainability
Global 12 (100%) 7 (60%) 8 (75%)
Regional 5 (40%) 3 (30%) 3 (30%)
National 4 (25%) 6 (40%) 6 (40%)
Note A study may combine different topics.  
Source Author’s own.
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national studies) used trade and market as drivers of  change (Briefs 
07, 16, 25, 36, 28, 41). They highlight the role of  regulation, such as 
trade and market barriers, in shaping future food security. These studies 
converge around scenarios that contrast future trade regimes: a liberal 
world led by global market forces; a world of  global trade regulated by 
international institutions; and a world of  regional or fragmented trade 
and markets. They all consider that deregulated trade would threaten 
sustainability and increase food insecurity and inequality. Some studies 
explore strategies related to the evolution of  global trade. For example, 
the study by FONTAGRO concentrates on a more competitive, efficient 
and sustainable family agriculture based on links with markets and 
better knowledge flows, better use of  natural resources and adaptation to 
climate change (Brief  25). In the Morocco study, three scenarios of  trade 
regulation were developed and led to the design of  the ‘Plan Maroc Vert’. 
This plan is based on two pillars for agricultural development: the first 
pillar supports the integration of  agricultural and agro-industrial firms 
in the world economy while the second seeks to modernise a small-scale 
agriculture based on solidarity, and supported by public intervention 
linking local entrepreneurship and community development (Brief  41). 
In the Agrimonde study, an economic growth scenario is opposed to an 
ecosystem preservation scenario. However, the conclusion is that in both 
scenarios food trade will remain necessary to secure regional food needs, 
and that global food security in 2050 will be primarily a matter of  food 
access as opposed to food availability (Brief  16).
Income and growth: Four studies cited income or economic 
development and growth as key drivers of  change (Briefs 07, 13, 31, 40). 
The key linkage is how economic growth drives change in consumption 
patterns, with potential ramifications throughout the food system. The 
Dualine case study states that ‘when incomes increase we observe an 
increase in calorie consumption, then an increase in the share of  calories 
from animal products and then stabilisation’ (Brief  13). Economic 
growth and rising income can be associated with different outcomes. On 
the one hand, global food security improves, but on the other, nutrition 
and health problems such as obesity are on the rise. Income distribution 
is also critical: although production might increase enough to satisfy 
global needs, there is no guarantee that food insecurity will be abated.
Technology: Five global, four regional and six national studies included 
technology as a driver of  change. They mainly take technology in a 
broad sense (Briefs 09, 16, 21, 25, 28, 40, 41). For example, in some 
studies intensification under a productivity paradigm is contrasted 
with agroecology or ecological intensification (Briefs 16, 25, 28). The 
Agrimonde study suggests that food security can be achieved through 
an alternative paradigm of  ecological intensification, while the Morocco 
study suggests that different technological paths are needed to support 
different farming systems. However, most studies also link shifts in 
the technology paradigm to a shift in societal values and policies, so 
that food security and sustainability are not necessarily in tension. 
This is highlighted in Brief  09 which suggests that new generations 
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technology may reduce negative impacts of  biofuel production on food 
security. However, the case of  the river basins in Brief  21 shows also 
that technology must be considered in a wider context of  potentially 
conflicting objectives and trade-offs (e.g. a dam for hydro energy 
threatening fishery and rice production).
Some of  the studies address the question of  farming systems with the 
future being characterised by a divide between technology and capital-
intensive systems, often at large-scale, and ecologically-oriented systems, 
often associated with small-scale, family-based agriculture (Brief  17). 
The first type is associated with trends towards more concentrated 
commodity production for mass consumption. The second takes 
different forms according to the location (small-size family farming 
in regions where people are poor and levels of  education are low, 
where farming can play an important role in the economy and social 
life – Brief  41), or hobby or part-time farming for a more diversified 
consumption and/or niche markets. Interactions between different types 
of  farms are also highlighted leading to the question: how can different 
farms coexist in the same geographic and economic space (Brief  02, 03, 
08, 41)? Indeed, many studies consider the possibilities of  alternative 
futures with different ways of  farming, providing insights on potential 
evolution and challenges (Briefs 02, 03, 04, 05, 17, 23, 41) or priorities 
(Briefs 20, 36, 41) for farmers and future farming patterns.
Consumption patterns: In 13 studies, change in food consumption 
is explicitly considered as a driver of  future production patterns and 
food security. Of  these, eight consider consumer behaviour as a global 
driver, with most highlighting the trend towards the standardisation of  
Westernised consumption patterns with more animal proteins and higher 
calorie intake (Briefs 01, 15, 38, 42). Change in consumption patterns 
is related to other drivers such as income growth and urbanisation 
(Briefs 13, 38). Policy is seen as having a crucial role through its 
potential to influence food consumption patterns (Brief  01). Waste 
and loss management emerges as an area where policy can influence 
both production and consumption. Some studies suggest possible 
ruptures where food demand becomes more regional and diversified, 
and where dietary patterns could evolve in contrasted ways, including 
a possible decrease in the consumption of  animal protein and healthier 
more diversified diets (Briefs 01, 15, 16, 42). Two studies suggest that 
convergence of  dietary patterns is not inevitable (Briefs 13, 38).
Policy: Policy is presented as a key driver of  change in 30 studies. In 
the national studies it is presented as one of  the two axes of  uncertainty 
used to build scenarios of  the future of  agriculture in Southern Africa 
(Brief  14) and in Thailand (Brief  23). It is also one of  the six drivers on 
which scenarios for nature conservation and agricultural development 
were built in Kapuas Hulu district, Indonesia (Brief  18). Several policy 
variables were combined to build scenarios for collaborative land use 
planning on Seram Island, also in Indonesia (Brief  39). National trade 
policy is the main driver of  the three scenarios in the case of  agriculture 
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in Morocco (Brief  41). Policy is also constitutive of  the axis on the 
national environment for research, development and innovation in 
the scenarios used to build the 5th Action Plan of  Embrapa in Brazil 
(Brief  36). Most studies consider policy as a driver of  change towards 
non-trend scenarios, or as a potential factor of  discontinuity. That policy 
matters is thus not just a general statement; some of  the studies go 
deeper and suggest how policies can shape the future. These include, for 
example, governance and cooperation styles such as the respective role 
of  state and non-state actors (Brief  03), or power relations (Brief  40).
Societal values: Twelve studies include societal drivers of  change, such 
as values, behaviour (excluding consumer behaviour) and education. 
Seven studies take a national or local perspective, and highlight the 
importance of  social values in preparing for emerging challenges to 
animal health (Brief  26), evolving towards more sustainable use of  
resources (Briefs 19, 32), land use planning (Briefs 18, 39), building 
scenarios for research or development (Briefs 28, 41). These studies 
show how important societal drivers are for food security and 
sustainability, and that food and agriculture cannot be dissociated from 
their socioeconomic and cultural environment. As stated in Brief  21, 
food security ‘is not about food, it is about peoples’ lives’.
4 Discussion and implications
Figure 3 shows how the drivers highlighted in the studies are linked to 
hunger. These foresight studies suggest a strong association between food 
security and climate change (i.e. changes in temperature, rainfall and 
frequency of  climatic hazards compared to the past) and demography 
(i.e. changes in the number and distribution of  people on earth) (Khan 
et al. 2014; Reilly and Willenbockel 2010; Beddington et al. 2012; Vervoort 
et al. 2014). The studies also show a strong tendency to highlight policy 
and governance as key drivers; indeed policy and governance are 
increasingly considered not just as part of  the solution but also as part of  
the problem. Consumption patterns and societal values are emerging from 
this inventory as new drivers of  change (de Haen and Réquillart 2014).
These observations resonate with other work which suggests an 
evolution in the focus on futures studies through three stages (Georghiou 
and Keenan 2006; Georghiou 2003): technological forecasting; 
integration of  technology and markets; and integration of  technology, 
markets and social dimensions.
Although food security is widely recognised as encompassing four 
dimensions – availability, access, utilisation and stability (FAO 2009) 
– availability continues to dominate debate (Khan et al. 2014; van 
Dijk and Meijerink 2014). Yet, several global studies and most of  the 
regional and national studies reviewed here emphasise the importance 
of  access to food. In this sense they are in line with other foresight work 
on food security (de Haen and Réquillart 2014; Hubert et al. 2010). 
Indeed, others acknowledge that ‘global food security is not only about 
producing enough food for the world’s population. Questions of  access 
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need to run alongside those of  availability’ (The Royal Society 2009). 
The most recent version of  FAO’s Outlook 2050 indicates:
Based on our assessment of  world agricultural resources, it seems 
that at the global level there should be no major constraints to 
increasing agricultural produce by the amounts required to satisfy the 
additional demand generated by population and income growth to 
2050 (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012).
The core issue is that, while there is enough food currently produced to 
feed the world’s population, around 1 billion people today remain food-
insecure (Ingram 2011). What might happen to them in the future has 
not yet been explored.
I argue that foresight studies should now systematically address the 
question of  accessibility. To do this the focus must evolve from global 
food security, with its implicit emphasis on quantities, production, 
productivity and technology, to the question of  food insecurity and its 




























Figure 3 Drivers of hunger highlighted in the briefs 
Note Drivers indicative of 1st and 2nd generation studies are in light grey boxes, while those associated with emerging drivers 
indicative of 3rd generation studies are in dark grey boxes. Connecting arrows represent influences as highlighted in the case 
studies. Arrows linking drivers with hunger are labelled with regards to the four dimensions of food security each driver is 
directly affecting (food availability, food utilisation, food access and food stability).  
Source Author’s own.
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The emergence of  policy, social and behavioural drivers in foresight 
studies is to be welcomed. Indeed, many previous foresight studies, 
especially those focused on technology, concluded with policy 
recommendations but they saw policy as an external factor. As a result, 
these recommendations were of  limited relevance to policy processes. 
In most recent foresight work, policymakers and a greater number of  
stakeholders more generally are now no longer seen as simply end users. 
Foresight on food security, agriculture and rural development is entering 
what foresight scholars have coined the third generation of  foresight 
(Georghiou and Keenan 2006). Third generation foresight adds a social 
perspective to the traditional technology and market perspectives; social 
factors and behaviour are becoming major drivers of  change (Cachia, 
Compañó and Da Costa 2007). This resonates with earlier findings on 
the futures of  the food system, highlighting the inclusion of  changes in 
political, social and economic processes (Erb et al. 2009).
The recognition of  the importance of  societal values, social behaviour 
and policies also highlights the need for foresight approaches that 
integrate local perspectives. These questions were not ignored in 
foresight studies reviewed here, but as a majority of  these studies used 
modelling approaches they were constrained in their ability to grapple 
with issues such as rights, power and institutions. Clearly there is an 
important role for mixed methods approaches which will allow the 
exploration of  disruptive scenarios.
5 Conclusion
The 38 futures studies reviewed in this article were selected through an 
open process and met three simple criteria. Their scale ranged from 
sub-national studies to global studies and they are based on a diversity 
of  approaches and methods.
The analysis of  these studies casts some light on possible new 
orientations for foresight studies in relation to the challenge of  hunger. 
Specifically, the future of  the populations who are food-insecure today 
is not just bound to the total amount of  food that will be available in the 
future. Policy, cultural values and individual and collective behaviours 
have the potential to disrupt today’s undesirable paths, which are driven 
by demographic, climatic and economic trends.
This is a call for foresight studies that can help support a fundamental 
re-thinking of  the global food system. It is a call for reflection on 
societal choices related to how and by whom food will be produced and 
consumed. A shift from focusing on food security to food insecurity, 
and from technology to people, institutions and society, and a more 
systematic inclusion of  the local dimension will allow foresight studies 
to be more relevant to the transformative agenda that is integral to the 
Sustainable Development Goals.
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Notes
*  The author wishes to express his recognition to all the colleagues who 
contributed to the screening and selection of  the relevant case studies 
from more than 400 source documents, as well as all the authors 
who have accepted to write the briefs. The inventory would not have 
been possible without the support of  the Institutional Learning and 
Change project, and in particular Javier Ekboir, Christian Sette and 
Cedric Egal, as well as the seven interns who have contributed to the 
web scanning of  relevant foresight studies. I extend my gratitude to 
Mariana Wongtschowski and Gerald Baltissen, the facilitators of  the 
write workshops where the briefs were produced. This work would 
not have been completed without the financial support of  the French 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs. I dedicate this work to the memory of  
Dr Enrique Alarcon, who so kindly accepted to accompany us during 
this process in Latin America but could not see its results.
1 For more on the survey and respondents, see www.egfar.org/sites/
default/files/files/Report_Inventory.pdf. GFAR = Global Forum 
on Agricultural Research. CGIAR = Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research.
2 www.gfar.net/information-gateway/. Search ‘The Futures of  
Agriculture’ in the search engine to access the briefs.
3 Source: http://bit.ly/FTPglossary. 
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Managing Waste in India with 
Foresight*
Ashish Chaturvedi and Jai Kumar Gaurav
Abstract With rising prosperity and urbanisation in emerging and 
developing economies there has been a rapid expansion of waste 
generation. India, with an urban population of 377 million that is expected 
to reach 590 million by 2030, is also facing an unprecedented challenge of 
waste management. Significant uncertainties about the future trajectories 
of waste management exist, including the concept of waste as a resource 
and the role of the informal sector. This article describes an analytical 
framework that combines foresight and political economy methods used 
in a multi-stakeholder workshop setting to develop future scenarios for 
the sector. The process provides insights to increase participation in waste 
management policymaking in India by opening up the process beyond 
expert committees. The use of foresight tools with political economy 
analysis has the potential to democratise the policymaking process of waste 
management in India for the inclusion of all stakeholders and particularly 
the informal sector.
Keywords: Foresight, political economy, waste management, 
urbanisation, informal sector, stakeholder engagement, policymaking.
1 Introduction
The rising prosperity of  emerging and developing economies is 
accompanied by rapid, and in most cases unplanned, urbanisation. 
Urban centres are concentrated areas of  population, economic growth 
and material prosperity. However, such concentration of  material 
prosperity and population has an undesirable consequence – it leads to 
the rapid expansion of  waste generation. In many cases the challenge 
of  managing the rising quantity of  waste is further exacerbated by the 
limited capacities of  the local authorities.
We focus on the challenge of  waste management in urban India. With 
the possible exception of  China, India is urbanising at an unprecedented 
pace and scale. The current urban population of  377 million (Ministry 
of  Home Affairs 2011) is projected to reach more than 590 million by 
2030 (McKinsey Global Institute 2010). However, the rate of  growth 
of  waste generation is more than twice the rate of  growth of  urban 
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population.1 The health and environmental impacts of  rapidly rising 
waste are largely due to the lack of  infrastructure to collect and treat it. 
Only 65 per cent of  the waste generated gets collected from households 
while the remainder gets dumped in solid waste disposal sites (CPCB 
2014). The collection rate of  65 per cent in India is lower than the 
average of  68 per cent for other lower middle-income countries and 
waste generation per capita is likely to increase by more than 50 per cent 
in the next ten years (Hoornweg and Bhada-Tata 2012: 86).2
In India, the responsibility of  municipal solid waste management 
(MSWM) lies with the local government, referred to as ‘urban local 
bodies’ (ULBs). While various policies for MSWM exist, none of  them 
have been able to significantly improve waste treatment thus far. The 
very detailed MSW Rules (2000) have been effectively implemented only 
in a few municipalities. Although the MSW Rules require ULBs to report 
on the status of  MSWM, in 2013–14, out of  a total 3,839 ULBs, only 
one third provided such a report to the Central Pollution Control Board 
(CPCB 2014). This suggests widespread non-compliance even after 15 
years of  the notification of  the MSW Rules. Such non-compliance could 
be ascribed to limited access to funding, and technical and management 
capacities at the municipal level (MoUD and CPHEEO 2014).
The widespread failure to effectively manage waste by the ULBs 
has created the space for the private sector as a solution provider. 
Traditionally, private sector actors in the waste sector consisted of  
the large numbers of  informal micro, small and medium enterprises 
(collectively known as the informal sector) engaged in collecting, 
segregating and recycling municipal solid waste. Medina (2007) 
estimates that around 2 per cent of  the population in developing 
countries depend on waste picking or the informal waste management 
sector for their livelihood. Although the exact numbers are not available 
for India, there is a widespread informal sector in large Indian cities 
that significantly reduces the burden of  the municipalities by managing 
certain fractions of  waste. Such private sector participation is not 
mediated by the ULBs and largely operates without any state support.
However, over the last decade, there has been a concerted effort to 
privatise waste management and transfer the responsibilities of  waste 
management to companies contracted by the ULBs. The decision to 
privatise waste management is driven by the belief  that due to better 
access to funding, technology and more cost-effective solutions, the 
participation of  the private sector can reduce the burden on ULBs and 
modernise waste management (Dukhan, Bourbon-Seclet and Yannic 
2012: 9). Such privatisation has relied on the participation of  large, 
and formal, waste management companies. The entry of  these large 
companies was facilitated significantly by the launch of  a large urban 
reform project initiated by the Government of  India, the Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) in 2006. Under 
the JNNURM, 46 cities with a million-plus population embarked on 
modernising their solid waste management sector in partnership with the 
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private sector. Most of  the additional central assistance (ACA) from the 
Government of  India, amounting to nearly INR 11.2 billion, was given 
to the large waste management companies (Government of  India 2014).
Despite the presence of  a large informal sector, private sector 
participation in the municipal solid waste context has predominantly 
focused on formal waste management companies that have been able 
to access government support and expand their operations. The role 
of  the informal sector as private actors has not been acknowledged by 
the government to the same degree, leading to an underestimation of  
their contribution, and has also caused conflicts at different levels that 
undermine the potential of  both (Chaturvedi, Arora and Saluja 2015: 8).
The discussion above suggests two defining characteristics of  waste 
management in India. First, there are significant uncertainties about its 
future trajectories. We focus on the critical uncertainty related to the 
very conception of  waste. Given the current scenario in India, it is not 
certain whether in the near future waste will continue to be dumped 
in landfills or whether it will be considered as a resource. Additional 
uncertainty is regarding the role of  the informal sector. It is not clear 
whether the focus on privatisation of  waste management will yield the 
desired results and lead to the further marginalisation of  the informal 
sector, resulting in widespread loss of  economic opportunities for the 
urban poor. The second defining characteristic of  waste management 
in India is the presence of  multiple actors who have several, and often 
conflicting, objectives. Understanding the complex interplay between 
the actors and their objectives and how they play out under different 
approaches (and technologies) is critical for designing and implementing 
effective interventions. The implication of  such a diversity of  actors and 
objectives is that the solid waste management sector is embedded in, 
and mediated by, a political framework with uneven power geometries, 
local political contexts and relations between stakeholders (Yates 
and Gutberlet 2011: 639). Consequently, these actors with their own 
conceptions of  the future would like to influence developments in the 
sector such that they help meet their objectives.
In this article, we describe the experience of  using foresight methods to 
deal with the complex and uncertain challenge of  waste management in 
large cities of  India. An analytical framework is developed to address the 
critical issues of  whether waste is conceived of  as a burden or as a resource 
and what the role of  the informal sector in future waste management 
will be. We also describe how combining foresight methods with political 
economy analysis allows us to identify the alliances that can drive progress 
within scenarios and also identify pathways between scenarios.
In what follows, Section 2 describes the analytical framework that 
combines foresight and political economy methods. In Section 3, we 
describe the results from applying the analytical framework to the 
context of  waste management in India. Section 4 describes the lessons 
from the process of  using foresight methods, while Section 5 concludes.
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2 Analytical framework
In order to put some order into the uncertain and complex world of  
waste management in urban India, we use two different methods. To 
deal with uncertainty about the future we structure the research along 
four steps of  foresight (horizon scanning) methods (Foresight HSC 2009) 
as follows.
Scoping: As a first step, we developed a scoping note that specified 
the key research question and identified the target group. The overall 
research question was: Who will drive the transformation from a waste 
management perspective to an inclusive resource management perspective in urban areas 
of  developing economies? The key target group for the research was city-level 
policymakers. The other key target group was the stakeholders who 
work with the policymakers and advise or influence their thinking on 
waste management. This group included those working with and for the 
informal sector, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
other civil society groups, waste management consultants and the media.
Ordering: As a next step, based on secondary research, we identified 
the drivers for waste management in developing countries. This allowed 
us to identify the two critical dimensions in relation to the research 
question. The first is the continuum between waste and resource 
management. The two ends of  the waste–resource management 
continuum can be described thus: when all waste is dumped into a 
landfill and nothing is recovered, the value of  waste is close to zero. On 
the other hand, if  all the embedded resources (materials and energy) 
are recovered from the waste, the value of  waste is enhanced and it 
is described as a resource in the proposed framework. The second 
dimension is the continuum between working with the informal sector 
and working against the informal sector. These combinations of  the two 
dimensions were used to create the four scenarios.
Implications: During a workshop in Delhi, participants characterised 
the actors, infrastructure and governance elements of  the four scenarios. 
The participants developed the four scenarios in a pre-specified 
structure.
Integrating futures: The insights from the steps outlined were used 
to develop recommendations that would provide strategic direction to 
decision-makers currently working on waste/resource management.
Our focus on the two critical uncertainties allows us to identify a range 
of  future scenarios and reflects the current focus of  waste management 
policy in India as well as globally. The first uncertainty relates to whether 
waste would continue to be treated as a problem to be managed or 
would be considered as a resource that can be utilised. There is a 
growing realisation that the linear economic model of  ‘take, make 
and dispose’ is reaching its final limits. Therefore, concepts like that 
of  a circular economy that is restorative and regenerative by design, 
and aims to keep products, components, and materials at their highest 
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utility and value at all times are gaining traction (Ellen MacArthur 
Foundation 2016). The ‘3R’ principle – reduction, reuse, and recycling – 
is considered a measure for developing the circular economy (Zengwei, 
Jun and Yuichi 2006: 5). The 3R principle has direct relevance for the 
waste management sector in developing countries as they have to spend 
around US$46 billion annually on MSW management with an unmet 
need of  another US$40 billion to cover the service delivery gap. There 
is increasing focus on using waste as a valuable resource to help ease the 
financial and resource constraints arising due to the increasing quantity 
of  waste originating in developing countries (Le Courtois 2012: 3–4). 
However, moving from waste management to resource management 
requires significant investment and even the private sector is unable to 
access adequate finance for such projects (Aulakh and Thorpe 2011: 60). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that if  a local government is not able 
to manage waste using its own resources, it will be challenging to engage 
a private enterprise to successfully provide the services (Coad 2005: 3). 
Therefore, the challenge of  moving from waste management to resource 
management is much more pronounced in developing countries.
The second critical uncertainty in our framework is about the extent of  
involvement of  the informal sector in managing urban waste. It is widely 
known that the informal sector plays a crucial role in management of  
MSW presently but government policies, particularly in India, favour 
formal ‘end of  pipe’ solutions like waste to energy plants that are likely 
to limit access to waste for the informal sector (Schindler, Demaria 
and Pandit 2012: 18–19). Existing literature also suggests that informal 
sector operations have a net benefit in terms of  economic, social and 
environmental impacts while formal waste management operations have 
a net cost (Ezeah, Fazakerley and Roberts 2013: 2514). The criticism of  
informal sector operations includes the health risks arising due to limited 
awareness or consideration for occupational health and safety by the 
informal sector (Ezeah et al. 2009). Informal sector workers and their 
families living near open dumps and landfills are highly susceptible to 
diseases and occupational health risks (Gutberlet and Baeder 2008: 1–5).
It has been highlighted by several studies that the informal sector 
operates in a very hostile social, physical environment and suffers 
discrimination, prejudice, repression, neglect and exploitation (Wilson, 
Velis and Cheeseman 2006; Sembiring and Nitivattananon 2010). 
Therefore, it has been suggested to legalise safe informal waste 
management activities by preparing educational toolkits, creating 
social support programmes, as well as providing strategic planning and 
technical and managerial guidance to the informal sector (Gunsilius 
2012: 2–4). In addition, to provide new service roles and niches to the 
informal sector, Wilson et al. (2009: 63) recommended that cooperatives 
should be formed and informal actors should be part of  waste 
management planning processes. There is a need for change in attitude 
and perception of  the public towards the informal sector enabling the 
integration of  the informal sector with the formal sector (Masood and 
Barlow 2013: 96).
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Using the ‘two axes method’ (Foresight HSC 2009), two critical 
uncertainties define the boundaries of  four scenarios. Figure 1 presents 
the two axes and the four resulting scenarios described in detail in the 
subsequent sections.
Based on the scenario descriptions developed by the workshop 
participants, the objectives of  the key actors were distilled. Identification 
of  actors whose objectives align allows us to detect relationships that 
are critical to make the scenario stable. If  these relationships unravel, 
then it is likely that the scenario might transform into one of  the other 
scenarios or might lead to a completely new scenario. To organise 
the actors and objectives and the identification of  alliances, we use 
the methodology developed under the Political Economy Analysis of  
Climate Change Policies (PEACH) project for rapid political economy 
diagnosis (Schmitz 2012). In the scenario descriptions, Table 1 was used 
to summarise the actors and their objectives.
It is clear from Table 1 that the actors involved in waste management 
could have several, and different, objectives. Even if  some actors have the 
same objectives, their priorities (rankings of  the objectives) might differ. 
However, the critical task is to identify where and when actors whose 
priorities might be markedly different would come together and form 
alliances. For instance, the local government’s highest priority is often a 
clean city. It could, however, ally with actors whose priorities might be 
different from its own as long as there is alignment over other objectives. 
The informal sector’s highest priority may be protection of  their jobs 
and livelihoods. The local government would form an alliance with the 
informal sector if, in addition to a clean city, it is also concerned about 
jobs in the local economy. However, if  it is not concerned about jobs, 
Figure 1 The four potential scenarios 
Source Authors’ own.
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but only about the resource value of  waste, it might ally with the private 
formal sector whose top priority is likely to value recovery from waste.
The illustration above suggests that in political economy analysis it is 
essential to pin down the core objectives because they help identify and 
group together actors whose objectives align, although the reasons for the 
alignment of  objectives might vary. In what follows, we use this notion 
of  alignment of  objectives to understand the stability properties of  the 
scenarios as well as characterise the intra- and inter-scenario dynamics.
3 Scenarios
Based on the analytical framework developed in Section 2, as a first 
step in developing the scenarios, we organised a workshop in Delhi 
in October 2014 in partnership with a local NGO and a bilateral 
technical cooperation agency. All the relevant stakeholder groups – 
city-level policymakers, informal sector, NGOs, civil society groups, 
waste management consultants, formal sector, donors and media 
representatives – were invited. Before the workshop, a scoping note was 
shared with all participants, along with the research question and some 
background information describing the foresight methods.
The workshop began with a brief  introduction to the waste 
management challenge and the overall research question. A foresight 
expert then provided an overview of  the methodology. As a next step, 
the ‘two axes method’ used to generate the four scenarios was explained. 
After a brief  discussion on the key drivers for waste management in 
the Indian context, a brief  rationale was provided for the choice of  
the two critical uncertainties that were the basis for generating the 
four scenarios. To facilitate comparison across the different scenarios, 
the participants were provided a common structure along which the 
four scenarios had to be developed. Each scenario was given a distinct 
memorable name capturing its key characteristics. The participants 
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Source Authors’ own based on method used in PEACH project (Schmitz 2012).
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were requested to respect the boundaries of  each scenario to ensure 
their distinctiveness. The participants were then randomly assigned 
to the four scenarios to ensure that different stakeholder groups were 
represented in each group.
The main characteristics of  the four scenarios as discussed during the 
workshop are summarised next.
3.1 Scenario 1: State of Nature
Business-as-usual in many urban agglomerations around the developing 
world.
Attitudes to waste: Typical linear models of  make-use-throw; waste is a 
problem that needs to be ‘managed’; informal sector is ‘part of  the problem’ 
(despite reducing burden on local government); limited engagement by 
manufacturers whose products (or packaging) generates waste.
Waste management process: Where there is a market, some household 
waste is collected, segregated and recycled by informal sector; outside 
legal framework; unsorted waste collected by private companies 
contracted by city governments (financed by taxes on property and 
subsidised by central government); waste is then either deposited at 
secondary collection points or sent directly to transfer stations; eventually 
transported to landfills – essentially open dumping grounds with limited 
energy recovery; informal sector further segregates waste at secondary 
waste dumps or landfills, ‘cherry-picking’ the valuable material.
Consequences: Lack of  scientific disposal mechanisms and capacity 
constraints leads to widespread open dumping of  waste, resulting 
in ‘mini’ landfills around the city. Waste is openly burnt due to the 
odour from dumps; policy instruments such as extended producer 
responsibility (EPR)3 neither understood nor applied.
Key issues: Limited incentives for private sector to develop innovative 
technologies; grass-roots innovation driven by informal sector; however, 
little attention to environment health and safety norms; conflict between 
formal and informal sector – resulting in lobby groups and alliances.
3.2 Scenario 2: The Revolutionary Margin
Attitudes to waste: Waste management is a service provided by 
informal sector, focus is on collective rights and safety; informal sector 
seen as a local government ‘ally’ (works within legal ambit); limited 
focus on resource recovery.
Waste management process: Local government works in partnership 
with informal sector, predicated on its ability to get organised as a 
collective body; informal sector provides door-to-door collection, 
segregation of  household waste (likely to be based on occupational health 
and safety considerations, e.g. ‘hazardous’ and ‘non-hazardous’ with 
limited focus on resource recovery); formal waste management companies 
manage non-recyclable waste as well as recovering energy at the landfill.
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Consequences: Organised informal sector accesses majority of  
recyclable waste so can bargain for better prices with recyclers in 
the formal sector; economies of  scale and better linkages mean the 
collective can invest in material sorting and recovery facilities.
Key issues: Initially low levels of  material resources and energy 
embedded in waste because of  improved ability of  informal sector to 
remove recyclable material; incinerators (for remaining waste) may need 
further subsidies; however, fraction of  waste not being recycled could increase 
where informal sector does not have market or technology to process new 
materials (from new, complex products); potential for conflict reappears as 
formal technology-driven companies exploit gap in the market.
3.3 Scenario 3: Techno-Nirvana
Attitudes to waste: Focus is on recovering the maximum value from the 
waste through innovative and capital-intensive technology.
Waste management process: Local government collaborates with formal 
private sector to recover value out of  waste and introduces technology-
based interventions for resource management; contractual agreements 
(through public–private partnerships) are for whole waste value chain; 
households segregate waste at source into multiple categories; door-to-door 
collection organised by formal private sector through motorised pick-up 
vehicles; large centralised material recovery facilities segregate recyclables 
and compost organic fractions of  waste; non-recyclable and inorganic 
fractions sent for energy recovery in large capital-intensive incinerators.
Consequences: Informal sector provides services to households 
trading recyclables but is restricted and actively discouraged by local 
government. This waste goes either to material recovery or to recycling 
facilities where it is crushed for recovery of  material or burnt in 
incinerators; waste management companies lobby against informal 
sector role since monopolistic access to all waste contractually agreed; 
manufacturers whose products can be turned to useful waste engage 
with local government and waste management companies to develop 
innovative solutions; regulations governing partnership between local 
government and private sector create entry barrier for small informal 
sector companies – leading it to become disenfranchised.
Key issues: Informal reuse and repair industry suffers because EPR 
is interpreted to extend producer property rights to entire product life 
cycle; waste management infrastructure highly capital intensive, large-
scale, mechanised, as well as carbon and energy intensive; cost passed 
on by local government to waste generators – households, commercial 
establishments, and non-commercial organisations; additional increased 
costs for pollution control and monitoring the infrastructure; financial 
intermediaries support innovative entrepreneurs or large waste 
management companies to set up waste management infrastructure; 
potential conflict between environmental groups and local government, 
inexperienced in the consequences of  large infrastructure.
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3.4 Scenario 4: Green Transformations
Attitudes to waste: Focus on inclusive resource management; local 
government values resource-saving potential of  skills, networks and 
decentralised infrastructure as well as potential for job creation which 
results from this partnership with informal sector collective.
Waste management process: Waste segregated at source by generators 
(households, commerce, etc.) with door-to-door collection managed 
by an informal sector collective; collections monitored and material is 
transferred to decentralised material sorting facilities, also managed 
by the collective in partnership with NGOs and technology start-ups; 
local government pays waste pickers, operates state-of-the-art landfills, 
and actively encourages repair and refurbishment markets through 
incentives such as providing space for weekly markets selling second-
hand and repaired goods; financial and regulatory instruments make 
landfilling of  recyclables and energy-rich materials prohibitively 
expensive for the waste disposer; repair and reuse industry actively 
promoted and works in close partnership with product manufacturers.
Consequences: Manufacturers work with informal collectives setting up 
take-back programmes for end-of-life products, making them a crucial 
link in their value chains; local government can enforce environmentally 
sound and occupational health and safety compliant processes. Process 
is facilitated by simplified regimes of  taxation to informal sector 
enterprises who are members of  the collective. 
Key issues: Incinerators not considered viable for developing 
country context (due to absence of  adequate monitoring capacities 
and infrastructure for pollution control); minimal conflict between 
formal and informal sectors since the former benefits from the latter’s 
participation in the value chain; however, such participation needs 
active intervention from local government and other policy enablers to 
ensure materials do not leak back into unregulated markets.
4 Combining foresight with political economy analysis
While foresight methods enable the characterisation of  future scenarios, 
they do not allow for the evaluation of  these different scenarios from the 
perspective of  the different actors involved. By combining actor objective 
analysis with the foresight method, we were able to identify the actors and 
the objectives that are influential in driving each scenario. The identification 
of  the actors and their objectives in the four scenarios indicated the 
alliances that would drive the particular scenario. The objectives of  the 
actors distilled from the discussions during the workshop and the scenario 
description by the working groups are summarised in Table 2.
The political economy analysis using the actor objective matrix also 
allows us to analyse the intra- and inter-scenario dynamics. It is well 
known that the informal sector has the knowledge and networks that 
will enable proper collection and segregation of  the waste (Cointreau, 
Gopalan and Coad 2012). However, the informal sector can play this 
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role at scale and with maximum efficiency only if  it has the mandate 
from the local government as in the Green Transformations and 
Revolutionary Margin scenarios. A comparison of  the objective of  the 
different actors under the Green Transformations and Revolutionary 
Margin scenarios also suggests that the inclusion of  the informal sector 
will not automatically enable the transition from waste management 
to resource management. The alignment of  interests of  the different 
stakeholders in a particular direction is critical to enable this transition. 
The Green Transformations scenario achieves this objective through 
the alignment of  objectives between local government and the informal 
sector collective, as well as the product manufacturers.
The informal sector has limitations in recycling certain parts of  the 
waste, especially because of  the changing composition of  the waste 
stream and a rising proportion of  complicated materials in the waste 
chain. In these cases, the informal sector can be a partner of  formal 
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waste management companies that have the finance and expertise to 
develop technologies. The informal sector can source the material to 
the formal waste management companies for some of  these waste parts 
(Chaturvedi, Arora and Kilguss 2011).
The role of  the local government is extremely critical in fostering 
and shaping these partnerships as seen in the Green Transformations 
scenario. In other cases, the local government’s inaction or the support of  
the formal sector creates conflict between the informal and formal private 
sector much like the Techno-Nirvana and State of  Nature scenarios. Our 
analysis of  the scenarios also suggests that the inclusion of  the informal 
sector is important because the results are not only inclusive in process 
but also because they are inclusive in outcomes. For instance, this is 
brought out through a comparison of  the Green Transformations and 
Techno-Nirvana scenarios where the latter achieves the transition from 
waste management to resource management at a lower cost because of  
the participation of  the informal sector. Also, the employment generated 
because of  the decentralised infrastructure in the Green Transformations 
scenario would be much larger compared to the Techno-Nirvana case. 
The observations made indicate that the inclusion of  the informal sector 
would facilitate, and in certain cases, accelerate the transition from a 
waste management to a resource management perspective.
To characterise inter-scenario dynamics, it is critical to understand what 
makes a scenario stable. In our framework, the stability of  a scenario 
depends on the alignment of  objectives of  the involved stakeholders. 
Table 2 clearly shows that the two scenarios on the waste management 
part of  the x-axis – Revolutionary Margin and State of  Nature – are 
relatively fragile because they are based on limited alignment of  objectives 
across different actors. This limited alignment does not allow for the 
development of  alliances that can stabilise the scenario. For instance, the 
actor objective matrix of  the Revolutionary Margin scenario suggests 
that it is a relatively tenuous scenario because it is contingent on the 
alignment of  a single objective – jobs in the informal sector – between the 
informal sector and local government. In the case of  the State of  Nature 
scenario, because there is hardly any alignment of  interests, it is relatively 
straightforward to infer that external influences (a crisis, an international 
or national policy) that change the objectives of  the actors could also 
transform the scenario. Table 2 clearly shows that the two scenarios 
on the resource management part of  the x-axis – Techno-Nirvana and 
Green Transformations – however, are relatively stable because they are 
based on alignment of  multiple objectives across different actors.
5 Learning from the process of using foresight
The four scenarios developed by the participants of  the workshop, 
although highly stylised, are based on alternative (shared) visions of  the 
future. They also represent the different political choices that could be 
made by the stakeholders involved in waste management. By clearly 
defining the possible futures of  waste management through the horizon-
scanning methods, a discussion on a comparative analysis of  these 
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scenarios could be initiated. The first implication of  such comparative 
analysis shows the value of  mainstreaming the informal sector in waste 
management in Indian cities. By working together with the informal 
sector, the local government (and the waste management sector in a 
city) is likely to benefit from the existing capacities in the private sector, 
beyond formal waste management companies. Also, working closely 
with the informal sector will allow for broadening the discourse on waste 
management and initiate discussion on alternative pathways from waste 
to resource management that are not focused exclusively on formal 
private sector participation and large-scale technological solutions.
Our analysis also establishes that the transformation of  the waste 
management sector in urban India cannot be achieved by initiatives of  
individual actors from the private or the public sector. The scenarios 
described make it explicit that local government-led initiatives that do 
not involve the informal sector would face stiff resistance from several 
actors. At the same time, the informal sector by itself  would not be 
able to achieve the transformation of  the waste management sector 
due to limitations or absence of  certain capacities. The transformation 
from waste to resource management is likely to be achieved through 
alliances of  several actors with divergent priorities. The forging of  such 
alliances depends crucially on the capacities and intentions of  the local 
government due to their centrality in waste management governance in 
the Indian context and their power to convene the different actors.
Forecasting could be expert-led or involve most stakeholders, including 
the general public. The type of  stakeholder involvement influences 
the futures techniques used: more participative exercises are more 
likely to use qualitative and deliberative techniques while expert-led 
exercises are quantitative or modelling based. The effectiveness of  the 
techniques depends on the issue and different stakeholders’ influence on 
the agenda (EEA 2011: 16). It is also argued that participatory foresight 
is more suitable for complex issues as expert knowledge often fails to 
provide answers to many important questions and the perspective 
of  all stakeholders is a necessary step towards rationalisation of  the 
deep social and cultural consequences (Nikolova 2014: 2). For this 
reason, the workshop involved participation from different stakeholder 
groups using predominantly qualitative and deliberative techniques. 
During discussion of  possible future scenarios, the groups were formed 
randomly so that no stakeholder group was able to dominate and 
influence the discussion. However, as ‘participative’ foresight initiatives 
often fail to distinguish between expert participation and stakeholder 
or citizen participation leading to the dominance of  certain voices and 
opinion in particular policymaking processes (Bingley 2014: 9), the 
possibility of  some stakeholder groups dominating the workshop cannot 
be ruled out completely.
Our findings have several implications for waste management 
policymaking in India. Most waste management policies are drawn up 
by expert committees in India and then shared with local stakeholders 
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to obtain feedback. However, there is limited scope for making large-
scale changes in the very conception of  the policy. The initial framing 
of  the issues by selected experts therefore dominates policy outcomes. In 
spite of  the several failures of  policies on waste management, such an 
expert-led policymaking process continues to be followed. Our analysis 
suggests that for uncertain and complex policymaking challenges, it 
is critical to open up the discussion on multiple conceptions of  the 
challenges, incorporate the views of  the different stakeholders and how 
these multiple conceptions could have a bearing on the initial framing 
of  the issues to be tackled by policy. This opening up of  the process of  
framing the challenge beyond expert committees would be critical for 
democratising the policymaking process. However, it is critical that such 
opening up of  the policymaking process is safeguarded against capture 
by the elite and powerful. Waste management is particularly susceptible 
to such capture because the marginalised informal sector works in a 
regulatory vacuum with little support from the state. As a result, it is 
likely that the voice of  the informal sector actors is either not heard or is 
captured by mediators and interlocutors.
The use of  foresight methods, in combination with tools of  political 
economy analysis, also show that policies for waste management in 
India should involve not only an environmental focus but should also 
include actors who are interested in the economic and social aspects 
of  waste management. This would ensure that waste management is 
not closeted within the confines of  the Environment Ministry but is 
incorporated into broader economic and social policy discussions. The 
experience of  countries that have made significant inroads towards 
the transition from waste to resource management like Germany and 
Japan (and more recently, China), suggests that policymaking on waste 
management has to be much more joined up, involving actors from 
different ministries as well as local actors from several government 
departments beyond those concerned with the environment.
6 Conclusion
Managing rapidly rising quantities of  waste is a global challenge. 
We have focused on the complex and uncertain waste management 
challenge in India. By using a combination of  foresight methods 
and tools from political economy analysis, we develop an analytical 
framework that has the potential to put order into this complex and 
uncertain challenge. Using foresight methods, we characterise four 
alternative conceptions of  the future of  waste management. Our 
results, although drawn from a workshop in India, have relevance 
for most developing and emerging countries that have a significant 
informal sector presence in waste management. We also believe that 
our analytical framework has enough explanatory power to be used for 
other complex and uncertain challenges beyond waste management.
Our results indicate that the use of  foresight methods to develop 
scenarios for the future through multi-stakeholder participation, could 
inform waste management policies in India and open up the process of  
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policymaking beyond expert committees. An understanding of  potential 
futures developed in partnership with local stakeholders would also 
empower the officials of  local government to make informed choices. At 
the same time, the opening up of  the policymaking process is critical for 
the inclusion of  a key actor in waste management in India, the informal 
sector, in policy processes.
Given the failure of  waste management policies that have relied 
exclusively on expert committees for the initial framing, it is critical that 
the policy process is further democratised. This is especially topical in the 
present context when the Government of  India is involved in redrafting 
all the waste management rules, and concerns have been raised about 
the process of  stakeholder consultations on the rules (ESG 2015). 
The use of  political economy methods shows that alliances of  actors 
with different priorities are critical for the transformation of  the waste 
management sector in India. However, the role of  local government, 
with unmatched convening power, is crucial in developing these alliances. 
Local government is also critical in mainstreaming the informal sector.
Our analysis suggests that in the absence of  such support the 
resourceful informal sector would have to confront the economically 
powerful and better organised formal waste management companies 
that are bidding for waste management contracts. However, such 
confrontation between the informal and the formal sector is neither 
economically, socially or environmentally desirable. On the contrary, 
it has the potential for undermining and delaying the transition from 
waste management to inclusive resource management. Such delays 
inevitably come at a cost to society. We show that developing alternative 
scenarios for the future together with political economy analysis allows 
us to identify actors and alliances that could delay the transition, but 
also identify those alliances that have the potential to accelerate the 
transition to inclusive resource management.
Notes
* This article draws on Chaturvedi, A.; Vijayalakshmi, K. and 
Nijhawan, S. (2015) Scenarios of  Waste and Resource Management: For 
Cities in India and Elsewhere, IDS Evidence Report 114, Brighton: IDS.
1 According to the Ministry of  Finance (2009), the rate of  growth of  
waste generation is 5 per cent while the World Bank estimates that 
the rate of  growth of  urban population is 2.38 per cent.
2 The comparable number for collection rates in high-income 
countries is 98 per cent.
3 EPR is as an environmental policy approach in which a producer’s 
responsibility for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage of  
a product’s life cycle. An EPR policy is characterised by: the shifting 
of  responsibility (physically and/or economically; fully or partially) 
upstream towards the producer and away from municipalities; 
and the provision of  incentives to producers to take into account 
environmental considerations when designing their products.
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Where Next for Social Protection?*
Stephen Devereux, Keetie Roelen and Martina Ulrichs
Abstract The rapid ascendancy of social protection up the development 
policy agenda raises questions about whether its current prominence will 
be sustained, or whether it will turn out to be just another development 
fad. What trajectory will social protection follow, which actors will drive it 
forward and what will be the main issues and challenges? This article reports 
on a small foresight study designed to address the question: ‘Where next 
for social protection?’ A scenario-building exercise revealed that there is no 
single linear pathway for social protection, but multiple highly context-specific 
trajectories subject to change as political ideologies and institutional capacities 
shift. A ‘wind-tunnelling’ exercise highlighted the importance of a country’s 
political regime as a fundamental determinant of which social protection 
policies will be adopted. Better understanding of political processes is needed 
to protect gains made in social protection against possible reversals when the 
political climate shifts against pro-poor redistributive policies.
Keywords: drivers of  change, foresight, rights-based approaches, 
scenario-building, social protection, wind-tunnelling.
1 Introduction
Social protection is incontrovertibly one of  the success stories of  
development policy in the early twenty-first century. Every year new 
social protection programmes are launched, more countries adopt 
a National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) or Strategy (NSPS), and 
evaluations generate further empirical evidence of  positive impacts. 
Current trends in social protection thinking and practice are taking 
two potentially contradictory directions – crudely, ‘rights-based’ versus 
‘growth-oriented’ – which have different implications for who should 
receive what types of  support, under what conditions and for how long.
1 Rights-based: institutionalising social protection in national policy 
frameworks, underpinned by legislation that endows justiciable 
claims to social protection entitlements to all citizens or residents, 
including refugees;
2 Growth-oriented: using social protection instrumentally, as a toolkit 
for achieving poverty reduction and economic growth; for example, 
by ‘exiting’ participants out of  programmes when they reach a 
‘graduation’ threshold.
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The trajectory of  social protection as a policy discourse deserves scrutiny. 
Although ‘social safety nets’ were introduced as a response to economic crises 
in the 1980s or earlier, the broader concept of  social protection originated in 
the late 1990s. It was encapsulated first in the World Bank’s growth-oriented 
‘Social Risk Management’ framework (World Bank 2001), and later advanced 
by rights-based frameworks such as the Institute of  Development Studies’ 
(IDS) ‘Transformative Social Protection’ (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 
2004) and the International Labour Organization’s ‘Social Protection Floor’ 
(ILO 2011). In the mid-2000s the analysis shifted to specific design issues 
(e.g. targeting, dependency syndrome) and efforts to build the evidence 
base on impacts of  specific instruments (e.g. conditional cash transfers, 
school feeding). In the 2010s the focus has moved on to establishing social 
protection as a policy sector within government ministries and to challenges 
of  coordination and systematisation (e.g. building a ‘single registry’).
Since the introduction of  social safety nets in the 1980s, social 
protection has expanded greatly as a component of  social policy. 
Common indicators used to measure this growth include the number 
of  social protection policies in place, the percentage of  the population 
covered by such policies and the proportion of  public expenditures 
allocated to social protection (ILO 2014). The ‘Social Protection Index’ 
(ADB 2013) captures both the ‘breadth’ and ‘depth’ of  social protection 
coverage, measured by the number of  beneficiaries and the level of  
benefits provided by social protection programmes.
This crude trajectory raises an obvious question: where next for social 
protection? We identify three broad potential scenarios: (a) expansion; 
(b) plateau; (c) decline.
Figure 1 Potential trajectories of social protection
2000 2015 2025
(a) Expansion  
Social protection continues to grow 
both conceptually and operationally, 
generating interesting new issues to 
research, new policies to design and new 
programmes to evaluate.
(b) Plateau  
Social protection becomes entrenched 
as a permanent fixture of development 
discourse, consolidating its place in 
government and donor policy and 
steadily increasing its coverage.
(c) Decline  
Social protection becomes just another 
development fashion that follows a 
conventional project cycle, peaking 
around 2015 but declining thereafter, 
just as rapidly as it rose.
Source Authors’ own.
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Against this backdrop, we undertook a small-scale foresight project that 
aimed to:
1 critically review the policy discourse on social protection since its 
origins in the late 1990s and how it has been shaped by the main 
influencing actors;
2 identify and explore themes that are likely to be high on the social 
protection agenda in the short to medium term;
3 identify drivers of  change that are likely to shape the social 
protection landscape in the medium to long term and to develop 
and test future scenarios for social protection;
4 identify entry points for responding to future themes, challenges 
and opportunities that will shape the future of  social protection and 
determine appropriate forms of  ongoing engagement.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodologies 
used for each component of  the research. Section 3 explores the ‘drivers 
of  change’ likely to affect social protection in the coming period, under the 
five ‘STEEP’ categories: social, technological, economic, environmental 
and political. Section 4 unpacks expected trajectories of  social protection by 
considering the main issues and debates that might affect which trajectory 
is actually followed. Section 5 looks forward by describing potential future 
scenarios and policy options for social protection in the next 10 to 15 years, 
drawing on the foresight methodology. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methods
An eclectic mix of  methods was designed and implemented, which 
included a background literature review; structured one-on-one 
interviews with key informants active in social protection policymaking, 
conceptualisation or research; a moderated online discussion event that 
engaged a wider audience working on social protection across the world; 
and two face-to-face foresight workshops.
The Centre for Social Protection (CSP), with the support of  Knowledge 
Services at IDS and Elliptics Ltd, facilitated an online discussion event 
on the topic ‘Where Next for Social Protection?’, which ran for four 
days in September 2014. The discussion was structured around four 
questions, one for each day.
 l Day 1 – Predicting the future: Do you think that social protection 
will become more or less prominent in the development policy 
agenda in the next five to ten years? Why?
 l Day 2 – Issues and debates: What will be the most important issues 
and debates in social protection in the next five to ten years?
 l Day 3 – Drivers of  change: What will be the most important drivers 
of  change affecting social protection in the next five to ten years?
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 l Day 4 – The way forward: What needs to be done, and by which 
actors, to ensure that social protection remains high on the 
development policy agenda in the coming five to ten years? What 
can we do?
More than 200 participants registered for the online discussion from 
all over the world. Just over half  of  the participants came from or were 
based in Africa, Asia or Latin America, while just under half  came from 
Europe (including the UK) or North America. Altogether 138 postings 
were made at an average of  34 postings each day.
Two foresight workshops were hosted by the Centre for Social 
Protection at IDS, in September and November 2014. The workshops 
brought together 18 people who work intensively on social protection, 
from research institutes, donors and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). Three forecasting methods were used in the workshops: drivers 
of  change analysis, scenario building and wind-tunnelling.
Drivers of  change analysis: Workshop participants brainstormed 
around the driving forces in the broader contextual environment that 
are likely to influence the direction of  social protection programming 
over the next 10 to 15 years, under five ‘STEEP’ categories – social 
(demographics, lifestyles, social trends, etc.); technology (ICTs, media, 
etc.); economy (economic policies, growth rates); environment (climate 
change, natural resource management), and politics (welfare regimes, 
development policies and international aid flows).
Scenario building: Workshop participants selected two of  the most 
powerful drivers identified in the ‘drivers of  change’ exercise, and 
constructed four scenario ‘spaces’, using one driver as an x-axis and 
the other driver as a y-axis to create four quadrants. These scenarios 
were developed into narratives by reflecting on what kind of  world each 
quadrant would represent, and the implications of  that possible future 
world for social protection programming.
Wind-tunnelling: Next, the participants proposed several possible social 
protection policies to be introduced into the scenarios, and discussed 
how effectively each policy would perform given the contextual situation 
described for each scenario. The purpose was to identify what is possible 
in terms of  robust social protection measures under different possible 
future conditions in specific country contexts.
3 Drivers of change
Drivers of  change were considered in five categories: social, 
technological, economic, environmental and political (STEEP). These 
drivers were identified and assessed using all methods in this project. 
Findings from the literature review point towards historical drivers 
of  the current state of  social protection, while findings from the key 
informant interviews, online discussion and foresight workshops 
consider drivers that are deemed likely to play important roles in 
shaping the future world in which social protection will operate. 
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A number of  social factors emerged across all different methods 
of  investigation in this project, including increasing inequality, 
demographic shifts and urbanisation.
Rising inequality has incentivised governments, particularly in middle-
income countries, to introduce social protection as a redistributive 
mechanism. Various key informants pointed towards the potentially 
dangerous social impacts of  inequality and the role for social protection 
as a palliative mechanism that can enhance social cohesion. In 
contexts with high levels of  income inequality, social protection is more 
affordable since there is usually a larger tax-base to finance it with 
domestic resources (Hickey 2008), while in contexts with high levels of  
social inequality the associated political volatility has triggered increased 
investment in social protection. So income and social inequalities have 
consequences on both the supply- and demand-side.
Demographic shifts will transform the composition of  societies. Some 
countries will be confronted with a ‘population dividend’ provided by 
a large percentage of  young people, while others are already foreseeing 
an increasing need for pensions due to a growing proportion of  older 
people. Will a higher demand for social protection for particular groups 
of  society translate into more and better-quality supply? During the 
online discussion, some thought that the key question is whether population 
ageing stimulates the expansion of  social protection – and especially pensions – or 
will ultimately lead to its unaffordability (or both).
Higher levels of  urbanisation also increase the need for social 
protection since rural–urban migration often disrupts traditional (rural) 
safety nets. Social protection has traditionally focused on the rural poor 
and has developed instruments which address particular vulnerability 
profiles. However, the types of  vulnerabilities change when people move 
from rural to urban areas, as increasing numbers of  poor people are 
doing, and lose their community-based safety nets and social capital in 
the transition from rural livelihoods to mostly informal paid work.
Urbanisation not only increases the need for formal social protection 
to reduce vulnerability among the labour force, but also increases the 
demand for social protection by ‘urban citizens’ who are more likely 
to mobilise and lobby for their rights. Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2012) argue 
that the higher levels of  urbanisation in middle-income countries 
have played a role in determining the socialisation of  formal social 
protection, in comparison to low-income countries. Labour market 
structures in urban areas are still characterised by high levels of  
informality, mobile workers and gaps in the provision of  social security 
for the poorest. This does not only affect migrants from rural areas 
but also international migrants, particularly as eligibility for social 
protection is often tied to citizenship status. This raises the question of  
how social protection will have to change to fill these gaps and address 
the new sets of  emerging vulnerabilities.
108 | Devereux et al. Where Next for Social Protection?
Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’
Technological factors were not considered to be greatly important in 
shaping the future landscape for social protection, other than in the 
delivery of  social transfers (World Bank 2012). However, two additional 
technological factors were considered in the workshops. Firstly, the 
role of  technology in changing skills requirements in labour markets, 
shifting demand for labour even further towards high-skilled labour, 
may have implications for the demand for social protection, particularly 
for low-skilled workers. Secondly, the rapid increase in the use of  social 
media may allow for greater civil society mobilisation and organisation, 
thereby generating greater demand for social protection.
In terms of  economic factors, issues regarding economic growth 
and economic volatility were discussed in the online discussion and 
key informant interviews. High levels of  economic growth in many 
developing countries and the reclassification of  low-income as middle-
income countries, gave rise to the question as to whether the demand 
for social protection will expand among the growing middle classes. 
A strong focus on economic growth as a development objective is also 
increasing the pressure on social protection to demonstrate positive 
impacts on inequality, productivity and growth (World Bank 2012). 
This could increase political support for social protection, but could 
also divert attention from its main objective – to protect people against 
risks and reduce vulnerability (de Haan 2014). Several key informants 
emphasised the importance of  reconciling the objectives of  economic 
growth and reducing inequality and the role of  social protection in such 
inclusive pro-poor growth.
Recent financial crises and economic volatility were referred to many 
times as suggesting a greater need for social protection. The financial 
crisis in 1997–8 in Southeast Asia acted as a wake-up call regarding 
the inadequacy of  existing social safety nets and proved an important 
milestone in the region’s development of  social protection (Cook 2009). 
Nonetheless, it was pointed out that recent crises have not yet raised 
enough awareness about the need for social protection. Further 
economic factors identified in the workshops include the changing levels 
and characteristics of  poverty, increasing flexibilisation of  labour markets 
and shifts in private versus public service provision, including a potential 
for more public–private partnerships in the delivery of  social protection.
Environmental drivers of  change were identified in relation to climate 
change and revenue from natural resources. Poor people in rural 
areas whose livelihoods depend on natural resources are likely to be 
impacted negatively by changes in the natural environment. The 
consequences of  climate change, including recurring disasters, as well 
as the unpredictability of  the weather and consequently agricultural 
productivity, are increasing the need for social protection to mitigate 
livelihood risks (ESCAP 2011). Many online discussants and key 
informants pointed towards the role of  social protection in making 
people more resilient to climate shocks by supporting them to adapt 
their livelihoods. Notwithstanding the importance that climate change 
(Endnotes)
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will play in shaping the world in 10 to 15 years’ time, this is an area 
where opinion is sharply divided, with one view being that climate 
change will continue to rise up the agenda and that social protection 
offers an appropriate response, and an opposing view being that social 
protection has only a marginal role in addressing the fundamental 
challenges to livelihoods that climate change poses.
Political drivers were considered crucial in shaping the future world that 
social protection will be part of  and to which it will need to respond. 
These drivers were identified as operating at different levels and include 
global development paradigms, political realities in donor countries 
and political commitment at national level. Inequality is widely seen 
as a major force that could drive a rationale for social protection and 
create a political incentive within the global development paradigm. 
Reducing inequality – encompassing income inequality and inequalities 
along socio-demographic characteristics – is also a ‘hot topic’ in current 
development debates, and social protection is often mentioned as one of  
the main policy instruments to achieve this.
How this will happen is still unclear and it could go in different 
directions: will growing inequalities cause greater social schisms and 
the development of  parallel systems (comfortable social security for 
the better off, and meagre poor relief  for the poor), or will they fuel 
demands for more universal and redistributive social protection systems? 
At the regional level in Africa, for example, the African Progress Panel 
and the African Development Bank are emphasising the need for 
governments to step up their investments in health, education and social 
protection, with a view to moving towards universal access to these basic 
social services. Consolidating regional integration and harmonising 
social security will help to address challenges posed to social security 
systems, for example by migrant workers.
This leads into a second political driver, namely the political reality in 
donor countries, or influential countries that have a strong impact on 
policy in developing countries. ‘Chindia’ was coined as a term during 
the workshops to denote the expanding and increasingly important 
role of  China and India in developing countries. Whether the political 
climate in countries that are driving social protection as a global 
development policy agenda is ‘progressive’ (rights-based) or ‘regressive’ 
(austerity-driven), has profound implications for levels of  financing and 
the nature of  technical support offered. While progressive agendas may 
be supportive of  more universal and redistributive systems that are 
embedded in legal frameworks, regressive policies are more likely to 
focus on maintaining the status quo and providing only discretionary 
support to those in absolute need.
While international agreements, UN conventions and donor agendas 
can put social protection into the limelight and provide the tools for 
establishing social protection systems, whether this translates into action 
will ultimately depend on political commitment at the national level. 
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What determines such political commitment will be context-specific. 
Democratic processes and the ability of  society to organise itself  and 
influence welfare policies are thought to be essential. At the same time, 
countries such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, China and Vietnam may not fit 
such a characterisation of  their political contexts but have seen strong 
commitment to and expansion of  social protection. National ownership 
of  social protection programmes is emerging unanimously as a 
necessary pre-condition for the sustainability of  programmes, and forms 
a strong pillar of  social protection strategies.
Yet, how and why governments decide on committing to social 
protection is highly context-specific. Frequently, the popularity of  social 
protection is explained along social-democratic (or Polanyian) lines – 
growing inequalities and vulnerabilities trigger expansions of  public 
policies. There is, however, no direct causality between increasing needs 
(demand) and increasing delivery of  social protection (supply), since 
it leaves the political drivers of  social policies out of  the equation (de 
Haan 2014). Public and political opinions on social provisioning and the 
role of  the state are deeply ideologically motivated.
In some regions, political commitment will derive from a determination 
to uphold the rights of  citizens. Nevertheless, it may also be strongly 
influenced by immediate political pressures, particularly in electoral 
democracies, or by longer-term considerations if  social stability is seen 
as critical to political legitimacy (ESCAP 2011; Cecchini and Martínez 
2012). In other contexts where social protection is externally financed, 
policy processes and sources of  financing are still detached. Evidence is 
Figure 2 Scenarios
Source Authors’ own.
High institutional capacity‘All dressed up but 
nowhere to go’
Regressive local politics, 
progressive politics in 
influential countries
Regressive local politics, 
regressive politics in 
influential countries
Regressive local politics, 












politics in influential 
countries
‘Oh dear’
‘The spirit is 










IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’ 103–118 | 111
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
built around ‘what works’ rather than on what kind of  evidence will be 
credible and useful to influence national policy processes (Devereux and 
White 2010; Gentilini and Omamo 2011).
This ties into a final driver that was discussed extensively during 
the workshops, namely that of  institutional capacity. What levels of  
financial, human and technical resources do countries have (or are 
willing to dedicate) for social protection programmes, and do they have 
institutions strong enough to deliver them effectively?
4 Future scenarios
4.1 Scenario building
Following the identification of  drivers of  change likely to shape the 
world in which social protection operates, two drivers were selected to 
underpin the ‘scenario-building’ exercise: ‘progressive/regressive politics’ 
and ‘high/low national institutional capacity’. These were subsequently 
placed on a continuum on an x-axis and y-axis respectively, such that four 
potential scenarios emerged (corresponding to the quadrants in Figure 2):
 l ‘Utopia’ (top right): progressive politics, high capacity
 l ‘The spirit is willing but the body is weak’ (bottom right): progressive 
politics, low capacity
 l ‘All dressed up but nowhere to go’ (top left) regressive politics, high 
capacity
 l ‘Oh dear’ (bottom left): regressive politics, low capacity.
It was decided that the ‘ideal’ scenario (top right – ‘Utopia’) would not 
be discussed as it was considered to be the least interesting scenario for 
further exploration, and least likely to occur in low-income countries 
where social protection is currently being introduced or expanded.
In the process of  scenario building, however, it became evident that 
the driver on ‘politics’ was not specific enough and conflated political 
processes at two different levels: (1) national or local level and (2) global 
or ‘influential countries’ level, where influential countries are those 
dominating the design and financing of  social protection programmes 
in low-income countries. Sub-dividing the politics driver to account for 
this bifurcation resulted in the emergence of  six scenarios for further 
exploration.
To keep the analysis manageable, it was decided to choose one slice – 
(a) or (b) – of  each quadrant, and in order to maximise diversity, the 
following scenarios were chosen for further elaboration: Scenario 1a: 
‘The spirit is willing…’; Scenario 2a: ‘Oh dear’; and Scenario 3b: ‘All 
dressed up…’.
Scenario 1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’ (progressive local politics, 
progressive international politics, low institutional capacity). In this 
scenario there exists goodwill and good intentions, both domestically 
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and internationally, but limited capacity to deliver social protection and 
other services effectively. Factors that might hold back progress in this 
scenario include: high or rising civil insecurity, food price and climate-
related shocks, a youthful population with low skills, the dominance of  
the private sector over societal interests, and rising social frustrations 
about government failures leading to service delivery protests.
Positive features of  this scenario include: an alignment of  national 
governments and donors and development partners around what needs 
to be done, high aid flows with a particular emphasis on strengthening 
institutional capacity and technical expertise, an active civil society 
which could be strengthened and rights-based policies – at least on 
paper. There is potential for technology to help tackle or bypass 
delivery challenges. There is a risk of  donor dependence or that social 
experiments will be trialled as pilot projects. Social protection initiatives 
that are launched in this context might be unsustainable because 
they rely heavily on expatriate financial and technical inputs, and 
government lacks the capacity to take over their management and scale 
them up.
Scenario 2a: ‘Oh dear’ (regressive local politics, progressive 
international politics, low institutional capacity). This scenario is 
characterised by high levels of  poverty and inequality. Citizens have no 
voice and civil society is weak or repressed, so government is effectively 
unaccountable. Civil society exists mainly as implementing partners for 
development projects of  international donors, rather than as activists 
campaigning for change. Government has no interest in rights-based 
approaches, clientelism is rife, public provision of  services is weak, 
the middle classes depend on private social services, and there is low 
commitment by public officials to help the poor.
Apart from the dire political situation, the economic situation is 
equally challenging. Labour markets are insecure with a large informal 
sector and unregulated markets; there is little social protection against 
livelihood shocks such as extreme weather events, price shocks and 
financial crises; people face multiple vulnerabilities, such as high health 
risks and low health outcomes. Because of  these political and economic 
challenges, there is extensive ‘economic’ migration within and between 
countries, including unplanned and poorly serviced urban informal 
settlement, as well as ‘political’ migration inside and beyond national 
boundaries (population displacement, refugees). International actors 
have a limited role, which is often restricted to humanitarian relief.
Scenario 3b: ‘All dressed up…’ (regressive local politics, regressive 
international politics, high institutional capacity). Because politics in this 
scenario are regressive both locally and internationally, external relations 
are dominated by ‘trade, not aid’ – international trade agreements rather 
than aid flows. The labour market is stagnant and unemployment is 
high. There is inadequate state regulation of  private sector employers. 
This is a low-wage economy dominated by informalisation. Societal 
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expectations and ambitions are low. Those who can, migrate to more 
vibrant economies in more progressive countries elsewhere.
Because local capacity is relatively high, financing for social protection 
is generated by economic growth and a mix of  public and private 
provision. However, only a minimal safety net is installed, to quell 
social unrest. Public expenditure is rolled back and public sector 
budgets are cut for ideological reasons. Social insurance is based on 
private contributions while social assistance comes with conditionalities 
attached. This leads to rising inequality and polarisation, with limited 
redistribution of  public resources and few groups being adequately 
covered by government-run social protection programmes.
5 Wind-tunnelling
The wind-tunnelling exercise aimed to formulate policy options 
for social protection within these three scenarios. The focus was on 
identifying viable and feasible options in the three different ‘future 
worlds’. Policy options formulated for one scenario were subsequently 
‘tested’ against the other scenarios to assess their feasibility and 
opportunities for application in radically different contexts. Discussions 
on the basis of  this exercise are summarised here.
Scenario 1a: ‘The spirit is willing…’ Proposed policy options 
included: building consensus on a single national vision and platform 
for social protection; using technical assistance in innovative ways to 
strengthen local capacity; signing up to the Social Protection Floor and 
adopting a ‘progressive realisation’ approach to achieving it, increasing 
public demand for social services, including accountability mechanisms 
such as grievance procedures, and introducing right-to-work schemes 
(employment guarantees rather than public works projects). All of  these 
proposals were agreed to be appropriate in a context of  progressive 
local and international political regimes but low institutional capacity.
These proposals received mixed reactions from Scenarios 2a and 3b. 
There was little enthusiasm for a national vision and no interest at all 
in signing up to the Social Protection Floor, which was dismissed as 
‘too progressive’. Public services would be delivered alongside private 
providers and there would definitely be no accountability mechanisms. 
The ‘right-to-work’ proposal was rejected in favour of  old-style public 
works: ‘No right to work, but a duty to work’.
Scenario 2a: ‘Oh dear’ Proposed policy options were very limited and 
unambitious, reflecting the limited commitment and accountability of  
this regressive regime and its low capacity to deliver public services. 
Social protection would effectively take its most basic ‘safety net’ 
forms: humanitarian response during crises (probably delivered by 
international agencies rather than the government), public works 
projects (also externally funded and run by donors or NGOs), mother 
and child feeding schemes, and contributory pensions for civil servants 
as part of  the government’s clientelist orientation.
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The regressive government of  Scenario 3b endorsed these suggestions, 
as both regimes share a common ideology. But since Scenario 3b has 
higher capacity to deliver services, the government would be the main 
implementing agency for all interventions. The progressive government 
of  Scenario 1a did not oppose these ideas in principle, but would 
implement them as part of  a coordinated national vision for social 
protection rather than as isolated projects. Contributory pensions for 
civil servants would only be acceptable as one component of  a universal 
pension scheme.
Scenario 3b: ‘All dressed up…’ Policy options in this scenario 
were highly regressive. The regime is assumed to be pro-business 
so deregulation of  business is favoured, implying low social security 
coverage and contributions, and no minimum wage to protect low-paid 
workers against exploitation. Social protection will be dominated by 
conditionalities and a focus on graduating people off programmes and 
into the labour market as quickly as possible. Minimal social assistance 
will take the form of  food banks that will be run by the non-profit third 
sector plus private partnerships.
The equally regressive government of  Scenario 2a supported these 
proposals in principle, but noted that international donor partners 
might not endorse excessive deregulation of  the private sector and 
restricted social security protections for workers. They might also lack 
the capacity to implement graduation programmes, even while agreeing 
with the intention behind them. The government of  Scenario 1a 
disapproved of  this entire set of  proposals on ideological grounds. 
Favouring business, conditionalities, graduation and soup kitchens are 
all antithetical to the more pro-poor and rights-based orientation of  this 
progressive regime and its progressive international partners.
This exercise revealed that the fundamental determinant of  a country’s 
social protection trajectory is likely to be the nature of  that country’s 
political regime. A progressive government will be open to rights-
based approaches such as the Social Protection Floor and employment 
guarantee schemes, civil society mobilisation and accountability 
mechanisms. Low institutional capacity can be partly rectified with 
the support of  development partners, especially if  the international 
political climate is also progressive. Conversely, regressive governments 
will reject rights-based approaches in favour of  minimalist safety net 
approaches such as food banks, public works projects and limited 
conditional cash transfers. The economic and political contexts will be 
conducive to business and the private sector, and contributory social 
security for formal employees is preferred to large-scale social assistance 
programmes such as social grants.
The exercise further revealed that the role of  the international political 
regime is likely to be limited. While it may be important in creating 
an enabling environment for progressive and innovative policy design 
(through the launch of  global initiatives such as the Social Protection 
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Floor and provision of  technical assistance, for example) or acting as a 
brake on regressive interventions, it is unlikely to form a decisive factor 
in shaping national social protection landscapes.
6 Conclusion
As noted earlier, this is not a conventional study that investigated a 
research question or hypothesis in order to draw out recommendations 
for improved practice from the empirical findings. Instead we used a 
variety of  methods and tools to draw out a range of  views on possible 
future trajectories for social protection as a policy domain in low- and 
middle-income countries, and we have presented these views without 
imposing our own prejudices or a false consensus where none exists.
At the start of  the online discussion event for this project, registered 
participants were asked to vote on whether they believe that social 
protection will grow, stabilise or decline in the next five to ten years. 
Responses were overwhelmingly optimistic. No less than 87 per cent 
(63 of  72 who answered) predicted that social protection will continue 
to grow, 10 per cent thought it will stabilise at its current level, and only 
3 per cent believed that it will start to decline from its present position 
on the development policy agenda.
Key informants interviewed for this project expressed a diversity of  views 
on this question. Many shared the dominant view that social protection 
will continue to rise on national policy agendas, while others predicted 
that social protection will reach a natural plateau fairly soon. A few key 
informants reflected the minority view that social protection will decline, 
especially at the level of  the global development policy discourse.
Reinforcing the pre-discussion vote, the dominant view among the online 
participants, as well as key informants, was that social protection will 
continue to become more prominent on the development agenda in the 
next five to ten years, for both ‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side’ reasons.
On the demand side, social protection will grow because there will be a 
continual increasing need for it. Social protection can help in bridging 
inequality and reducing vulnerability. It can function as a stabilising 
force post-crisis (economic and political) and address social exclusion of  
the poorest. However, the increasing need for social protection should 
not be taken as a sign of  its success, if  it is used instrumentally as a 
‘band-aid’ for failed economic strategies and systemic failure.
On the supply side, social protection is increasingly gaining political 
support. The demand will be met because there is increasing political 
interest in supplying social protection. The last decade has seen an 
exponential growth in the number of  developing countries that are 
introducing social protection programmes. Countries like Brazil and 
Mexico in Latin America, or Rwanda and Ethiopia in Africa, have 
pioneered national social protection programmes that have served as 
models for their regions. Some countries, such as South Africa and India, 
have even integrated legal provisions for social protection into their 
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constitutions. This trend will not only continue, but it will likely move 
towards a more holistic agenda linked to the provision of  basic services, 
such as health and education, as well as to economic sectors such as 
agriculture and job creation. Political will and national ownership remain 
decisive in the evolution of  national social protection systems.
It is never easy to predict the future, but a few projections can be 
made with some degree of  confidence. Social protection will continue 
to consolidate, especially in middle-income countries, where projects 
and programmes will increasingly become components of  integrated 
systems with linkages to other social and economic sectors and 
(where appropriate) harmonised financial and technical support from 
development partners. Challenges of  affordability and extending 
coverage will persist in low-income countries – there might even be 
reversals in unfavourable economic and political contexts.
Economic shocks and political crises, whether at national, regional or 
global level, will continue to either undermine the deepening of  social 
protection systems or will motivate increasing investments in building 
systems to protect people against the consequences of  these shocks – 
this could go either way. Social protection will increasingly become a 
response to income inequality and social inequities rather than being 
driven only by poverty and demographic vulnerabilities. It is not yet 
clear whether rights-based approaches towards universal provision 
underpinned by justiciable legislation, such as the Social Protection 
Floor, will gain traction globally or only in certain countries.
The governance of  social protection will gain increasing attention, 
particularly with respect to such issues as decentralised programming, 
the role of  civil society, and bottom-up social accountability 
mechanisms. Development partners will need to redefine their role, 
probably moving away from financing social protection projects 
directly and building the evidence base on impacts, towards innovative 
approaches to technical support and building national capacities.
Ultimately, the direction that social protection takes will vary from 
country to country and will shift over time, as capacities to deliver 
fluctuate and as governments and political ideologies change. Better 
understanding of  political processes around social protection, and 
innovative approaches to building institutional capacity, are essential to 
consolidate progress and to exploit both ‘progressive’ periods and times 
of  austerity as windows of  opportunity for reshaping social protection, 
as it moves forward into its next phase.
Notes
* This article draws on Devereux, S.; Roelen, K. and Ulrichs, M.
(2015) Where Next for Social Protection?, IDS Evidence Report 124,
Brighton: IDS.
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’ 103–118 | 117
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
References
ADB (2013) The Social Protection Index – Assessing Results for Asia and the 
Pacific, Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank
Cecchini, S. and Martínez, R. (2012) Inclusive Social Protection in Latin 
America: A Comprehensive, Rights-based Approach, Santiago: United 
Nations
Cook, S. (2009) ‘Social Protection in East and Southeast Asia: A 
Regional Review’, paper prepared as part of  a Social Protection 
Scoping Study funded by the Ford Foundation, Brighton: IDS
de Haan, A. (2014) ‘The Rise of  Social Protection in Development: 
Progress, Pitfalls and Politics’, European Journal of  Development Research 
26: 311–21
Devereux, S. and Sabates-Wheeler, R. (2004) Transformative Social 
Protection, IDS Working Paper 232, Brighton: IDS
Devereux, S. and White, P. (2010) ‘Social Protection in Africa: Evidence, 
Politics and Rights’, Poverty and Public Policy 2.3: 53–77
ESCAP (2011) The Promise of  Protection: Social Protection and Development 
in Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific
Gentilini, U. and Omamo, S.W. (2011) ‘Social Protection 2.0: Exploring 
Issues, Evidence and Debates in a Globalizing World’, Food Policy 36: 
329–40
Hickey, S. (2008) ‘Conceptualising the Politics of  Social Protection in 
Africa’, in A. Barrientos and D. Hulme (eds), Social Protection for the 
Poor and Poorest: Concepts, Policies and Politics, London: Palgrave
ILO (2014) World Social Protection Report 2014/15 – Building Economic 
Recovery, Inclusive Development and Social Justice, Geneva: International 
Labour Organization
ILO (2011) Social Protection Floor for a Fair and Inclusive Globalization, 
Report of  the Advisory Group Chaired by Michelle Bachelet, 
Geneva: International Labour Organization
Niño-Zarazúa, M.; Barrientos, A.; Hulme, D. and Hickey, S. (2012) 
‘Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa: Getting the Politics Right’, 
World Development 40.1: 163–76
World Bank (2012) The World Bank 2012–2022 Social Protection and Labor 
Strategy: Resilience, Equity and Opportunity, Washington DC: World 
Bank
World Bank (2001) Social Protection Sector Strategy: From Safety Net to 
Springboard, Washington DC: World Bank
This page is intentionally left blank
Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’
118 | Devereux et al. Where Next for Social Protection?
© 2016 The Authors. IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies | DOI: 10.19088/1968-2016.159
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence, 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source 
are credited. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
The IDS Bulletin is published by Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
This article is part of IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’; the 
Introduction is also recommended reading.
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Cities, Violence and Order: 
The Challenges and Complex 
Taxonomy of Security Provision in 
Cities of Tomorrow*
Jaideep Gupte with Stephen Commins
Abstract How will security in cities be understood in the future? For whom 
will it be provided? What are the ways by which urban security provision 
will be governed? And, what impact will violence and order in cities have 
on the processes of state-building in fragile contexts in the future? This 
article reports on a foresight study that addresses these questions. A key 
finding is that there are multiple and overlapping forms of urban violence, 
and the ways these interact have important consequences for understanding 
order in future cities.
Keywords: cities, urban, violence, foresight.
1 Introduction
Cities are not only critical nodes of  governance in the global North 
and South, but also play a ‘critical role in the processes of  state 
consolidation, transformation and erosion’ (Beall, Goodfellow and 
Rodgers 2013: 1). Indeed, as Tilly (2010) argued, the changing 
relationships between cities and states can help us understand the 
centrality of  cities in such processes.
At the same time, the state is no longer regarded as the sole or 
uncontested provider of  security in cities. This is due to two key 
advances in knowledge around, firstly, how cities as a unit of  
government grew to be distinct from the nation state that is weakened 
in an ever-globalised world (see for example Schiller and Fouron 2003). 
As Friedman argues: ‘[T]he focality of  the state in identity formation 
is giving way to competing identities from indigenous, regional, and 
migratory populations. The latter has also entailed a decentralisation 
of  resources within the state… and an increasing division of  powers, 
between the state as the representative of  the nation and the subgroups 
that tend to displace it’ (Friedman 2003: 8).
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Secondly, the state is viewed as one of  several actors centrally involved 
in the processes and actions that produce and mitigate violence 
(see for example Punch 2012), alongside local, non-state and other 
sovereign groups (Muggah 2014, 2015b). In parsing out the nature 
of  state violence, the focus has therefore shifted away from a singular 
understanding of  the role of  the nation state, and moved towards 
processes of  governance (Nugent 2004) and multiple sovereignties 
(Rodgers 2006) that come together to produce outcomes of  security and 
insecurity. In turn, the diverse types of  violent encounters so produced 
only bear a superficial connection with the structures of  the nation state, 
but instead, play out in the everyday (even intimate) spaces in the city 
(Datta 2012).
The most complex of  these relationships are invariably playing out in 
the cities of  low- and middle-income countries (Muggah 2015a), where 
most of  the urban population growth in the coming three decades is set 
to take place (United Nations 2014). It is in these contexts that everyday 
lived experiences of  violence undermine the confidence of  citizens in 
government systems, directly and indirectly have a negative impact on 
livelihoods, and frequently reduce the quality and quantity of  service 
provision. Though these impacts are varied and often characterised as 
hyper-local, they do collectively shape wider discussions on governance 
and state fragility at the national scale (Commins 2010).
When it comes to the subtleties of  addressing the concerns of  how 
security will be provided in cities in the future, however, there has 
been a lack of  thinking beyond simplistic doomsday scenarios or 
utopian projections. This is reflected in what are arguably simplistic 
understandings of  order, governance and control in cities of  the 
developing world.
At one end of  this continuum are ‘feral cities’ (Norton 2010), 
characterised by a complete failure of  the state to maintain the rule of  
law, thereby being overrun by all-subsuming slums (Davis 2006). As a 
result of  their collective failures, state apparatuses at both the city and 
national levels are viewed in a non-distinguishable manner. They are 
contrasted only with a paradoxical balance between on the one hand 
informal institutions that control the city, and on the other, the greater 
international systems, such as trade and communications, that continue 
unabated to connect with the city (Bunker and Sullivan 2011). At the 
other end of  this spectrum are ‘charter cities’ (Romer 2014). Romer 
describes these as monolithic entities, newly created to be free of  the 
vested interests and inefficient rules and bureaucracies that hinder 
security, growth and development.
Aside from the two extreme characterisations, pertinent questions 
around how security in cities will be understood in the future, how 
and for whom it will be provided, and how it will be governed, remain 
largely unanswered. A growing body of  evidence showcases the 
heterogeneity of  security processes and outcomes, both within and 
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between cities (Gupte, Justino and Tranchant 2014). Notwithstanding 
these recent advances, contemporary paradigms of  urban development 
do not substantively account for the ways in which the social, political, 
economic and physical aspects of  urban form interact and shape the 
mechanics of  security provision in cities. Part of  this gap is due to the 
separation between development theory or urban planning on the one 
hand, and issues of  security, conflict and violence on the other. These 
have usually been different intellectual and programmatic domains, to 
the detriment of  a coherent approach to either analysis of  insecurity or 
effective approaches to security provision.
This has left a perceptible gap in development policy, compromising the 
manner in which we respond to urban challenges today.
2 Research questions and study design
This study was driven by three main research questions:
1 What might the challenges of  security provision in cities look like in 
the future?
2 How can development policy and practice pre-emptively respond 
today?
3 What types of  programmes should be given greater priority and 
support in the future?
The study design is illustrated in Figure 1, and included review of  the 
relevant literature and of  relevant programmes, policies and interventions 
in a selection of  cities. These reviews were conducted iteratively, fed off 
one another and informed the futures workshop. Following the futures 
workshop, a series of  consultations with key informants (KI), stakeholders 
and experts were conducted, in order to help ground the workshop 
findings in current stakeholder and donor priorities.
Figure 1 Design of cities, violence and order study
Literature review
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For the foresight workshop, a group of  urban experts and leading 
thinkers representing a broad range of  disciplinary perspectives gathered 
to identify what the drivers of  violence and order in cities might be in 
the near future. The discussion was systematised through the ‘STEEP’ 
– social, technological, economic, environmental and political (see 
Figure 4) – framework so as not to reduce the drivers to a simplistic value 
judgement, i.e. ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ or ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’. Instead, 
the drivers of  change are represented as slider-scales that can be adjusted 
to postulate how the processes of  change might function in cities in the 
future. The list of  drivers can be fine-tuned depending on local contexts.
These foresight techniques are not meant to predict the future. Rather, 
they produce potential characterisations of  future cities that can be used as 
heuristic tools to help consider the nature of  challenges in the future, and 
the types of  policy response, both today and in the future, that these might 
necessitate. This material is then supplemented with expert consultations 
across a wide range of  donors, practitioners and academic experts to 
identify key biases and blind spots in research, policy and practice.
3 Dimensions of urban form relevant for futures thinking on cities, 
violence and order
The workshop adapted a scenario-planning process with the twin aims 
of  ‘characterising what the challenges of  security provision in cities 
might look like in 2040’ and ‘formulating ideas on how development 
policy and practice can pre-emptively respond today’. The process 
was designed to generate a set of  narrative scenarios of  the city in the 
future, referred to throughout the process as ‘cityscapes’. Shocks and 
stresses could be laid over these cityscapes to ‘test’ their resilience. The 
resilience testing process would reveal weaknesses in the social, political 
and economic structure of  the cityscape. Near-term development policy 
and practice interventions could then be designed to address these 
weaknesses and mitigate future impact.
For the purposes of  this study, we conceptualised ‘violence’ and ‘order’ 
in cities as being functions of  three interconnected dimensions (D) of  
the urban form:
D1 Grid – focusing on city spaces, their layout and planning, as shaped 
by economic, political, technological, social and gendered factors.
D2 Governance – focusing on the processes and structures that form 
the institutions through which people are excluded and included; 
sociopolitical voice and participation versus marginality and exclusion; 
willingness and capacity of  state actors.
D3 Ephemerality – focusing on the shifting dynamics and identities of  
violence that are often related to the grid and governance of  the city, 
but not reducible to them.
These dimensions were conceptualised such that cities may display 
different configurations, with one or two of  the dimensions dominating 
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depending on local, temporal or spatial contexts. In the illustration 
above, the three dimensions of  urban form are shown to have elements 
that are unique to each dimension, as well as elements that fall within 
the overlap of  two, or all three, dimensions. It is important, however, to 
acknowledge upfront that this three-way articulation was not envisioned 
to be an exhaustive description of  the urban form, and was used 
more as a heuristic tool to widen the group’s thinking, rather than as a 
framework to limit the scope of  discussions.
Indeed, several alternate castings are plausible, including one that is 
interpreted through the dimensions of  Infrastructure–Governance–Contingency, 
or around Planning–Policing–Possibilities, for example, or castings that 
use fewer or more dimensions. The point of  such a heuristic tool is not 
only to systematise thinking about cities into the various dimensions, 
but importantly to push us to focus on the overlaps of  two, or more, 
dimensions. For example, the organisational set-up of  municipalities 
would pertain to the governance dimension (D2), while the role of  
non-state actors in the provision of  essential services such as water or 
neighbourhood policing would be placed in the overlap of  the governance 
and ephemerality dimensions (D2 ∩ D3). As another example, elements 
of  the city master plan, such as zoning demarcations (hawker zones, for 
instance) would be placed in the grid dimension (D1), but multiple or 
shifting uses of  public spaces (street markets during the day, places of  
congregation or prayer in the evening, for instance) would be placed at 
the intersection of  the grid and ephemerality dimensions (D1 ∩ D3).
Based on this typology, ‘violence’ and ‘order’ in the city are placed at 
the intersection of  all three dimensions (D1 ∩ D2 ∩ D3). Doing so 
Figure 2 Three dimensions of urban form – violence and order (V & O) in cities are 
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recognises that both ‘violent’ and ‘ordered’ outcomes in cities result 
from varying combinations of  elements in each of  the three dimensions. 
We will therefore use this typology to identify the elements pertaining 
to each dimension for the issues we focus on. For example, ‘everyday 
violence’ in cities could be broken into the elements shown in Figure 3.
4 Key trends
There is good reason for cities to be described as the ‘new frontier’ for 
international development (DFID 2010). Nearly two thirds of  the global 
population of  9.1 billion in 2050 is projected to be urban. This implies 
a doubling of  the global urban population from 3.3 billion currently, to 
6 billion in 2050 (United Nations 2014). While approximately half  the 
world’s urban population live in smaller towns, our focus in this study is 
maintained on the larger urban agglomerations, as well as the smaller 
towns that are projected to grow to host more than 500,000 residents. 
These growing towns and cities are key as markers for policy and 
programming interventions on violence mitigation.
We find that while some of  these growing agglomerations, such as Juba 
(South Sudan) or Buenaventura (Colombia), are already beginning 
to feature in the research agendas on violence and order, others 
such as Lubango (Angola), Herat (Afghanistan), Pokhara (Nepal) or 
Muzaffarpur (India), however, continue to be relatively hidden from 
international view. Nevertheless, these are all locations where there are 
growing concerns over violence and order, ranging from the increasing 
presence of  gang and criminal activity in Pokhara, violent evictions in 
Lubango, to social unrest and mob violence in Muzaffarpur.






management of essential 
services (by state and 
private-sector providers); 
state policing (e.g. arms 
and munitions control, 
training, strategies); 
inclusion of most at-risk, 
marginalised groups
Grid: planning of essential 
services (e.g. street lighting, 
accessibility, layout); policing  
(e.g. number of personnel  
per capita, crime rates)
Ephemerality: 
provision and  
management of essential 
services (by non-state  
actors); changing nature  
of secure/insecure spaces  
(e.g. by day/night; for  
women/men); policing/ 
security/control (by  
non-state actors)
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Violence in both urban and rural contexts is a serious threat to human 
security (UN-Habitat 2007), and disproportionately impacts those who 
are already poor and marginalised (Justino 2007). Recent research 
points to the increasingly urban geography of  violence (Buhaug and 
Urdal 2013; Raleigh 2015). This moves us beyond thinking of  urban 
violence only as a periodic segment of  war that is otherwise a rural 
phenomenon. When the violence of  war does spill into urban areas, it 
is invariably indicative of  changing strength ratios between rebels and 
government (see for example Holtermann 2014). We also know that 
violence against civilians during civil wars now occurs predominantly in 
urban areas (Raleigh 2012).
However, the types of  violence associated with war or armed conflict are 
not the only significant modalities of  urban violence. The destructive 
impacts of  criminal and everyday violence can be more acute than 
traditional war – the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) finds that ‘by far the largest aspect of  the global burden of  
armed violence is the deaths and injuries that occur in non-conflict or 
non-war settings’ (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008: 67). Of  the 
31 most fragile and conflict-affected countries today, 23 are projected 
to be significantly urban in the near future. At the same time, fatalities 
due to armed violence in non-war settings far outweigh war-related 
deaths. Much of  this violence is centred in cities. Violence, therefore, is 
increasingly a defining characteristic of  urban living in both conflict and 
non-conflict settings.
An often-cited metric for death and victimisation in the city is homicide. 
According to the most recent data available, the 20 cities with the 
highest non-war-related homicide rates were predominantly in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, with a few from sub-Saharan Africa, 
North America and Central Asia also making the list. It is also the case 
that homicide rates tend to be higher in cities.
Not highlighted by these global trends are cities where the 
inconsistencies of  national crime records prevent global comparisons. 
One glaring omission in this regard is Karachi, Pakistan, where 
‘killings’ (not specifically defined as homicides) have dramatically 
increased over the past decade, and at the same time have come to be 
concentrated in a handful of  neighbourhoods. In absolute numbers of  
killings, Karachi rates among the most dangerous cities in the world 
(Hashim 2012). Another aspect not captured in the global comparisons 
of  the highest homicide rates, are emerging situations like that of  
India, where 43,355 intentional homicides were recorded in 2012 at a 
rate of  4.5 per 100,000 people (Gupte and Muggah 2015). Criminal 
violence generates at least ten times more deaths and injuries in India 
than terrorism and conflict. In this, a comparatively small number of  
intermediate and large cities register a disproportionate amount of  
gun violence: four of  the top five most violent cities in terms of  murder 
by firearms are located in Uttar Pradesh.1 The most violent cities are 
not mega-cities, but rather mid-sized cities of  between 1 million and 
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3 million people. These mid-sized cities continue to grow rapidly and 
feature disproportionately large populations of  unemployed and under-
educated youth. They are also exhibiting severely under-resourced 
services, including public police forces.
5 Foresighting cityscapes 2040
The cityscapes developed for this study were set in the 2040s, giving a 
25-year time horizon. This time period was chosen to reflect commonly 
used high-level planning horizons (in the United Kingdom) and to go 
sufficiently beyond the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 
20302 timeline so as to complement but not get completely diverted 
by the current debate. In addition, a 25-year time horizon is tangible 
enough for the participants to grapple with and relate to, yet far enough 
into the future for change to be quite dramatic.
Using the STEEP – social, technological, economic, environmental 
and political – framework, the opening session generated input on the 
key global trends and external forces driving change and impacting 
our societies, environments and cities. Five participants were invited to 
share short presentations identifying between three and five key trends 
or external forces that, from their perspective, are driving changes in 
violence and order now, or are emerging as drivers of  future change. 
The workshop facilitators recorded and mapped the drivers onto a 
wallchart depicting the city, its transactional environment and the 
external forces affecting the core (see Figure 4).
Drivers of  change identified by the group of  experts at the futures 
workshop were mapped according to the STEEP framework and 
Figure 4 The STEEP framework overlaid onto the city and its wider environment
Source Diagram developed for the workshop by Fran Seballos (IDS) and Alun 
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according to the environment from which the driver emerged – 
external, transactional or from the city itself. Due to the specialist nature 
of  the experts’ interventions, a plenary session was facilitated to explore 
drivers beyond the city context, which may affect how individuals, 
organisations, institutions and cities function and interact in the future.
The list was by no means meant to be exhaustive, but served as a platform 
on which the following futures thinking could be based. Populating the wall 
chart as described allowed the rapid clustering of  drivers under broader 
headings. The process generated nine broad clusters of  ‘drivers of  change’:
1  Population dynamics
2  Authoritative control of  urban space
3  Changing meaning of  cities and urban living
4  Environment and resource scarcity
5  Changing economies
6  Movement (flows) of  people
7  Technological innovation
8  Complexity of  governance structures
9  Political economy of  land, (illegal) commodities and services.
The nine clusters were then visualised as ‘slider-scales’. In 
conceptualising these slider-scales, care was taken so as to not reduce 
any one to a simplistic value judgement – i.e. ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ or 
‘positive’ versus ‘negative’. Instead, the ends of  each scale signified 
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a nuanced calibration (to maximum or zero effect) of  the drivers of  
change within that cluster of  drivers of  change.
Two scales for the Technological Innovations cluster were 
conceptualised: (1) ranging from being predominantly linear and 
incremental in nature, to being rapid and disruptive; and (2) as being 
reliant on increasingly virtual interactions to being reliant on interactions 
through physical contact. Figure 5 shows a visual representation.
From these eight slider-scales, each of  four groups was allowed to select 
between two and four spectrums to provide a framework for their future 
cityscape. This was a departure from the usual process of  scenario 
development that is premised on the selection of  two ‘high impact: high 
uncertainty’ scales which are overlaid to create a quadrant giving four 
potential scenarios.
In building the cityscape frameworks, the groups had to identify which 
end of  the scale would be shaping the city, and in order to avoid group 
bias, they had to select one driver and use the opposite end of  the 
spectrum to that which they intuitively felt would be more likely. This 
rule was instigated to stop the groups building cityscapes that were 
overly influenced by their preconceptions of  what a future city may look 
like, and to ensure that a range of  future possibilities was fully explored.
Groups were then referred to the ‘three dimensions of  urban form’ – grid, 
ephemerality and governance – as a point of  reference for describing and 
articulating the interactions and dynamics between the STEEP drivers, as 
framed by each group’s chosen spectrum extremes. To help visualise the 
cityscapes, each group was encouraged to either select a known city, or 
name and locate their city – for example, a coastal city in southern Asia. 
For this workshop, this provided important context for considering issues 
such as the availability of  land for expansion, or the types of  climate 
impacts that may be experienced – for example, sea-level rise.
Once the cityscape narratives were fleshed out, the groups were 
also asked to consider the impact of  three kinds of  unmitigated and 
exogenous shocks and stresses on the interactions and dynamics 
between the actors, spaces and institutions, i.e. the worst case within the 
context of  their cityscape. The shocks and stresses were:
 l S1 Everyday insecurities – this includes those insecurities and 
vulnerabilities which do not threaten the state per se but nevertheless 
form the everyday lived experiences of  city-dwellers.
 l S2 Violence, uprisings and armed conflict – this includes protracted 
conflicts that are increasingly located in and around cities, or even if  
they are not, often have the control of  cities as their objective.
 l S3 Climate change and disasters – this includes the many small 
disasters, i.e. fires, landslides, local floods, waste flows, not just the 
headline ones.
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Thinking through the unmitigated impact of  such shocks and stresses led 
to the identification of  weaknesses in the cityscapes’ systems, institutions 
and interactions – or conversely to their strengths. Considering both 
the weaknesses and strengths, each cityscape group then took up the 
challenge of  designing interventions – policy or programmatic – that 
would mitigate (in the case of  weaknesses) or ensure management of  (in 
the case of  strengths) the shocks and stresses identified.
To show how the slider-scales might be operationalised, the following 
sub-sections present excerpts from two cityscapes as examples (see 
Gupta with Cummins 2016 for complete versions). The cityscapes are 
developed using various calibrations of  drivers of  change as markers. 
Potential policy responses, and how these might interact with the future 
city, are then identified.
Cityscape 2040: ‘Coastal collapse’3
A coastal Chinese city with a population of  10 million and a broader 
urban region of  20 million making a poly-centric, export-dominated, 
special economic zone. In 2015, it was still a successful exporter of  ‘white 
goods’ – for example, fridges, washing machines, microwaves and other 
manufactured goods to the European and North American markets. It 
had developed very fast from 1995 to 2015, but by 2040 there are serious 
signs of  strain on the economic and social model on which the city’s 
development and prosperity had depended. The city is located on the 
coast where there is a container port (which was modern in 2015, but 
will fall on harder times due to a decline in export demand), and there is 
a river. Expansion to the megalopolis of  30 million people will be rapid 
and not constrained by any geographic features (like mountain ranges). 
The main constraints will therefore be the ‘workableness’ of  the urban 
region – distance, traffic, commuting times and so on. Given that the city 
is located on the flood plain with a low-lying river delta, flooding and 
sea-level rise have been greater challenges.




Impact of  slider-scale calibration: By 2040, there was a general and 
local recession caused by a shift in large-scale manufacturing out of  
China. There was still limited demand for the type of  goods produced 
in the Chinese market as the middle class had developed (2015–35) but 
for the last five years (2035–40) even here demand slowed. Much of  the 
basic manufacture and assembly for these goods was now done in other 
Asian and African countries.
Some of  the entrepreneurial and managerial staff were able to emigrate 
and work in Africa in supervisory, planning, IT and managerial posts for 
the kind of  firms which had been producing previously in the city region. 
In a return flow of  migration, some foreign traders and a few people 
with specialist skills came from abroad to live and work in the city.
♦
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There are a lot fewer formal sector jobs. In rural areas, the informal 




Impact of  slider-scale calibration: By 2040, the Chinese political system 
had evolved, but not fundamentally altered. The Chinese Communist 
Party was still in control, but the difficulties in the economy and 
previous experience with the devolution of  some decision-making 
autonomy to city level meant that (successful) local experiments were 
welcomed. Unsuccessful experiments adversely affected career chances 
for local officials and managers – leading in extreme cases to disgrace, 
demotion and/or relocation. But so did continued inadequate economic 
performance in the city and signs of  public discontent. Citizens’ interest 
groups could organise around local issues of  service delivery, economic 
performance, and issues such as the efficiency and cleanliness of  the 
city, housing, etc. They did not have to be under Party control but were 
still not allowed to challenge the system or threaten its ‘stability’ (order) 
as defined by the Party. To do so could trigger direct reprisals and police 
intervention – even with force – for example, clearing streets by police 
action if  a demonstration ‘got out of  hand’.
The coordinated pressure for better services on the one hand, and the 
comprehensive use of  electronic surveillance technologies on the other, 
mean that there is now permanent potential for conflict. There is a 
danger that the middle class may become more insistent that the state 




Technological change Rapid/disruptive 
change
Impact of  slider-scale calibration: The period 2025–35 revolutionised the 
industrial base of  the city. Computerised, robotised and fully automated 
production processes replaced the need for less skilled labour working in 
assembly for instance. The manufacturing process was mainly centred 
on carbon compounds and new materials, not metal. 3D printing largely 
replaced the need for transport of  components and assembly. Finished 
items were much smaller and lighter. In many cases software transfer 
meant that customers could have their items locally produced in ‘3D 
print warehouses’. This meant that the large factory buildings were 
mainly standing idle – but some were adapted to other uses – broken 
up into small units used for product design, such as 3D print shops of  
various kinds and centres for manufacturing green energy technologies.
The new technology inevitably meant that there will be winners and 
losers – the main losers are likely to be lower-skilled workers and those 
working in transport.
What might be the policy response to increased tensions and violence in 
this cityscape? First, the strong citizen response to the floods, coupled with 
♦
♦
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a more responsive attitude by the authorities, creates new possibilities of  
a stronger coalition between the authorities and the wider population. 
The poorer sections of  the population insist on no evictions and no 
victimisation for those involved in activism – particularly the squatters’ 
movement. The ‘no empty space’ movement is a citizen-led coalition 
campaigning for any empty housing to be made available and for factory 
space to be used at advantageous rates for business, community groups, 
self-help training initiatives and so on. The community is also providing 
labour at subsistence wages to build up the sea defences to provide a new 
protective barrier for the poorer residential areas. The city is providing 
the rocks and cement to make this possible. Street vendors’ organisations 
succeed in their campaign for a more progressive policy and indoor space 
for regularisation of  their status. A liaison group between the traders and 
the city and police negotiates a resolution of  almost all areas of  friction in 
a tolerable and mutually acceptable way.
Second, the precarious stand-off between the authorities and certain 
sections of  the population continues. Occasional victimisation of  
prominent activists, such as leaders of  the street vendors or squatters, 
continues. Periodic ‘crackdowns’ lead to confrontation between police 
and local youth – sometimes with violence and counter-violence. 
Groups do not achieve any wider solidarity, each group has to ‘fight its 
own corner’ – leading to contestation over services and mistrust and 
competitiveness between different initiatives. There is some voluntary 
work and patchy philanthropic initiatives. The port is still functioning, 
but is of  diminishing economic importance. Within the wider city area 
(the 30-million conurbation) some new small enterprises emerge and 
some ‘urban farm’ ventures develop on a small-scale cooperative model.
Finally, the downward spiral continues. The ‘Chinese Detroit’ scenario 
threatens. City finances are non-viable – the city is effectively bankrupt 
and the state is not keen to bail it out or provide a rescue package. 
Policing and services are – step by step, without a deliberate policy or 
announcement – gradually withdrawn from the poor areas. The poorer 
sections of  the population are left to fend for themselves and these areas 
of  the city become effectively ‘no go’ areas for officials and outsiders 
from the residential areas which are not so hard hit.
Cityscape 2040: ‘Post-capital commons’4







Impact of  slider-scale calibration: Climate variability is thought to be 
highly disruptive, with serious conditions of  flooding and high levels 
of  out-of-season rainfall interspersed with heat stresses getting more 
frequent and intense with time. However, as the city itself  is not coastal, 
the climate-related shocks and stresses are perceived as ‘happening 
♦
132 | Gupte with Commins Cities, Violence and Order: The Challenges and Complex Taxonomy of Security Provision in Cities of Tomorrow
Vol. 47 No. 4 September 2016: ‘Foresight in International Development’
elsewhere’. As a result, risk management is not highly systematised 
across the city. Most efforts towards building resilience are mainstream 







Impact of  slider-scale calibration: The population can be described by 
extreme demographic differentiation and accompanied by a reduction 
in family sizes. A change in gender dynamics is perceptively evident 
with women more likely to work, given the need for dual incomes across 
most households. Smaller family units also imply fewer elderly parents 
are able to live in the same home – this marked transformation in 
domestic space is significantly different from rural settings, where larger 




Technological change Rapid/disruptive 
change
Impact of  slider-scale calibration: The city is envisaged as being shaped 
by new technologies that are disruptive to the status quo. In particular, 3D 
printing technologies have rapidly developed and revolutionised two sectors. 
Firstly, new building technologies have replaced bricks and mortar with 
3D printed materials. The technology has become widespread through 
middle- and upper-income neighbourhoods, where residents have been 
able to readily afford the expensive raw materials required to switch to this 
technology. Low-income neighbourhoods continue to use low-grade non-
permanent materials. The regulatory environment has been unable to cope 
with the ‘democratisation’ of  building technology, and this has inevitably 
led to a greater degree of  non-conformity with building regulations. Recent 
government efforts have been aimed at regulating the design files, while 
building regulations need to be enforced through code inspectors.
Second, small arms manufacturing has switched almost completely to 
using 3D printing. The open-source nature of  the design files has led to 
widespread gun ownership among civilians in all walks of  life. Control 




A collapsing dollar has triggered the Chinese to demand repayment 
of  their debt. As a result, a new Bretton Woods system has emerged 
that sets up a global consensus that the reconstruction of  spaces and 
economies is in the collective interest, and directs money towards such 
efforts. Though cities become less important, this, however, does not 
exacerbate intra-urban inequalities. A group of  global leaders articulate 
a different way of  generating and allocating resources that ‘ensure the 
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What might be the policy response to increased tensions and violence 
in this cityscape? First, the nature of  governance structures in the city 
imply that the burden of  risk management cannot be placed on any 
one single scale, but is spread across local and national actors. Investing 
in a strong evidence base early is important, as is the need to empower 
communities with access to this evidence. Substantial resources need to 
be diverted towards re-imagining the conceptual frameworks used to 
understand ‘refugees’ and ‘internally displaced’. As people get displaced 
from one city and seek refuge in another, city-based citizenship becomes 
a contested topic that requires support from research funding.
Second, technology regulation systems are key to maintaining order 
and control; however, there are differential impacts across the city. 
Innovators in design and usage of  new materials are thought-leaders 
and key influencers – so development interventions need to focus on 
including them in the process of  change. Gender dimensions continue 
to be central, not only for the differential impact of  violence, but also 
due to the gendered nature of  the relationships people have with 
technological innovations. Interventions therefore need to focus on 
creating space for both women and men to be leading innovators.
6 Conclusions
Using foresight methods, we find that there is a continuing need for 
donors to invest in more evidence-gathering and to undertake more 
detailed research on the interplay between violence and order in cities. 
This includes maintaining focus on different typologies of  violence. 
Violence might occur ‘upon cities’ (as in cities coming under siege). 
But it might also occur ‘within cities’ (where violence is located in urban 
settings, but almost by circumstance), or it may be ‘inherent to cities’ 
(where the type and modalities of  violence are specifically urban in 
nature; and even become ingrained in the everyday fabric of  urban 
life). The three levels are deeply interconnected (through cross-cutting 
themes of  gender, for instance), but they present significantly different 
challenges in terms of  entry points for violence mitigation strategies.
Another important conclusion is that ‘ordered cities’ are often 
synonymised with ‘planned’, ‘smart’, or even ‘charter’ cities. Misconceived 
planning, policy, or design interventions are likely to create insecurity, not 
reduce it. Urban order can also be repressive and exclusionary, and these 
processes can occur over very long periods of  time. As such, ‘order for 
whom?’ is the operative question that significantly impacts outcomes. In 
this sense, there is a critical gap in our understanding of  the lessons that 
the safest cities provide us in terms of  systems thinking – as opposed to 
violence preventing innovations in unsafe cities.
Both national and local governments, as well as donors and other 
stakeholders, need to rethink their tools and analytical frameworks 
to assess whether the lived experiences of  urban violence are being 
adequately taken into account. This should also extend to research, 
policy design and programme implementation. Using ‘foresighting’ can 
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help identify urban futures that are possible, probable and preferable. As 
heuristic tools, these future scenario-planning approaches are useful in 
helping to assess the nature of  future challenges, and the types of  policy 
response, both today and in the future, that these might necessitate.
The futures thinking presented in this study is relevant for mega-
cities such as Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro as they continue to change, 
but importantly also for smaller towns and cities that are projected 
to host more than 500,000 residents, particularly in fragile and 
conflict-affected countries. In either setting, experience shows that an 
approach to ‘get the economy right first’, or even focusing too much 
on national institutions of  government, without giving attention to 
local government, might create social and political fissures and create 
violence in cities. Institutional conditions and governance arrangements 
are such that they tend to exacerbate processes of  marginalisation, 
unless that is, issues of  inclusion are explicitly placed on the table.
In terms of  violence mitigation, there are tangible differences between 
‘political settlements’ and ‘peace processes’ – in many ways, the former 
is static and non-transformative, while the latter is more geared towards 
the fluid future of  cities. As we have noted, crime and violence statistics 
are useful proxy indicators of  everyday violence and fragility in cities 
because they represent social stress, failures of  state systems/legitimacy, 
and may create deeper processes beyond specific numbers (i.e. fear of  
taking certain bus lines, visiting certain neighbourhoods, or mistrust of  
other ethnic, religious and political groups).
But everyday violence and fragility also goes beyond simple statistics 
of  violence to include the ungoverned or non-state governed spaces 
that they can represent. It also includes the destabilising factors that 
urban pressure can bring to national politics, and the positive element 
that this might have on forcing greater accountability on political elites. 
One commentator refers to ‘pirate’ cities in regard to how citizens have 
created their own service systems, while another has referred to the 
‘self  service’ state.5 Both reflect the ways in which governance failures 
have an impact on local communities. The complex nature of  the 
overlap between urban and national fragility is, however, a pressing issue 
at a national and international scale as well.
Notes
* This article draws on Gupte, J. with Commins, S. (2016) Cities, Violence 
and Order: The Challenges and Complex Taxonomy of  Security Provision in Cities 
of  Tomorrow, IDS Evidence Report 175, Brighton: IDS.
1 Interview with Rajan Medhekar, Director Gender (Retd.), National 
Security Guard, India.
2 For more details, see: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
post2015/transformingourworld.
3 Group notes contributed by Roger Williamson.
4 Group notes contributed by Eric Kasper.
5 Garth Myers, written communication.
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Glossary
ACA additional central assistance
ADB Asian Development Bank
AFI African Futures Institute
ANR Agence Nationale de la Recherche [National Research Agency]
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
AT Agricultural Trends
BFAP Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy
BFP Basin Focal Project
CAP Country Assistance Planning
CCAFS Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security
CDD Community-Driven Development
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIAT International Center for Tropical Agriculture
CIRAD Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique 
pour le développement [Agricultural Research Centre for International 
Development]
CIRED Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le 
Développement [International Centre of  Research on Environment and 
Development]
CNAM Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [National 
Conservatory of  Arts and Crafts]
CoLUPSIA Collaborative land-use planning project [Indonesia]
CPCB Central Pollution Control Board
CPHEEO Central Public Health & Environmental Engineering 
Organization [India]
CSO civil society organisation
CSP Centre for Social Protection
DFID Department for International Development
DG Directorate General
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council
EEA European Environment Agency
EFC Economic and Financial Committee
EFMN European Foresight Monitoring Network
eLAC Regional Action Plan for the Information Society in Latin 
America and the Caribbean
Embrapa Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária [Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation]
EPA Environment Protection Agency
EPR extended producer responsibility
ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
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FAPRI-MU Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the 
University of  Missouri
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FFEM Fonds Français pour l’Environnemente Mondial [French Global 
Environment Facility]
FI4AR French Initiative for International Agricultural Research
FONTAGRO Regional Fund for Agricultural Technology [Latin America]
FTP Forward Thinking Platform
GCARD Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development
GCPSE Global Centre for Public Service Excellence
GEA Global Energy Assessment
GFAR Global Forum on Agricultural Research
GHG greenhouse gas
GIS geographic information system
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung [limited liability 
company, Germany]
GMO genetically modified organism
GO Global Orchestration
GovInn Centre for Studies on Governance Innovation
GPS global positioning system
GTZ Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit [German Society for 
Technical Cooperation]
HSC Horizon Scanning Centre
IAASTD International Assessment of  Agricultural Knowledge, Science 
and Technology for Development
IAF Institute for Alternative Futures
ICT information and communications technology
IDDRI Institut du développement durable et des relations 
internationales [Institute for Sustainable Development and 
International Relations] 
IDS Institute of  Development Studies
IEA Institute of  Economic Affairs
IFs International Futures
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IFTF Institute for the Future
IHEST Institut des hautes études pour la science et la technologie 
[Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology]
ILAC Institutional Learning and Change
ILO International Labour Organization
ILRI International Livestock Research Institute
INGO international non-governmental organisation
INR Indian rupee
INRA Institut national de la recherche agronomique [National Institute 
for Agricultural Research]
IPEA Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada [Institute for Applied 
Economic Research]
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISNAR International Service for National Agricultural Research
ISS Institute for Security Studies
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JNNURM Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
KI key informant(s)
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
LCS Low Carbon Society
MA Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MICROCON Micro Level Analysis of  Violent Conflict
MoD Ministry of  Defence
MoUD Ministry of  Urban Development
MSW municipal solid waste
MSWM municipal solid waste management
NGO non-governmental organisation
NPM New Public Management
NSPP National Social Protection Policy
NSPS National Social Protection Strategy
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PARME Partnership and Research in the Caribbean
PBL Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving [Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency]
PEACH Political Economy Analysis of  Climate Change Policies
SAMAQQ Sécurité alimentaire en Méditerranée à l’horizon 2030: 
aspects qualitatifs et quantitatifs [Food Security in the Mediterranean: 
Qualitative and Quantitative Aspects]
SASP South Africa Scenario Planning
SCAF Simulação de Cenários Agrícolas Futuros [Future Agriculture 
Scenario Simulation Project]
SCAR Standing Committee on Agricultural Research
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SID Society for International Development
SOFI State of  the Future Index
STEEP(LE) social, technological, economic, environmental, political 
(legal, ethical)
STEPS Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways to 
Sustainability
SUAS Swedish University of  Agricultural Sciences [Sveriges 
Lantbruksuniversitet (SLU)]
SWAC Sahel and West Africa Club
TEAGASC Irish Agriculture and Food Development Authority
TFLAC Technology Foresight Programme for Latin America and the 
Caribbean
UCLA University of  California, Los Angeles
UKCDS UK Collaborative on Development Sciences
ULB urban local body
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
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UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USAID United States Agency for International Development
V & O violence and order
WARDA West Africa Rice Development Association
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